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The worldwide crisis in the financial markets and the evident failure of cross-border
regulatory mechanisms has once again raised the issue of global governance. The
crisis hit a nerve centre of our globally integrated system, and the worldwide conse-
quences show clearly that only a global approach to policy that comprehensively
integrates regional solutions can effectively battle crises.
But the call for increased and coordinated international cooperation goes beyond
the financial markets. The question of global governance takes the nature of existing
international structures and approaches to regulatory mechanisms into account. On
a national level, governance is based upon closely integrating political, economic and
social systems. Policies designed to take account of this approach ensure a sustaina-
ble and stable framework within which each actor plays their role.
National governance systems have changed in the world of globalisation. In part they
appear to be substantially weakened; the state’s capability to assert itself is reduced.
The world is shrinking – politics, economies and societies are moving closer together.
These facts require an international governance system. For the Konrad-Adenauer-
Stiftung, this call is closely linked to the concept of Social Market Economy encom-
passing a free market with a strong regulatory framework at its core. Likewise at the
global level, solidarity and freedom must be combined in such a way that takes the
common good into account.
There is more to the issue of global governance than political and economic structu-
res. A necessary question is which fundamental values form the basis for countries
to cooperate and engage internationally. Which guiding principles should apply to the
economy and the financial world in the future? Which values should shape the world
that we want to live in? What concepts should guide international cooperation? In
our view, the Social Market Economy model can here, too, provide a point of refe-
rence. The human being stands at its centre – this central tenet is where politics,
the economy and society must jointly begin their efforts.
Beyond the necessary short-term interventions long-term solutions that will demon-
strate sustainability have to be considered. This requires trusting and cooperative
relationships with reliable partners. The debate on global structures and how to
strengthen them, meanwhile, must engage important regional centres. Common
viewpoints must be explored in a closely-knit dialogue. In addition, knowing the inte-
rests and positions of the negotiating partners is essential if one is to obtain endu-
ring compromises.
The present publication gathers reports and analyses on the G5 countries of Brazil, China,
India, Mexico and South Africa. They examine how these important emerging powers are
positioning themselves on issues of global economic and political governance, the possibi-
lities of an international social order, as well as questions on the system of values that
guide these countries in their actions. The contributors from the G5 countries give their
point of view on already existing structures and the kinds of reform required.1
The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung is present and active in the G5 countries with seven foreign
offices, where it has its own national and regional programs. We will use this network
to expand the discussion of issues of global governance in politics and civil society in
these important emerging countries, and to further intensify their dialogue with Europe
on these topics.




1| The arguments and opinions expressed in the papers are those of the authors. They cannot be




THE POSITIONING OF EMERGING POWERS IN THE
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE SYSTEM
4With global interdependence and technological innovation steadily on the rise,
globalisation is accelerating as well. At the same time, the number of problems and
challenges which can no longer be solved nationally or regionally has also increased:
climate change, international terrorism, cross-border criminality, energy security and
a sustainable trade policy are just a few examples. The devastating consequences of
the current financial crisis worldwide highlight in particular the mutual interdepen-
dence of international relationships.
These developments are taking place amid profound shifts within the balance of global
power. A substantial change is under way in the international order established after
World War II, with the rise of new dynamic centres of power. Large emerging nations
such as Brazil, China and India have so far profited the most from globalisation. They
have been able to bring their comparative advantages to bear within the highly intercon-
nected production and trade systems that exist worldwide. The term globalisation can
no longer be considered separate from the growing economic importance of the South.
In the meantime, traditional powers – in particular the United States – have been
weakened in their ability to act abroad. The unipolar moment under the leadership of
the United States has passed; the financial crisis and the protracted involvement of
the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan seem to prove it. The rise of the South has under-
mined the dominating role played by European and North American countries within
the global system. New poles develop and as regional powers they often play a
significant role at the global level as well. These developments, along with a growing
interdependence, make the need for effective cooperation on a global scale all the
more urgent.
THE NEW ROLE OF EMERGING COUNTRIES
The end of the Cold War offered the big emerging countries new development opportu-
nities. The international role assigned to the countries known as the G5 – Brazil, China,
India, Mexico and South Africa – is no longer simply defined by the size of their eco-
nomies and growth rates. What matters are broader facets of global influence: how
active they are in international bodies and forums; the international repercussions of
their environmental and social problems; their influence on regional political stability
and security. These countries have gained substantial amounts of expertise, self-
confidence and real power in the foreign policy arena.
INTRODUCTION
TURNING GLOBAL POWER SHIFTS INTO OPPORTUNITIES FOR COOPERATION
Susanna Vogt
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Berlin
5One must also take into account the geographic and therefore geo-strategic impor-
tance of the large emerging countries. The sheer size of these countries – they have
to be considered country continents – gives them substantial regional leverage. The
countries have realised this regional leadership role and are developing their own set
of policies for their periphery. This is another way in which the traditional centres of
power in the West are losing their international influence. Furthermore, the emerging
powers are gaining demographic clout as the population drops in industrialised nations.
The relative youth of the population of many emerging countries represents a great
development opportunity. The economic development of these countries has given
rise to a significant middle class, which over the long term will affect the country’s
economic and political situation.
Thanks to their distinctive development paths, the emerging powers can serve as a bridge
between developing and industrialised countries. Many newly industrialising countries are
already committed to development cooperation, even if they still frequently receive inter-
national assistance of their own. For some, this role can also be strategically impor-
tant: their status as an emerging power means access to and having a voice in the
forums of the developing countries. That, for example, partially explains China’s lack
of interest in joining the G8, perceived as merely a club of rich industrialised nations.
Despite the generally positive developments of the last two decades, the big emerging
nations still face major domestic political challenges. Substantial dynamism, galloping
growth and solid competitiveness in selected markets occur alongside endemic poverty,
major income inequality, insufficient infrastructure, regional imbalances within these
countries, ethnic tensions and major environmental challenges. Thus the development
priorities of many emerging countries are improved productivity, better education,
technological innovation and job creation.
INCREASING COOPERATION
Emerging countries are increasingly important on the global stage – in both positive
and negative ways – and that poses a challenge for the traditional Western centres
of power. A period of international power transition can be highly charged and can
escalate into confrontation. After all, the appearance of rising powers on the one
hand implies the existence of declining powers on the other. To head off potential
conflict, a new mode of reliable international cooperation is required to reach con-
sensus on the pressing questions of global governance. Compromises are required –
despite the difficult situation that sees an increasing number of actors in very diffe-
rent stages of development and their attendant yet divergent priorities.
The fundamental crisis caused by the global meltdown of the financial markets appears
to have strengthened the resolve towards international cooperation. This in turn has
created opportunities for a new kind of global governance. Enhanced cooperation also
provides an opportunity for new international alliances and new responsibility sharing
to solve global problems.
NEED FOR REFORM
The debate over reforming the global governance structures is not new. The inter-
national community responded clearly to the devastation caused by two World Wars
with the creation of the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions – the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). But the dramatic increase of global
6integration has long overtaken the parallel process of institutional cooperation. Inter-
national institutions are making hardly any progress towards strengthening their
role in the international balance of power. For some time, questions have arisen over
whether international organisations are able to act and if global governance structures
work. Criticism has been levelled at an inefficient decision-making process as well as
the lack of concrete results of international agreements. Furthermore, questions
must be asked about the legitimacy of these organisations given the rise of multiple
new players on the global stage – who however enjoy only limited influence on the
decisions international institutions make. One example is how the positions of World
Bank President and IMF Managing Director are traditionally split up between Europe
and the United States.
The financial crisis has led to calls for new institutions responsible for effective
economic and financial cooperation. But since creating new institutions is extremely
difficult, reform of the global governance structures should be based upon what
already exists. Starting points can be found within the organisations themselves,
and traditionally overlooked institutions should also regain enhanced importance
in the search for effective problem solving. One example is the UN’s Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC), which has come up in discussions over the current crisis.
A reformed ECOSOC could assume a legitimate role as a world economic council.
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) could become
more involved in the dialogue between industrialised and emerging countries.
Existing structures are open to change and adjustment to a new global reality. But in
the end, the will to change has to come from the member states of the organisations
themselves. New and influential players must get more involved in the organisations
and be encouraged to speak out – thus better reflecting the economic and political-
strategic situation we live in today. Such a move must include concrete steps towards
reform and will force Western nations that profit from the status quo to give up their
privileged positions.
THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF INFORMAL FORUMS
Given the reform backlog within international organisations, informal global bodies
have played an increasingly important role in recent years. Among those with an
expanded role are forums such as the G8 and the G20.
The G8 was founded as the G6 in 1975 to coordinate the economic policies of the
world’s biggest economies, with the founding nations Germany, France, Great Britain,
Italy, Japan and the United States. Canada joined in 1976, and Russia became a
member in 1998. Initially, the grouping mainly focused on monetary policy issues.
But heads of state and government meeting at the G8 summits, as well as the respon-
sible ministers, increasingly turned their attention to foreign and security policy issues
as well as the environment. Since the end of the 1990s, the topics addressed by the
G8 has expanded to international economic, political and societal challenges brought
on by globalisation.
G8 decisions usually prove politically binding and have a lasting effect on the inter-
national agenda setting. They lay the groundwork for positions, which can then be
presented with one voice in multilateral institutions. But a legitimacy issue has arisen
over the selection of member states because, despite global developments, none of
the emerging nations has a voice within the G8.
7To make up for this deficit, Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel initiated the Heiligen-
damm Dialogue Process during Germany’s G8 presidency. For the time being limited
to two years, the process institutionalises an exchange of ideas between the emer-
ging nations of Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa and the G8 countries.
This exchange takes place continuously at the working level at the OECD, which
provides the platform for the dialogue. The exchange is topic-oriented, and focuses
on promoting alignment and establishing consensus over mutually beneficial cross-
border investment; innovation and intellectual property rights; energy and climate
change; and development especially in Africa. The results of this dialogue are due
to be presented in 2009 during the Italian presidency of the G8.
The G20 also plays an ever-expanding role in addressing global issues. The group
was founded in 1999 as a forum for informal dialogue between the finance ministers
and the central bank presidents from emerging and industrialised countries to help
coordinate their international economic and monetary policies. Aside from the G8
and G5 countries, the G20 counts as members Argentina, Australia, Indonesia, South
Korea, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. The EU, the IMF and the World Bank are also repre-
sented. Altogether, the members make up some 90 per cent of the global economic
output, 80 per cent of world trade and two-thirds of the world’s population.
The G8 and G20 are part of an informal governance structure that allows for quick,
operative and effective alignment among member states. Proof can be found in the
G20 global financial summit called in response to the international financial crisis.
The informal alignment that occurred in the run up to the gathering increased the
potential for more effective cooperation within official structures, groupings and
organisations. These global governance arenas also reflect a trend towards a new
pattern of behaviour in international cooperation. States are increasingly developing
coalitions and networks on concrete topics and issues, which are ad-hoc and issue-
based, shifting alliances. This enables them to make allowances for the complex web
of interests and new power structures in the world. Fixed alliances – in particular
those of an ideological nature – are becoming less influential. Interestingly enough,
the goals of the newly formed alliances are often contradictory and many initiatives
duplicate each other. The danger of a selective multilateralism through an unstruc-
tured participation in too many cooperative structures – which can be considered as
a kind of forum „shopping“ – exists. This development significantly increases the
complexity of international relations.
Heiligendamm 2007: the G8 meeting with the G5
8SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION
A further effect of the shift in the international balance of power is a significant increa-
se in the ties among countries in the South, making them simultaneously less depen-
dent on OECD nations. Trade among emerging countries has skyrocketed in recent
years; direct investments have jumped from $2 billion in the mid 1980s to $65 billion
in 2005, mainly thanks to large multinational companies from emerging nations such
as India’s Tata group or Mittal Steel, Mexico’s Cemex or Petrobras from Brazil.
In addition, active cooperation among the countries of the South plays an important
role. The general public first took note of this development during the ministerial
meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Cancun in 2003. There, some of
the most important emerging and developing countries formed a grouping under the
leadership of Brazil and India, which also called itself the G20. Among other issues,
the G20 presented a unified approach to the liberalisation of agricultural markets, thus
significantly influencing the agenda of the ministerial meeting, which ended without
agreement. A new negotiating partner with substantial power to block decisions had
formed. It was a self-confident partner – often under the leadership of G5 countries
– that also asserted itself within other organisations and situations.
Brazil, India and South Africa are trying to increase cooperation on issues like trade
and agriculture, along with transportation, health and defence, as part of the IBSA
Forum that formed in 2003. The democratic nature of these three emerging powers
is stressed as a base for cooperation within the IBSA framework and as criteria for the
selection of other members, as a way, for example, to set themselves apart from
China.
The alliances established by emerging countries themselves can be distinguished from
concepts developed from the outside. One is the concept of BRIC countries developed
by investment bank Goldman Sachs in 2001. It highlights the future importance of
Brazil, Russia, India and China as emerging economies. Another such group is the
G5, which the G8 developed as a way to improve dialogue. At the outset, these
forums were little more than loosely defined groups of designated countries. But the
forums soon underwent a type of consolidation. For example, BRIC countries drew
up a joint declaration on security, development and climate change issues at their
meeting in Yekaterinburg in May 2008. During the G8 summit in Hokkaido in 2008,
meanwhile, the G5 was no longer just a loose affiliation of countries with which to
hold discussions – it, too, put out its own joint declaration.
Even in these forums, however, the question must be raised whether the composition
of the groups makes them any more legitimate or effective. The G5 operates like a
North within the South, but whether it can be an effective leader of the South is que-
stionable, as is whether the South acknowledges the regional influence of G5 mem-
bers. Regional cooperation will continue to provide many answers to globalisation in
the future. An ideal approach would be the expansion of regional networks along with
the strengthening of global structures. But to what extent can South Africa, for exam-
ple, truly represent the African continent and its interests at the international level?
On many topics, G5 members also have clearly diverging interests. Their views on
such issues as the political system, economic integration, the societal model and the
demographics of a country are very heterogeneous. As a consequence, members
9pursue their own agendas on those topics, while rivalry exists within the G5 in other
areas. One obvious example concerns efforts to secure a permanent seat on the UN
Security Council where the big regional players are serious competitors with each
other. Mexico and Brazil, as well as India and China compete when it comes to play-
ing a regional leadership role and influencing the countries on their periphery – thus
regularly undermining cooperation efforts. The fine line between partnership and
competition is defined by the specific issue at stake and the appropriate negotiation
alliance.
GROWTH AND RESPONSIBILITY
Expectations are high as emerging countries become more integrated into global
governance structures. They need to contribute in a constructive and responsible
manner to the resolution of global issues. Their increasing power requires them to
become responsible stakeholders acting beyond their purely national interests on
matters of international cooperation, to be part of solutions that contribute to the
common good. Those countries must be willing to delegate a part of their national
sovereignty to supranational instances, and, as they gain in influence, shift from the
role of rule taker to active rule maker. With influence comes responsibility.
For the time being, domestic priorities still primarily shape the international agenda
of emerging countries. In negotiations over critical economic and environmental
issues, the countries often fall back on their wording of a common but differentiated
responsibility and their option of defensive development.
The need for each country to find ways to support further economic development at
home cannot stand in the way of the necessary solutions for, for instance, the reduc-
tion of greenhouse gases or world trade issues. Such solutions need to receive sup-
port from all influential actors in line with their global responsibilities. A free rider
attitude would otherwise lead to global upheaval. At the same time, one must bear
in mind the extent to which emerging countries can actually contribute to solving
problems. Their effective participation in dealing with global issues is limited by their
substantial domestic challenges. This dilemma will continue to restrict constructive
global cooperation between industrialised and emerging countries.
Under whose leadership cooperation efforts will occur in the future is another proble-
matic question. Despite the current weakness of the United States, a great deal of hope
is being pinned on the new US President Barack Obama. For instance he announced
that the United States would again step up cooperation with the United Nations, which
could lead to new worldwide integration efforts. But the G5, in a multipolar world,
might also move into positions of leadership. The traditional great powers should get
involved in this process early on so as to remain part of the dialogue.
Countries with Western values and standards have so far largely shaped global
governance institutions. Democracy and market economy have been the unshake-
able pillars of international cooperation. But alternative development models now
exist, one such example being the Chinese approach. The goals of the global gover-
nance institutions will change with the increased integration of actors from the Global
South. Which values and guiding principles will shape global governance in the future?
How and where can one reach consensus over values; how can it be supported?
Or is there a threat of a value-free competition between the most influential countries?
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Until now the emerging countries have not made their positions clear on such
questions. What kind of goals are they pursuing with their growing international
involvement? What kind of demands and constructive ideas are the emerging powers
putting forth in the development of a multipolar world order? The countries’ medium-
and long-term strategic positions are so far still underdeveloped, which also hinders
finding a basis for joint global cooperation.
A JOINT BEGINNING TO A NEW ERA
The established industrialised countries have long supported the countries of the
South in their development, and continue to do so to this day. Thanks largely to
globalisation, the growing economic importance of some of these countries has now
become highly relevant for the further development of global governance structures.
The strategic orientation of countries such as Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South
Africa with regard to global challenges as well as their increasingly independent-
minded foreign policy will have a significant impact in the future.
This is however not reflected yet in the clout currently enjoyed by the large emer-
ging countries in the existing international organisations and informal global gover-
nance forums. This shortcoming carries with it the risk that the emerging powers will
choose the path of South-South cooperation, using a series of shifting alliances to
develop their own approaches towards global influence and coordination.
In their own self-interest, the established Western powers should seek stepped-up
dialogue on equal footing with emerging countries. To win the emerging powers over
to a more effective multilateralism, one must know and understand their positions.
While divergences and rivalries are inevitable, they must be overcome to find a reso-
lution to global problems that reflects the common good. Emerging countries would
also be at a disadvantage should they shun a coordinated approach with the esta-
blished powers. Only joint action can lead quickly and efficiently to positive results for
all. Global governance will in the future increasingly be shaped by the ability for a
host of different actors with diverging interests to coordinate their policies. We stand
at the beginning of a new era. The sooner both the established and emerging powers
adapt to this new situation, and jointly agree on a new set of rules, the smoother




 During the last two decades Brazil has consolidated a new and stronger type of relationship
with both the developed and the developing world. The country has discarded its former inward-
looking approach and moderated its former protectionist posture in trade and industry. In its
 place, it has adopted a positive, outgoing attitude towards growth and development albeit
 preserving its main options in trade and development policies, in general favourable to special
and differential treatment for developing countries.
 In the case of trade and investment flows, Brazil has expanded its links with other developing
and emerging countries, becoming itself an investor in neighboring countries and promoting trade
agreements with partners in the South.
 Lula da Silva’s presidential activism focused on intensifying South-South exchanges while
 reinforcing and broadening Mercosur to form the basis of a unified economic and political space 
in Latin America. However, although the recently launched UNASUR´s goal is full integration, there
is no clear mechanism for real trade liberalisation among its members. Besides, South American
countries still have diverging views on integration, with the new „Bolivarian way” presenting a
real challenge for Brazilian leadership in the region.
 Brazil has always favoured a multilateral approach to global economic governance. The country
is an early and active participant in multilateral bodies, such as the Bretton Woods institutions
and GATT. It defends a reorganisation of those institutions aiming to strengthen its own influen-
ce, and that of the other emerging countries in their decision-making process. Those countries
wish to receive grants to finance critical infrastructure development projects and to protect them
against speculative financial crisis.
 Brazil has become a real protagonist in multilateral trade negotiations. As a leader of WTO’s G20,
Brazil – together with India – has been invited to closed-door consultations with developed coun-
tries. Brazil’s agenda is aggressive in agriculture and defensive in industrial goods and services in
correspondence with its clear comparative advantages. G20 demands better access to the develo-
ped countries’ markets pushing for the reform and elimination of agriculture-distorting production
and export subsidies.
BRAZIL
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
UniCEUB – Centro Universitário de Brasília, Brasilia
Denise Gregory
Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (CEBRI), Rio de Janeiro
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 Brazil experienced an export boom during the height
of the world economic growth, from 2002 to 2008; its
exchange reserves stand at US$ 200 billion and equal
the total foreign debt; foreign direct investment almost
doubled in 2007 (US$ 37.4 billion, against US$ 18.8
 billion in 2006), and has now reached investment grade.
Furthermore, Brazilian firms, mainly private, are quickly
internationalising their activities and investments. They
invested US$ 27 billion abroad in 2006, making Brazil
a net exporter of capital for the first time.
 Brazil strongly supports multilateralism and UN
collective action as the best ways to provide for global
political governance. The country stresses its traditio-
nal adherence to the international law principles of
non-interference in other countries, domestic affairs,
and of searching for pacific solutions to interstate
controversies.
 Brazil has always been an active UN participant and
one of the most frequent non-permanent UNSC mem-
bers. Since the beginning of its government in 2003,
Lula has intensively campaigned for Brazilian UNSC
candidacy, so far without success. Although Brazil has
taken part in many UN Peace-Keeping operations, it
has never engaged itself in a Peace-Making initiative
of the UNSC.
 The IBSA Forum (India, Brazil, South Africa) initiated
in 2003, is one of the most cherished by Lula’s govern -
ment. IBSA intends to articulate common positions to
build up consensus on specific issues and push for
changes in the global trading as well as UN system.
There are several working groups operating on a vast
thematic ranging from environment, education to
 health and energy.
 In order to give globalisation a more human face,
Brazil argues that non-economic values have to be
taken into account. Social justice is seen as a question
of redistributing power, resources and technologies
among participants in a new world order of solidarity.
Existing asymmetries require action on the social
roots of those injustices. Multilateral and bilateral
 cooperation have to focus on social investments.
 Brazil has recently engaged in an ambitious global
initiative aiming to secure innovative financing mecha-
nisms to reduce hunger and extreme poverty around
the world, but especially in Africa. But these face the
recurrent problem of implementation and poor manage-
ment. Results so far have been restricted to a coordi-
nation center for the distribution of Anti-Aids drugs in
Africa, based on voluntary contributions. The country
has been a donor of official development assistance
with a modest but increasing contribution. Brazil
 favours trilateral schemes, including the provision of
Brazilian technical services with financing by third
countries or agencies. Cooperation has focused on a
selected number of partners in South America, and 
in the Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa.
 Due to its professional and highly skilled diplomacy,
Brazil is capable of exercising a true leadership in
both regional and multilateral instances. However,
Brazil has limited  resources, economic and military
means, to exert full leadership.
 Regional integration and the construction of an
 integrated political and economic South American
space depend on the ability of Brazil to build confidence
among its neighbours. Current challenges are coming
from the „Bolivarian” activists, who adopt non-market
and anti-capitalist approaches towards  integration.
 All international market variables – trade, invest-
ment and financial flows – are favourable to Brazil.
Most questions on the Brazilian foreign agenda are
essentially those of domestic economic policy. The
country has homework to do in order to prepare its
engagement in a new phase of growth and sustaina-
ble development. The list of tasks include: tax and
 labour reforms, improvement of its judicial system, 
a complete restructuring of the educational system,
and massive investment in logistical factors. Brazil
has to continue to moderatly open its economy to
promote a greater integration into global economic
interdependence. Current Brazilian political leadership
is hesitating to implement the global agenda.
 Brazil has experienced modest growth rates, parti-
cularly when compared with the other emerging eco-
nomies. The country has shown reduced capacity for
saving and investing due to a distorted tax system
and a high and increasing  level of public government
expenditures.
 The challenge posed to Brazil resides in its capacity
to sustain an adequate rate of economic growth, com-
pounded with necessary structural changes/reforms,
productivity gains and market competitiveness.
 It is important to differentiate Brazil from the other
G5 countries: obedience to a set of principles and
loyalty to international values is a differentiating
 factor. In particular, the defence and promotion of
democracy, the respect of international rules, human
rights and a structured, dynamic market economy.
14
THE WORLD SCENARIO AND BRAZIL
During the almost two decades since the beginning 
of its adjustment, reform and stabilisation processes
of the early nineties, and despite the financial crises in
between, Brazil has consolidated a new, stronger type
of relationship with the world economy. Notwithstan-
ding the reluctance in some sectors of its political and
economic elite, Brazil has discarded its former inward-
looking approach and its protectionist posture in trade
and industry, and adopted a positive outgoing attitude
towards growth and development. In the foreign poli-
cy realm, there is a renewed capacity to act as a posi-
tive power broker in South America and, thanks to its
highly qualified professional diplomacy, the country
has reaffirmed its cooperative stance in the framework
of contemporary multilateralism, easily recognised in
its natural leadership of WTO trade negotiations.
Most importantly, during the last two decades Brazil
has oriented its political values and economic ‘philo-
sophy’ much closer to a pattern typical of OECD coun-
tries than was the case up to the big economic changes
of the 1990s and early 2000s
1
. This implies that there
could be a common agenda in terms of macroeconomic
policies – monetary, fiscal, investments and trade flows
– with its main partners in the advanced economies
and big emerging countries alike. Together with other
rapidly emerging economies in the developing world,
such as China, India, South Africa, Mexico, South
 Korea and many others, Brazil is actively looking to
set the pace and to format the profile of a future inter-
dependent world economy, combining the virtues of
global capitalism and the  redistributive potential of
moderate state interven tion.
Attempts to enlarge the G8 (at least politically) with
new partners that have relative weight in these spheres,
the so-called G5-countries Brazil, China, India, Mexico,
and South Africa, represent an initial recognition that
global coordination cannot be ensured on a small scale.
All these countries, with the exception of Mexico, have
come to depend less on the North and more on each
other, which explains the explosion of South-South
investment and trade flows, a move that Brazil has
been actively seeking since 2003. Brazil entirely
agrees with the initiatives aimed at enlargement of
the G8 (at least politically) to include new partners
that have relative weight in the spheres of economic
policy coordination, strategic security and the joint
administration of common global issues (environment,
global epidemics and transnational crimes). Brazil
acknowledges that the G5 represent an initial recogni -
tion that global coordination cannot be ensured on a
small scale.
Future projections for economic growth in Brazil are
mostly positive and point to a new dynamism that
might lead Brazil and some other emerging econo-
mies to a position of relative prominence in the world
economy over the next two or three decades. The
growing relative weight of these new economies con-
tributes to: (i) diversification of the basis for growth;
(ii) extension of goods and services flows in the world
economy; (iii) expansion of investment and financial
flows in new geographic and political dimensions; (iv)
new economic counter-cycles; and (v) dilution of focal
crises and assurance that the costs of eventual adjust-
ments can be more evenly distributed.
Brazil is steadily improving the economic basis for its
integration into this new scenario. In the political and
security spheres, Brazil can also contribute to the
 improvement of the regional strategic scenario, since
it helps to reduce tension points and potential friction
among South American neighbours. As a consequen-
ce, informal meetings and consultative mechanisms
among them intensify the dialogue on the interests 
of these powers in the global and regional spheres.
As a traditional exporter of agricultural commodities,
Brazil has attained some degree of economic develop-
ment by virtue of the industrial substitution process,
but it has also opened its economy to the influxes 
of the global economy in the last two decades of the
20th century. Similar developments occurred with
 other major developing economies. Yet, despite much
progress accomplished throughout the 20th century 
in industry, agriculture and the scientific establish-
ment, Brazil has not reached high levels of technolo-
gical development in the same manner, for instance,
as others rapidly developing nations, such as Japan
or, nowadays, South Korea. Brazil has, nevertheless,
increased its integration into the world economy,
coming from low levels of the foreign trade compo-
nent of GDP to almost a quarter of it created in exter-
nal exchanges, although this is still far less than the
world average rate.
Each of the G5 countries has differentiated assets 
and weaknesses. If the criteria used by OECD for the
assessment of a membership request can be conside-
red valid for the exercise launched at Heiligendamm,
namely market economy, political democracy and
 respect for human rights, the five countries could
 receive differentiated punctuation in each item. Brazil
is a country that could receive a positive assessment
in most of the criteria, with the partial exception of
the critical treatment of human rights protection in
some areas, mainly landless peasants in the agricul-
tural frontier and poor people living in favelas domi-
nated by criminal gangs. Brazil’s adherence to demo-
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cratic principles is nowadays unquestionable, although
the quality of its public institutions needs improve-
ment, because of extensive corruption and red tape.
Brazil also has solid capitalist structures, even though
they are distorted in part because of the strong tra di -
tion of state interventionism and unilateral market
 regulation by the government.
Brazil occupies a singular position, not necessarily
unique, but specific, within the contemporary system
of international relations. It is certainly a ‘country-
continent’ that, in exploratory analyses, can be classi-
fied in the category of ‘monster-countries’, as George
Kennan once referred to the other giants like the
USA, Russia, and China, or even ‘anchor countries’,
as German political sociology prefers to call them
Ankerländer. This type of political characterisation
is certainly ambiguous, since the primary dimension
of the population data and the physical size of the
territory do not always correspond to proportional
 importance in international relations or in the global
economy, as in the case of China during a specific
 period of the twentieth century, or as in the case of
Russia at the end of that century. In the case of Brazil,
one can say that its diplomatic capacity and political
influence are proportionally higher than its share in
the world GDP or its part of the global financial flows
or the total trade in goods and services.
Among these major players who are emerging or are
already known as big powers, Brazil is presumably
 destined to play a prominent role in the changing
 scenarios of global governance. Among the G5, Brazil
is the most culturally homogeneous nation, endowed
with rich natural resources and biodiversity, with
long-held market economic rules and institutions,
and, probably, with a unique economy capable of
playing an enhanced role in the transition from an
 oil-based carbon emission productive system toward
a renewable and sustainable world energy provider,
through biofuels. Brazil is also a non-nuclear state,
together with South Africa and Mexico. Brazil is part,
with Mexico, of the Tlatelolco Treaty, which aims to
promote denuclearization of Latin America, and has
promoted the UN Resolution on a South Atlantic
Peaceful Zone, to which South Africa has adhered.
President Lula da Silva came to power in 2003 aiming
to gain more international space for Brazil, engaging
its diplomacy in many negotiating fronts at the same
time, either at multilateral, regional or bilateral levels.
His goal is not only to gain international prestige for
Brazil, but also to make diplomacy serve the cause 
of national development. This ‘instrumentalisation’ 
of Brazilian diplomacy is not new: historically, this
 political vision, which regards the functionality of its
diplomacy as linked to the developmental process 
of the country, has been a long-enduring feature of
 diplomatic policies designed by the Itamaraty (as the
Brazilian foreign ministry is called), and has been
described by more than one author as a ‘diplomacy 
of development’2.
GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE
The decision-making process of cooperative regulation
of international economic relations is clearly domina-
ted by big partners. This is the case of the financial
schemes defined in Bretton Woods, and the same 
can be said of the provisional application of GATT. 
In these two fields of international cooperation, the
decision-making process was not multilateral, and the
agreements achieved tended to reflect the existing
power relationships.
The financial institutions as well tend to reproduce,
with few adaptations, the decision-making pattern
adopted in their constitutive phases, with a clear over-
representation of small European countries at the
 expense of emerging economies and major developing
countries. The IMF has been successful in providing
emergency relief and in specific cases structural
 adjustment assistance. Nevertheless, it also tended 
to impose the same patterns of public policies, which
in some circumstances resulted, in high costs to the
economies that called for its assistance.
Brazil is an early participant in the major institutions
of international economic interdependence, most
 notably the Bretton Woods organisations and GATT.
Although it was a typical ‘developmentalist’, protec-
In the megacities of the emerging countries many people live
under poorest conditions.
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tionist developing country during most of the forma -
tive years of those institutions, Brazil took an active
part in the successive multilateral trade rounds with 
a focus on the special needs of developing countries,
as summarised in the most favourable treatment and
non-reciprocity clauses3.
On the financial assistance side, Brazil has historically
maintained a good relationship with the World Bank
and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), even
though Brazil’s own National Development Bank (BNDES)
nowadays has proportionally more resources than
these two institutions. Brazil now enjoys full access 
to other sources of foreign capital. The country’s rela-
tionship with the IMF was a more troubled one, due
to Brazil’s need for emergency relief as recently as
2002, and a record of many adjustment programmes
in the past. More recently, an impressive rise in the
country’s exports reduced its financial vulnerability,
with total exchange reserves in excess of its external
liabilities. The current financial crisis, still unfolding,
presents nevertheless many challenges for Brazil, as
trade surplus are being drastically reduced and exter-
nal credits have become scarce.
Brazil has always had little normative power within
the Bretton Woods institutions. Nevertheless, espe -
cially in the trade agenda, it took advantage of the
relative open rules that governed, and still govern,
 international economic relations during the last half-
century. Brazil’s participation in international trade
flows has always been modest, around 1.1 per cent 
of the world exports for the last four decades. Acting
sometimes as a free rider, Brazil requested access to
developed-country markets, without necessarily provi-
ding an equivalent opening. Moreover, in the financial
field it absorbed external savings but maintained strict
control over capital flows, so as to keep the balance 
of payments afloat. Some of Brazil’s greatest develop-
ment projects, such as the Itaipu hydropower dam,
were financed by the private financial market, with
high costs to the national treasury. Today, there is 
no lack of private financing for infrastructure develop-
ment, but a deficiency in management capacity to run
big projects. That capacity has been seriously impai-
red inside the government, due to poor coordination
among state agencies.
Regional and Multilateral  Engagement
The economic opening and the trade liberalisation 
of the 1990s contributed more to the modernisation
of the Brazilian productive system than the ‘develop-
mentalist’ projects of the earlier decades4. Neverthe-
less, Brazil still hesitates between regional and multi-
lateral strategies of international economic integrati-
on, since each of them has different costs and specific
opportunities: the costs can be created by the classical
trade and investments deviation associated with regio-
nal integration, and a continued inward approach to
trade liberalisation. This approach is connected to the
neighbours’ markets. Opportunities are linked to multi-
lateral expansion of foreign trade, where Brazil expects
to gain new market access for its modern agricultural
sector. At the same time, this may lead to severe
competition in the industrial domain, especially from
the new dynamic trade players from Asia-Pacific.
Brazil is indeed aggressive in agriculture and defen -
sive in industrial goods and services, corresponding 
to its clear comparative advantages. Notwithstanding,
Brazil is still reluctant to open its national productive
system. The current administration is committed to 
a policy of ‘defensive development’, i.e., the right to
maintain policy space for future economic diversifica-
tion. This position reflects some of the past ‘develop-
mentalist’ era, which was considered positive during
the vogue of substitutive industrialisation.
As a result of economic opening and trade liberalisati-
on of the early 1990s, productivity gains accelerated.
This trend was further strengthened by the wave of
privatisation and constitutional reforms launched by
president Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002).
Some private companies (Gerdau, Marco Polo, Sadia,
Friboi) and many former state companies (Embraer
and Vale, among others) acquired a new sense of their
importance outside the domestic market and decided
to go global, undertaking acquisitions and starting
new businesses on a worldwide scale. Many of them
were upgraded in the lists of global companies, until
then a status almost reserved to the giant state oil
company Petrobras. In 2006, those firms invested
US$ 27 billion abroad, making Brazil a net exporter 
of capital for the first time in its economic history.
The ongoing crises can impair the capacity of those
big Brazilian companies to finance themselves hinde-
ring the prospects of new share issues and mergers
and acquisitions abroad as planned by some of them.
Also, there will be a probable drop in the investment
plans of multinational companies in Brazil.
Leadership in the Trade Agenda
Recently, Brazil increased its involvement in the coope-
rative regulation of international economic relations by
developing a clever leadership in the trade agenda,
which gives it more influence on decision-making
 mechanisms of the WTO. Brazil’s higher profile in trade
negotiations at the WTO has been exercised through
17
leadership of G205 in the Doha Round. G20. Although
more consensual in its ‘offensive agenda’ (against
protectionism and subsidies in rich countries) than 
in its ‘defensive agenda’ (the dismantling of its own
protectionist devices in industrial, services and farm
policies), Brazil became a real protagonist in multila-
teral trade negotiations, and was perceived in Brazilian
society as capable of generating significant results.
The real leadership is provided by India and Brazil,
with China assuming a more timid posture6.
Strong Diplomacy
Traditionally, Brazil has consistently proposed reforms
in international economic institutions, including the
formal and informal bodies responsible for so-called
‘technology transfer’, that is, intellectual property,
today shared between WIPO and WTO. The purpose
of these initiatives has been to increase the weight
and voice of developing countries in the decision-
 making processes, and to expand resource allocation
and technical assistance. Brazil’s growing role in the
agenda of discussions certainly corresponds to its spe-
cific weight in the world economy, as well as to its
active professional diplomacy.
Brazilian diplomats, by using their technical training
and being present in several forums, are capable of
applying their activism and thus compensating for the
country’s small relevance in terms of goods and ser-
vices flows, and financial and technological exchanges.
This activism, which comprises many initiatives at
world level (such as President Lula’s anti-hunger pro-
gramme), interregional summits (like those organised
between South American, African and Arab countries)
and public health efforts (anti-HIV/AIDS cooperation),
has been highlighted in Lula’s administration which
seeks to confirm a prominent role for Brazil in the
 regional and world context. This has been achieved
to a certain degree, including non-economic fields, for
instance in the leadership of the UN mission in Haiti7.
In order to achieve sustainable development in the
international economic-trading system, Brazil defends
the fulfilment of the Doha liberalising agenda and WTO
panels’ decisions on a review in intellectual property
chapters that are, according to its current poli tical-
 diplomatic view, incompatible with technological  develop -
ment or primary national objectives. Difficulties experi-
enced, or less than ideal results achieved in the Doha
Round, could represent a setback for Brazil, which 
expects some level of market access for its vibrant
agribusiness export companies. The postponement of
the multilateral trade negotiations pushes Brazil to try
new arrangements for market  access. But Mercosur’s
coordinating mechanisms are faltering, due to diver-
ging views among its members towards further libe-
ralisation. Full adhesion of „Bolivarian” Venezuela into
the South American regional scheme will probably not
improve the current situation.
Reform Agenda from the Brazilian Perspective
Brazil also defends a reorganisation of the Bretton
Woods financial institutions. The developing countries
wish to receive grants to finance critical infrastructure
projects and protect themselves against speculative
financial crises. These initiatives reflect a paradigm
shift in Brazilian decision-makers and society as a
whole: from a spectator stance to an aspiring active
participant in changing global rules and influencing
the international system, translated into some effec -
tive initiatives. Together with the other BRICs, Russia,
China and India, and other emerging countries, Brazil
expects to strengthen its influence in the decision-
making process of those institutions, making them
more reflective of today’s world economic reality.
Brazil defended the enlargement of both the G8 and
of the Financial Stability Forum, during the recent
G20 (Finance) meeting, in Washington, in November
2008, to encompass those twenty members.
Brazilian initiatives in favour of reforming old, multila-
teral, economic and political institutions are presented
by their proponents as a search for a change in the
world power axis, supposedly to reinforce polycen-
trism in the world order as opposed to the unilate -
ralism of the superpower, in the direction of a new
international trade geography. This new geography
 proposal would focus on the intensification of South-
South exchanges, with the negotiation of preferential
trade agreements between Third World countries.
Southern Activism
Nevertheless, there has been criticism in Brazil with
very few concrete results coming from those nego -
tiations8. Mercosul concluded a few fixed preferential
trade agreements, but in tariff cuts they were very
 limited in scope and coverage. The Mercosul-India
Agreement covers only 450 products and the Agree-
ment with the Southern African Customs Union (SACU)
only 958 products. No agreement has been reached
in the negotiations with the European Union. With
Mexico, Brazil deepened the existing complementarity
agreement, basically in the automotive  sector. The
hemispheric project for a Free Trade of the Americas
(FTAA) did not stand high within the ranking of Lula’s
foreign policy priorities. It was perceived as a project
pushed by the United States that threatened Merco-
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sul’s unity. FTAA negotiations came to a standstill 
in 2004. The initiative is practically dead, also due 
to the unwillingness of the US Congress to reduce
sectoral protectionism. Even in the absence of a
multilateral liberalization scheme, it was not possible
for Brazil to negotiate a preferential trade agreement
with its most important partner, and it was not only
due to Mercosur’s exclusive arrangements. Most
 important differences among the two partners were
to be found in the Brazilian willingness to limit the
agreement to a market access scheme, and in the  
US preference for a broader arrangement, covering
services, investments and intellectual property matters.
Brazil’s Southern activism, however, is not directed
against the North. In fact, Brazil seeks selective alli-
ances with developed countries on some issues, such
as the efforts toward the reform of the UN Charter
and the enlargement of the Security Council (where 
a G4 was established, together with Germany, Japan
and India). Most of the time, Brazil’s diplomatic acti-
vism is directed toward reinforcing the presence and
power of ‘peripheral countries’ in the core system. 
It could be a reformist agenda if those emerging and
developing countries were able to mobilise a sufficient
coalition force with the same objectives, so as to pro-
mote a substantive change in both form and substan-
ce in these institutions. Since there is no concentra-
ted alternative power, there are parallel initiatives, 
in varied coalitions with periphery partners, to build
up pressure channels against the North.
Examples of such initiatives are the aforementioned
G20; the IBSA process9; the Summits or high-level
meetings among South American countries together
with Arab and African countries; the BRIC coordina -
tion forum; and the Community of South-American
Nations (CASA)10, replaced by Unasul. The formal
constitution of a BRIC diplomatic group in May 2008
(at a ministerial meeting held at Yekaterinenburg,
Russia); and the project of becoming the focal point
of an integrated economic space in South America,
are new challenges facing the Brazilian diplomatic elite.
All those endeavours require great capacity of policy
coordination among various partners. In December 2008,
Brazil promoted a Latin American-Caribbean leaders
Summit, during which Cuba was formally  accepted in
some regional institutions, like The Group of Rio coordi-
nation mechanism for political issues.
The Banco del Sur (Bancosur), or Bank of the South,
is also based on the idea of building institutions exclu-
sively for developing countries. Bancosur, which is not
yet in force, was proposed by Venezuela’s president,
and Brazil adhered to it only in order not to leave
Hugo Chávez with a free hand in South America11. Also,
in trade negotiations, Brazil has been much tougher
towards rich countries, for instance in refusing to
make concessions in its defensive stances and asking
aggressively for market opening for its competitive
exports, than it has been in bilateral approaches toward
Argentina, China,  Russia or less developed countries,
to whom it made many unilateral concessions. Many
of those initiatives, especially towards less developed
neighbours in South America, are explicitly labelled as
‘diplomacy of generosity’ which, despite its character
of enlightened self-interest on behalf of the long-term
interests of Brazilian industry, follows much more of
an ideolo gical approach than a pragmatic one.
Brazil also participates in initiatives that involve deve-
loped countries in the economic sphere, as for instan-
ce the financial G20, which has an agenda somewhat
similar to that of the Financial Stability Forum, a
smaller coordinating group which could be replaced
by the G20, according to Brazil. It is important to high -
light Brazil’s effort, together with the US and other
developed countries, in ad vancing the acceptance of
biofuels in general, and of ethanol as a gasoline additive
in particular. This  objective comprises a definition of




In the trade front, Brazil is struggling to eliminate the
protectionnist barriers erected by US and EU against
its sugar-cane ethanol, with no success up to now.
Another important chapter in global economic inter-
dependence is the issue of foreign direct investment.
Despite remarkable advances in the last two decades,
in terms of new institutions to guide growing world
economic interdependence, there are as yet no multi-
lateral rules for foreign investment, for instance. This
is undoubtedly one of the most notorious gaps in the
multilateral economic system. Capital-exporting coun-
tries have established bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) or voluntary adhesion rules that widely libera -
lise these flows, in agreement with their national treat-
ment provision (but only valid between them, as in
the existing OECD codes).
Brazil, which has historically been a recipient of foreign
direct investment, signed more than a dozen of these
bilateral instruments, but put none of them into force.
The main reason for that was the government’s fear
that they could reduce Brazilian capacity to regulate
public policies and curtail space for national deve lop -
ment strategies. Overall, despite the new confi guration
of the global economy with the emergence of dyna-
mic emerging countries, Brazilian economic  diplomacy
shows little enthusiasm for a wider libera lisation in the
WTO, and maintains a defensive agenda, especially in
its less competitive sectors, such as  services, high-
technology industry, investments and intellectual
property. Brazil and other developing countries fear
that this may result in the deepening of existing
asymmetries.
The ‘graduation’ agenda, that is, the dismantling of
preferential treatment for the most dynamic emerging
countries, as proposed by the developed ones, re -
quires an equivalent offer from developing countries
by reducing their own barriers to trade in industrial
goods, services and investments. According to rich
countries, emerging economies have to offset the
 reduction in agricultural protectionism, subsidies and
market access. For many developing countries, the
asymmetries are typical distortions created by unre-
stricted markets which can only be compensated by
appropriate sectoral public policies, generally indus trial
and ‘import substitution’ protectionist trade policies.
In the past Brazil had relative success in its substitu -
tive policies, which mobilised those same instruments.
Nevertheless, at a certain stage of its development
process, the same policies that had been  responsible
for the rise of its industrial capacity, together with exter -
nal shocks and with serious imba lances in the fiscal
side, led to the stagnation of the country’s economic
growth. Excessive protectionism caused distortions
both in production and distribution, as well as several
weaknesses in the external competitiveness of Brazilian
industry.
All along its industrialisation process, Brazil has
 insisted on policies that have clear distorting effects
on the industrial sector and negative social impact.
One of them is its persistent adherence to old practices, 
such as preferential treatment for developing countries,
which has insulated its industry from competitive pres-
sures. The so-called structural asymmetries could be
seen as an opportunity for integrating these countries
into the  international system, rather than a barrier 
to such  integration. The asymmetries are, to some
extent, comparative advantages, such as low-cost
labour  force, and can be used, in a world characteri-
sed by high mobility of factors of production, at all
levels and  directions. Out-sourcing and off-shoring
phenomena represent two aspects of processes with
intense  relocation of production, which are strongly
 benefiting countries like China and India. While these
countries decided to integrate themselves more acti-
vely in the current dynamics of global capitalism,
 Brazil has been slow in following those trends.
GLOBAL POLITICAL GOVERNANCE
Brazilian involvement with global political governance
has, first and foremost, a regional dimension. Latin
America is a region untouched by great conflicts, and
Brazil intends to keep it that way. After the classical
years of ideological alignment during the Cold War,
free from any major conflict except for the Cuban
 crisis of 1962, Brazil has no interest in a new arms
race in Latin America (that could be promoted by
some new candidates to caudillo’s). Since the return
of democracy in the mid-1980s, Brazil has been
 engaged in the promotion of the democratic evolu -
tion of the continent and its geographic integration12.
Indeed, Brazilian diplomacy has deployed great
 efforts towards fulfilling this agenda of regional inte -
gration, economic and political cooperation. Fernando
Henrique Cardoso was especially active by making
Brazil the coordinator of the ‘guarantor-countries
 mechanism’ in the peace process between Peru and
Ecuador. Indeed, between 1995 and 1998 the two
countries negotiated the peaceful settlement of a
 territorial conflict that had lasted for over a century.
The same diplomatic activism was deployed during
political crises in Paraguay and Bolivia, avoiding a
break up of their democratic institutions or a return
of the military to power. A ‘democratic clause’ was
conceived and implemented within Mercosul. Lula, 
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for his part, has helped to defuse potential crises in
Venezuela and Bolivia, and clashes between Colombia,
Ecuador and Venezuela, arising from the presence of
guerrilla camps on their borders. Brazil commands
the UN Stabilization Force in Haiti (Minustah), which
is seen as the main Brazilian contribution to interna-
tional stability, as it involves much more than the use
of raw power and lays great emphasis on social and
economic reconstruction of that country.
The major challenge to peace in the region seems to
be the anachronistic problem of narco-guerillas, which
is in fact entangled with organised crime. For this rea-
son, it is closer to a police problem than to a strategic
security matter. The relative peace in Latin America,
that is, the absence of noticeable interstate and intra-
state conflicts (despite aboriginal movements in some
countries and, therefore, a potential cause of national
fragmentation), should contribute to the low level of
military expenditures in the region. But the refusal by
national military forces, including Brazil’s, to assume
a role in tracking drug dealers may lead to the ex-
pansion of instability created by the narco-guerillas,
which threatens to contaminate the political system
and ‘invade’ the cities (if it has not yet done so).
Ambitions for UN Security  Council Membership
Since the original framing of the United Nations
 Charter in 1945, Brazil has not succeeded in its am -
bitious project of joining the UN Security Council
(UNSC) as a permanent member, a situation echoing
its former frustrated candidacy to the Council of the
League of Nations in 1926. Nevertheless, Brazil has
always been an active participant in UNSC delibe ra tions,
as well as one of its most frequent non-permanent
members; accordingly, it has taken part in many
peace-keeping operations. However, there has never
been a  decision in favour of participating in peace-
making operations, for political and constitutional
reasons. However, this is feasible, since domestic
opinion- makers, namely the military and diplomats,
clearly endorse the establishment of such a project
for Brazil to reach world leadership.
The UNSC candidacy gained a new impetus after the
re-democratisation of Brazil in 1985, when president
José Sarney addressed the UN General Assembly in
1989 and confirmed the intention, without necessarily
demanding the concession of the veto right. Antici -
pating predictable objections to this intention among
some of its neighbours, Brazil did not present its
candidacy as an expression of the ‘regional will’,
 although the discussion of the regional representation
issue would be inevitable. Although it has campaigned
intensively in favour of its candidacy since the begin-
ning of Lula’s government in 2003, Brazil has not 
yet seen its aspiration fulfilled. When might this be?
This is difficult to say, taking into account not only the
question of regional representation but also the diver-
ging views among the current five permanent mem-
bers. Perhaps they all tend towards a single  undeclared
stance: a complete lack of interest in  enlarging the
UNSC by even a few new permanent members.
In support of its natural candidacy to the UNSC,  Brazil
highlights its historical adherence to political multila-
teralism. Diplomatic doctrine and practices show its
strict adherence to international law principles of
non-interference in other countries’ domestic affairs,
and an orientation favourable to peaceful  solutions 
in interstate controversies. Such legalism could be
con sidered excessive, but it may also reflect a deficit
of objective material conditions for Brazil’s external
power projection, as well as the lack of  domestic
support for external military undertakings. These
 factors explain Brazil’s strong defence of the UN’s
 legitimacy in solving any conflict between states, as
well as its belief in the collective security mechanism
as the sole acceptable resource for dispute  settlement
among states. In summary, no initiative should be
 taken against or in absence of UN resolu tions, which
are considered the equivalent of inter national law.
Traditional UN mechanisms are, however, considered
inappropriate to deal with such global issues as un-
derdevelopment and collective security. The General
Assembly decision-making process and the Security
Council structure have not followed changes in the
global economic order, and did not accommodate the
developing world agenda. Brazil defends multilatera-
lism, but with more affirmative policies regarding new
challenges like terrorism, climate change, energy secu -
rity, renewable energies and combating hunger, an
agenda that requires the developing countries’ inte-
rests to be addressed. Affirmative policies are concei-
ved by the new Brazilian leadership as actions direc-
ted at the roots of the perceived problems, e.g. social
injustice, poverty, inequalities, and so on, rather than
at their mere consequences13.
There is little academic reflection in Brazil dealing
with UN issues and its Security Council concerning
 effective means for promoting peace, security and 
the legitimate use of force in international relations.
Military studies about the UN’s effectiveness tend 
to focus on the evaluation of its material capacity,
while diplomatic statements prefer to highlight the
desirable democratisation of the UNSC through the
expan sion of the number of its permanent members,
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in  other words through the inclusion of Brazil. There 
are few studies containing proposals to provide the
UN with adequate military tools, besides the tradi -
tional instruments and peace-keeping mechanisms.
In matters of world political governance, Brazil tends
to adhere to the existing cooperation schemes, such
as the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
and its specialised agencies which focus on global 
or sectoral aspects of social and economic develop-
ment. The country also tends to highlight the ‘social’
roots of any threat to peace and security, and pro -
poses justice and development as almost universal
means of solving conflicts14. In sum, multilateralism
and collective action by the UN are emphasised as the
best ways to provide for global governance,  without
disregarding regional cooperation. Informal dialogue
schemes, as ad hoc groups, are considered useful, but
not as legitimate substitutes for multilateral forums.
Informal Cooperation Mechanisms
Brazilian diplomacy has shown real activism, together
with South Africa and India, as seen in the proposal
for an IBSA coalition. This initiative is one of the most
cherished by the current administration, and the Foreign
Ministry has invested a lot of resources – diplomatic,
financial, technical cooperation – in a variety of areas
(cultural, educational, social, scientific and technolo -
gical, productive and industrial), which include sum-
mit-level meetings and the tentative coordi nation of
political objectives of the three countries on multilate-
ral issues, such as peace and security, trade and deve-
lopment. They have expressed the urgent need for
the developing world to articulate a coherent agenda
and to take a collective approach to global governan-
ce, particularly the reform of the UN, the UNSC and
the Bretton Woods financial institutions. IBSA intends
to articulate common positions on issues such as cli-
mate change, especially the principle of common, but
differentiated responsibilities and  respected capabi -
lities. Current modalities of cooperation include spe-
cialised ministerial meetings, as well as 14 thematic
working groups on a vast prospective agenda: agri-
culture, health, energy, labour, education, environ-
ment, and even joint military exercises15.
In parallel, Brazil agreed with Russia’s plan to trans-
form the BRIC concept into a real diplomatic action.
Several informal consultations have been held at
 foreign ministers’ level, in order to institutionalise it
as a new coalition16, which materialised in May 2008.
Russia hosted the first formal meeting of the BRIC’s
foreign ministers, to be repeated annually at the
margin of the UN General Assembly. Another BRIC
Summit will be held Russia (Moscow, in July 2009).
Real diplomatic gains here are clearly with Brazil, as
Russia, China and India already have a real share of
world power, due to their nuclear status and greater
relevance in the global economy.
Current Brazilian diplomacy also favours ad hoc initia-
tives aimed at selected partners in the Third World.
Innovative partnerships have been established in order
to create an axis of cooperation for a new political
and economic international geography. For example,
IBSA has made technical cooperation commitments 
to benefit third parties such as the Palestine National
Authority, and poor countries like Haiti or East Timor.
The dialogue forums between South America, Arab
and African countries also aim to go beyond trade, 
investment or private joint ventures, in order to en-
compass governmental technical cooperation, social,
educational, and  political objectives.
Following the first official visit of a Brazilian president
to the Middle East, the South American and Arab
Countries Summit of 2005 called for more bi-regional
cooperation to promote trade opportunities, ethnic
and religious tolerance, a more profound engagement
in multilateral discussions concerning Middle East
conflicts, and strengthening South-South cooperation.
Relations with China and India have been intensified,
particularly in outer space and biofuels cooperation,
where they are complementary to the Brazilian econo-
my. The list of projects already initiated or in the pipe-
line is quite impressive, with many working groups
discussing bilateral endeavours in agriculture, energy
and other fields. As yet, there is no independent eva-
luation of the costs and benefits of all these initiati-
ves, which may involve considerable resources in
light of the limited Brazilian budget for cooperation.
Capacities of Leadership
Brazil is capable of exercising a degree of leadership
in some of the issues on the multilateral agenda,
 focusing on economic fields, such as the multilateral
trade negotiations, rather than on financial, techno -
logical, peace or security issues. Regarding the latter,
Brazil has less leverage to act on its own and prefers
to join UN initiatives in peace-keeping operations,
 rather than in peace-making, as in the case of Brazil
commanding the United Nations Stabilization Mission
in Haiti (MINUSTAH), launched in 2004.
In respect of South America, the first priority in
 Brazilian foreign policy, effective results have been
somewhat less successful than initially expected,
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 despite considerable investments, both material and
diplomatic. Mexico, whose decision to link up with the
US at the end of the 1980s contributed to this South
American inflection of Brazilian diplomacy, is seen,
even though not officially, as a competitor for pres tige
and leadership in Latin America, as well as a  potential
opponent, together with Argentina, of the Brazilian
project to become a permanent member of the UNSC.
Instead, the relationship with Argentina, is deemed 
of the utmost importance for Brazilian diplomacy. Such
a priority has received criticism from Sao Paulo indu-
strialists, who have been confronted with unilateral
 restrictions on their exports of manufactured goods 
to the southern neighbour. The Brazilian government
tolerantly allowed Argentina to impose arbitrary safe-
guards, contrary to the principles and practices of a
customs union, which Mercosul aims to be and WTO
 rules on trade defence mechanisms. In addition to this,
the government’s tolerant response to Bolivia’s natio -
nalisation of Petrobras’ assets and investments in 
gas and oil fields aroused widespread protest. Lately,
 Brazilian diplomacy reacted more vigorously when
Ecua dorian government undertook retaliatory measures
against Brazilian companies operating in that country.
Lula’s foreign policy priority has been the strengthe-
ning of South American integration, through the
 enlargement of Mercosul to include Venezuela (and
possibly Bolivia), and make it a platform for a unified
economic and political space in the continent. Never-
theless, the Brazilian project for CASA did not go for-
ward as planned, and the recently-launched Unasul,
first proposed by Venezuela, has objectives vaguely
defined in its constituent treaty. Despite its diplomatic
efforts, Brazil was not able to redefine this in line
with the model initially desired: to be a political and
institutional base for the programmes of physical in-
tegration and trade liberalisation in the South Ameri-
can region. Although Unasul’s goal is ‘full integration’,
there is no clear mechanism for real trade liberalisa -
tion among its members, or for reciprocal economic
opening.
A Brazilian proposal to establish a South American
Defense Council was grudgingly agreed and launched
at a Summit meeting in Bahia, in December 2008; 
it should function as a consultative mechanism for
peace and stability within the Unasul framework. Brazil
sees it as an opportunity to extend its capabilities in
the military equipment and defence industries to the
whole continent, but some neighbouring countries
 express their discomfort with many demonstrations 
of Brazilian leadership in the region.
These South American initiatives, together with other
South-South actions, should work as a test case for
the exercise of a Brazilian regional leadership. In the
future, this could be extended to the global sphere, 
as an alternative to the traditional models of political
cooperation by the rich countries. The results of such
diplomatic activism still need to be independently eva-
luated, in order to separate effective gains from diplo-
matic rhetoric, which tends always to be optimistic and
unilateral in its assessments and presentations.
Among all these initiatives, it is curious to note that
current Brazilian diplomacy is not strengthening the
 relationship with the OECD, the very institution that
could facilitate and speed up Brazil’s entrance into the
current G8. Brazil has had a long relationship with the
OECD, always pursuing a gradual and cautious ap-
proach. As of today, Brazil is a full member of the or-
ganisation’s Steel Committee and an observer member
in several other committees, such as those on invest-
ment, public management, trade and agriculture. Lula’s
administration views accession to the OECD with hesi-
tation, mainly by virtue of its ‘developmentalist’ diplo-
matic position. There is the economic policy orientati-
on, aimed at securing the so-called ‘spaces for national
development policies’, that could allegedly be limited if
Brazil decided to accept the set of liberalisation codes
and protocols negotiated at the OECD. Moreover, joining
the OECD could compromise Brazil’s ability to indepen-
dently articulate its positions on North-South issues,
especially with regard to free trade and liberalisation.
And finally, it could be viewed as a political betrayal of
the South-South agenda.
Overall, Lula’s foreign policy hesitates to incorporate 
a ‘first world’ agenda in its planning: it certainly does
not intend to be seen as adhering to a ‘rich country’
structured system. Instead, it prefers to build up alter-
natives for economic and political action, according to 
a ‘reformist agenda’ for a new world order. Brazil’s
 reform proposals for Bretton Woods institutions are
 oriented towards giving more weight to the criteria in
which Brazil would respond more positively, popula tion
and GDP, instead of trade and finance; nevertheless,
the fact that Brazil has amassed large foreign exchange
reserves, in excess of its import needs or  financial ex-
ternal obligations, together with the deci sion to create 
a Brazilian Sovereign Fund, reveals its eagerness to play
a new role also in this domain. In the multilateral trade
system, Brazil repeats traditional defensive arguments,
asking for special and differential treatment to develo-
ping countries, and increased access to developed
 markets, without significant commitments in return.
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INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL ORDER
Brazilian diplomacy sees the world in the traditional
way, as divided between developed and developing
economies, with all the asymmetries that characterise
an international economic order that emerges from
unequal relationships between central, dominant nati-
ons on the one side, and peripheral countries on the
other. Although old exploitation theories or unequal
exchange theses are discredited nowadays, due to
their contradiction with actual historical reality, social
justice is still seen as a question of actively redistri-
buting power, resources and technologies among
 participants in a new, world order solidarity. Correc -
tion of existing asymmetries among countries would
require action on the social roots of those ‘injustices’.
According to those views, a new international social
 order should be built on the basis of programmes of
multilateral and bilateral cooperation aimed at redu-
cing the huge gaps in world development, with spe -
cial focus on social investments. Also, together with
many other developing countries, Brazil tends to
highlight the ‘social’ roots of any threat to peace and
security, and proposes justice and development as
almost universal  means to solve conflicts.
There are some doubts, nowadays, as to whether
 foreign aid promotes development, or whether it actu-
ally reduces the chances of a poor country to achieve
its own pattern of growth and world economic integra-
tion, based on market incentives, generally in  trade,
rather than on foreign assistance programmes. In any
case, Brazil became an industrial power as a result of
state inducements to native entrepreneurs, and free
flows of foreign investment guided by the market
 returns. Bilateral cooperation with advanced countries
concentrated chiefly on human resources training.
Brazilian diplomacy is aware that practical solutions
to development problems include the promotion of
structural changes in the economies for the expansion
of trade and investment. In order to fully integrate in
the international trade circuitry, the developing coun-
tries must have free access to the developed countries’
markets, through the elimination of defensive mecha-
nisms and distorting instruments, especially producti-
on and export subsidies, which penalise the Third World
primary good producers. Nevertheless, this agenda is
hardly accepted at multilateral level. Developed coun-
tries require compensation in terms f corresponding
market opening for services and  investments. Therefore,
continuing slow integration of developing countries in
the world economy is the most likely result. For Brazil,
it means simultaneously preserving diplomatic actions
on the South-South scale and at the regional level.
Whatever the results of those initiatives, they will
certainly contribute to the consolidation of Brazilian
diplomatic prestige vis-à-vis a broad range of part-
ners in the developing world.
This does not mean that international cooperation is
 irrelevant. Technical cooperation can be an extreme-
ly helpful contribution for the developing countries.
Nevertheless, the process of development needs a
genuine endogenous basis, so as to induce effects
that can be extended to the rest of the economy as
well as to society as a whole. A practical demonstra -
tion of the accessory nature of official development
assistance can be seen in the fact that very few deve-
loping countries have ever succeeded in effectively
leaving their ‘underdeveloped’ condition to maintain 
a sustained process of economic growth, structural
transformation and social distribution of the benefits
of growth. Indeed, there are no examples of develop-
ment based on assistance, despite the several deve-
lopment decades officially sponsored by the UN and
the huge amount of financial contributions transferred
to African countries. The very few countries that achie-
ved positive results did not ground their development
on international cooperation.
The Millennium Development Goals
The international community established a formal
commitment in 2000 with the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals (MDG), a set of eight groups of targets,
to be accomplished by 2015 and aiming towards the
reduction of poverty and social as well as gender ine-
qualities, the access to basic means of livelihood and
public provisions in health and education. However,
most poor countries will probably not achieve those
The ethanol production from sugarcane is boosting Brazil's
biofuels industry.
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goals. Problems include the lack of funding, the provi-
sion of basic medicines and of essential public services
in countries that are deficient in basic state structures.
But most important is that many of the targeted coun-
tries enter the category of ‘failed states’, while donor
countries are suffering from what could be called
 ‘donors’ fatigue’. In other words, the crisis of official
aid may not be just a matter of money or material
resources. Most recipient countries lack the minimal
requirements for governance. In Africa, many coun-
tries are almost entirely supported by international
public assistance, while the general populations
watch those  resources being partially embezzled by
elites who display very little commitment to national
development. Brazil, for its part, has already accom-
plished many of its targets, including the reduction 
of poverty to one half of existing levels, but it will pro-
bably fail in halving the income distribution inequality.
The main  obstacles to achieving the development
goals lie not in a lack of funds, but in institutional
 organisation, in Brazil and elsewhere.
Based on the domestic ‘zero hunger programme’,
 Brazilian diplomacy has recently engaged itself at the
highest level in an ambitious global initiative for redu-
cing hunger and extreme poverty, although with modest
practical results. Together with other willing countries,
including France, Spain, Chile and the Nordic coun-
tries, Brazil was seeking new ways to sustain effective
actions against world hunger and poverty: the so- called
‘innovative financing mechanisms’. Several of these
would be mandatory, such as additional taxes on air
tickets, in lieu of the famous, but inapplicable, Tobin
Tax. They also propose the same bureaucratic imple-
mentation mechanisms, through the UN and its spe-
cialised agencies17. On the basis of French proposals,
the new financial resources, many from national bud-
getary allocations, were diverted to a new UN  office
for the acquisition of anti-HIV/AIDS drugs for poor
countries.
Although the intentions are the best possible, these
projects are in many cases redundant and overlap
with other UN programmes already in force. Although
the problem of the correct management of resources
exists, there is no lack of official programmes or
 financing to fight hunger. The problem is doing ‘more
of the same’, or trying to make multilateral mobili -
sation in favour of the poorest countries feasible
through traditional lines of action. These assume, 
on the one hand, the collection of funds and, on the
other hand, their targeting to the ‘needy’. Several
economists have reduced expectations for this type 
of action that tends to reproduce the same patterns
of dependency on foreign aid.
Donor Engagement
Brazil can add the bilateral level to its multilateral
status as a contributor to the International Develop-
ment Association (IDA) of the World Bank, since it
has been a net donor of official development assi-
stance (ODA) for many years. The country has de -
veloped its cooperation mechanisms, particularly by
means of the Brazilian Agency for Cooperation (ABC),
a subordinate entity of the Ministry of External Rela -
tions. This is in addition to multilateral channels that
are used in combination with national ones, due to
budgetary scarcity. In light of its limited financial
 resources, Brazil favours trilateral schemes for coope-
ration and assistance which includes the provision 
of Brazilian technical services with financing by third
countries or agencies. Bilateral cooperation is focused
on a selected number of partners, in particular neigh -
bour countries in South America, and less-developed
Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa (the PALOPs,
including East Timor). Here, Brazil again seeks co-
operation with rich countries, so as to increase the
amount of available resources.
Social commitments also include a variety of other
 actions in international bodies, among them the
 International Labour Organization (ILO). Due to its
current trade union leadership, the Brazilian govern -
ment’s  ‘labour’ diplomacy is supporting many ILO
conventions that are controversial domestically, such
as like job stability of the work force. On the other
hand, despite strong support from labour unions for
the introduction of a social clause in international
 trade agreements, Brazilian diplomacy has restricted
the discussion to voluntary commitments in ILO
instruments. As a  result, any advances in the WTO
have been banned,  under the correct assumption
that this kind of device would be used for protec -
tionist purposes.
Another engagement front for Brazilian foreign policy
has been the discussion over the social and environ-
mental impact of the production of renewable fuels,
which has raised concerns about the effects on price
surges and availability of food products. Official diplo-
macy is trying hard to defuse a political offensive by
domestic allies and a varied group of ecologists, oil
producers and leftist opponents of the ethanol and
biofuels agrobusiness. Oddly enough, ‘social’ allies,
like those of the World Social Forum, and political
 ‘allies’, like the Cuban and Venezuelan presidents,
have taken sides with the most aggressive opponents
of biofuels. In the end, the most important Brazilian
contribution to a new world energy matrix, one that
could help to reduce social imbalances and establish 
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a new, environmentally friendly, productive basis of
renewable energy, is being opposed on the basis of
social concerns. The issue is still open.
MODELLING THE NEW WORLD ORDER:
BRAZIL’S  ROLE
Brazil has no major security concerns, which could
arise from hypothetical external menaces: there are
no challenges arising from any big power or from bor-
der disputes. Brazilian military forces do not have any
real ‘enemy’, i.e. foreign powers seeking the interna-
tionalisation of the Amazon region, terrorist attacks
against Petrobras’ offshore platforms, neighbouring
guerrillas involved in drug traffic etc., that could
justify their stronger preparation in terms of arms and
military equipment. In the absence of credible threats,
there is a possible role for them under the banner
of UN peacekeeping missions, and in peace-making
operations (which depends on conceptual changes,
including constitutional ones).
The world economic scenario was very positive during
most of the 2000s, opening excellent opportunities for
a fully capitalist country like Brazil endowed with fully
functional market institutions. The growth of  alter -
native markets for Brazil in emerging economies was
able to compensate for the sluggish trend in some old
engines, like the USA, Japan or Germany. Brazil never
pursued a socialist path like China, nor did it enter into
nationalist and intrusive state prac tices like India.
Brazil is conspicuously lacking in investments for
 infrastructure, which, up to 2008, were plentiful in the
world eco nomy. There was no lack of liquidity in the
 international financial markets, where opportunities are
linked to risk perception and high returns possibilities.
In May 2008, two leading risk-rating agencies have
upgraded Brazil to  investment grade, which streng-
thens its capacity to attract additional flows of foreign
capital. At that moment, all international market
 variables, trade, investment and financing flows, were
favourable to Brazil18. However, the deepening of the
crisis in the fall of 2008 worsened perspectives every -
where. In addition, the country still has ‘homework’ to
do in order to prepare for a new phase of growth and
sustainable development. In fact, most questions on
the Brazilian foreign agenda are essentially questions
of domestic economic policy, and this must guide the
discussion on Brazil’s role in the new world order.
Similar to the situation in most other emerging econo-
mies, Brazil’s basic problem resides in the country’s
capacity to sustain an adequate rate of economic
growth, compounded with structural changes, produc -
tivity gains, and market competitiveness. Overall world
growth rates between 2002 and 2008 were higher than
in the preceding 30 years, and emerging economies had
been growing at double or triple the world average, at
rates of 4 to 5 per cent annually in that  period. Latin
America and Brazil, unfortunately, were lagging behind,
growing at half the world rates and three times less
than dynamic emerging countries in Asia. The  lower
growth rates occurred despite the much higher commo-
dity prices of natural resource products exported by
 Latin American countries, due to a sustained  demand
from international markets. With the declining trend 
in commodity markets everywhere, overall conditions
for sustained growth rates in Brazil and most of Latin
America became suddenly erratic and doubtful.
Modest growth rates also coincided with huge availa -
bility of financial resources and risk capital, which
 raises the question of the continuous financial depen-
dency in Latin America: is the region really risk-free
in respect of new financial crises? Latin American
countries’ exchange reserves have never been so
high, at least one of the positive effects of the finan-
cial crises of the 1990s, and interest rates and spre-
ads on borrowing have attained historically low figu-
res. This was not due to a new wave of irrational exu-
berance or unsounded trust in those markets, but to
the fact that liquidity was indeed flowing high. The
reversal of fortune in late 2008 and early 2009 could
put the regional economic scenario under a double
strain: that of the downsizing of export receipts from
commodities and that of lack of new foreign invest-
ments or external credits to sustain existing projects.
Irrespective of immediate perspectives for economic
growth, what, then, could explain the low growth
 rates in Brazil and in many of its neighbours during
the boom years? Some countries that were tempora-
rily growing, like Argentina and Venezuela, were in
fact leaving previous periods of recession, or they had
been pushed by the demand side, that is to say high
government expenditures, in the case of oil revenue.
The answer, at least for Brazil, lies basically in the
low level of productive investments, either domestic
or external. In the case of Brazil, there is a clear
practice of ‘un-saving’ by the state, and an exagge -
rated ratio of public expenditures to GDP (at 38 per cent
 similar to most OECD rich countries, but with a per
capita GDP six times lower). External investments
could be higher, should the business environment
and government regulation be more positive and open
for services and „strategic sectors”. With regards 
to domestic investment, the negative factor is the
„crowding-out” effect of excessive taxation over
 entrepreneurial activity in general.
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In addition, persistent budgetary deficits limit the
possibility of sustainable growth, taking into account
the huge internal debt and high real interest rates. 
In spite of macroeconomic stability, painstakingly
achieved in the recent past and conducive to good
fundamentals in economic policy-making, there are
still risk factors, which may reduce stronger trends in
foreign capital inflows. Recent trends towards rene-
wed state control of strategic activities, such as oil
exploitation in the big, newly-discovered off-shore
fields, could impair Brazil’s desire to aspire to a big-
ger role in the future world economy, as the state
clearly has no  resources to replace foreign investors
and make all the investments needed to enhance
Brazil’s presence in an international scenario.
Exchange rates have never appreciated so greatly in
Brazil than during the boom years of 2002-2008. They
were even higher than during the exchange band pe-
riod of 1995-1998. Despite those facts, exports grew
steadily each year19, and its revenues strengthened
 foreign exchange reserves, reducing the danger of a
new external debt crisis. Nevertheless, the exchange
boom did not reverse the traditional dependency on
foreign capitals for consumption financing, due to the
more expensive domestic credit. Volatility is inherent
to the very nature of speculative capitals, but becomes
perverse only when economic policy is itself at volatile,
that is, unstable or erratic. That happened many times
in Latin America since the 1950s, mainly due to bud-
getary deficits, fiscal irresponsibility and exchange rate
manipulation. The main problems in Brazil’s macroeco-
nomic scenario are, precisely, fiscal imbalances and
high levels of interest rates, both for investments or
consumption credits.
Thus, we must accept the domestic nature of Brazi -
lian problems of low growth and ‘volatility’. But how
can we explain the growth differentials among the
BRIC countries? Let us check each of the elements
that stimulate any country’s economic growth and
 development. Brazil has plenty of vast resources of
raw materials. Abundant and low-cost energy is large-
ly available, too. Most of it is renewable, like hydro-
power and ethanol, but it also includes prospec tively
huge volumes of offshore oil and gas. There is also
enough manpower, at low-cost, albeit poorly educa-
ted. The transport and communications infrastructure
is a hindrance, as Brazil still has to invest heavily in
logistical factors. A modern capital market is present,
but not very liquid or affordable for all.  Finally, the
country has also to improve its judicial system and 
a fast arbitration mechanism for dispute settlement,
allowing for low transaction costs, stable and trans -
parent rules of the game, with minimal external influ-
ence in the public sector. In sum, Brazil has serious
deficiencies, starting with a burdensome, excessive
and complex tax system, with the intrusive presence
of the state acting as an uninvited partner in the life
of private companies, at their fiscal and bureaucratic
 interfaces.
In comparison with China or India, Brazil is still a
small player in the international economic and strate-
gic scenario, due to its modest capacity to decisively
influence any development that could impact the
world’s decision-making process. China, for instance,
has experienced an impressive rise in every important
market: manufacturing, commodity and raw-materials
consumer, especially energy, finance and technology,
not forgetting the political and military interfaces.
 India has followed closely. However, this should not
diminish Brazil’s chances of integrating a future G13,
in case of such a development in the next few years.
The retraction, both in volume and value, of its com-
modity exports, could impair the accumulation of
 foreign exchange reserves – necessary in case of an
expanded leadership in the region and elsewhere –
though not diminishing Brazil’s prospects to play a
 future greater role in the world scenario.
But the real question is whether Brazil effectively
wants to adhere to such a small club, taking into
 account all other necessary changes that must be
 introduced in respect of its current status as a deve-
loping country. Among the changes that could help
raise its economy to a new level of world integration
are, at the domestic front, tax and labour reforms,
improvements in the judicial and political apparatus,
and, above all, a complete restructuring of the educa-
tional system. On the external side, there is a pressing
need for a continued trade and foreign investment
opening, the liberalisation of capital account, going
towards currency convertibility. Leadership exercises
in South America could be just an appetizer in a big-
ger undertaking towards new world responsibilities,
but even that is contested by the other middle
powers in the region.
Brazil would have no greater role to play in world
security matters, in cases of major disruptions in
 international order, such as military conflicts, nuclear
proliferation, fundamentalist terrorism, even if it should
hold a decisive regional influence. The South Ameri-
can region is, in principle, free from major risks of
being involved in a conflict of major proportions. It
cannot,  however, be considered immune to indirect
effects of destabilising factors elsewhere, or new
forms of ten sions arising from still undetected risks.
Probable challenges are more likely to arise from or-
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ganised crime and weapons and drug smuggling than
from strategic menaces, but the real question is to
know if the national States’ security apparatus and
their armed forces are ready and prompt to respond
appropriately to those old challenges or whether the
region will continue to linger on the verge of social
disruption and political instability.
Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, for instance, the
most probable source of new menaces for Western
powers, is unlikely to take South America as its ope-
rational base, although one cannot exclude religious
proselytism and other forms of resource mobilisation
taking place among such an ethnically diverse popu-
lation. In the case of major terrorist attacks and simi-
lar risks at world level, they are to be confronted by 
a combination of intelligence and direct repression,
mainly under the command and leadership of the US.
Brazilian diplomacy has reaffirmed its preference for
political action on the ‘causes’ of terrorist menaces.
Initiatives taken in the realms of social justice, deve-
lopment cooperation and poverty alleviation could
dismiss real terrorist actions.
Overall, new opportunities for Brazilian industry, and
its modern and very dynamic agriculture, are likely to
arise in other big emerging economies. Trade flows
with some of them, such as China, are already spiral-
ling, and promise to maintain pace in the foreseeable
future. China has just become the second individual
trade partner of Brazil. Brazilian companies are inve-
sting a lot abroad, particularly in neighbouring coun-
tries. Although the pace is likely to be reduced during
the ongoing crisis, those companies have already le-
arned the way of internationalisation, and should be
prepared for future challenges in regional markets
and elsewhere. At the same time, Brazil is opening
new embassies in African countries, in order to pre-
pare for those future perspectives.
CONCLUSIONS:  GRAND ASPIRATIONS,  
BUT HOMEWORK IS STILL ON THE AGENDA
Thanks to its open-minded society and very dynamic
economy, international options remain widely open
for Brazil. The main conditions for its integration into
the global world depend much more on a set of social
and economic reforms that need to be made domesti-
cally than on any other initiative that could be taken
on the international level. In short, the best remedy
for the international enhancement of Brazilian
 presence is, and forcefully needs to be, domestic
 reform.
Brazil has a unique capacity to mobilise and activate
new partners and devise new alliances in the interna-
tional sphere. Due to its competent diplomacy, the
country has been able to exercise a true leadership 
in both regional and multilateral instances. It is true
that Brazil lacks capabilities, especially in the financial
or military aspects, in order to respond to its willing-
ness to exert greater influence abroad. Nevertheless,
it can mobilise extensive support for certain causes,
on the basis of specific commitments taken on strong
moral and legal grounds. For the accomplishment of
its main international goals, that is, gaining open mar-
kets for its competitive exports, accession to a UNSC
seat, and becoming a basis for an integrated economic
space in South America, Brazil has to develop capabili-
ties that depend solely on its own capacity to bring
about a full process of domestic reform.
A successful conclusion of multilateral and regional
trade negotiations, not only the Doha Round, is the
first requisite for economic expansion domestically
and a greater presence internationally. This outcome,
of course, does not depend uniquely on Brazil. It is 
a complex game, which combines national interests,
world economic structural trends – arising from foreign
investment, capital flows and exchange movements –
and political pressures at institutional level. Brazil is
capable of playing this game, but it has to open itself
more globally to world economic inter dependence.
The difficulty here is that Brazil, being a member 
of Mercosur, cannot negotiate independently, since
Mercosur’s trade rules and its internal differences in
terms of industrial capacity, trade and sectoral poli-
cies constrain extra-bloc negotiations. Nevertheless,
economic authorities, especially at the Central Bank,
and entrepreneurs are adjusting initiatives in that di-
rection, thus pushing for Brazil’s integration into the
world economy. Brazil’s current poli tical leadership is
lagging behind on this new track. That explains the
hesitation within the government to  accept and pro-
mote the new international agenda for Brazil, and
that agenda is globalisation.
Another issue of great interest to Brazil is the reform
of the UN Charter and the expansion of its Security
Council. Who is going to be admitted, and which re-
gional adjustments have to be made to accommodate
all interested parties? Some compromises have to be
realistically feasible, otherwise there will be no reform,
nor any enlargement of the UNSC. Brazil has been a
permanent candidate for a permanent chair, with all
the frustrations and successes of such a long-drawn
effort.
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Engagement in UN peace-keeping missions, like the
one in Haiti, was perceived as a sort of entrance ticket
to the UNSC, and tactical compromises at regional
 level would be the price to pay for that strategic vic-
tory. However, that seems not to be the case. In the
big powers’ game, political goodwill and disinterested
cooperation do not register as qualifying elements for
admission to the inner circle.
International security depends, also, on appropriate
means for the use of force, as well as political will
and capacity for making use of it. Willingness, or the
power to use force has to comply, according to Brazi-
lian traditional diplomacy, with international law and
to guarantee the respect for institutions that legiti -
mate its use in adequate circumstances. No matter
what happens to the reform process in the UN, Brazil
should acquire real capability to enter the big powers’
game. The necessary requisites for that, not conside-
ring any kind of nuclear ‘tool’, are soldiers and a
checkbook, i.e. military and financial resources. Brazil
has to prepare itself to accede to this new status,
 entirely conscious that those requisites have to be
built at home, not abroad.
Regional integration and the construction of an inte-
grated political and economic space in South America
depend, for sure, not only on material forces, but
 essentially on the ability of the Brazilian leadership 
to build confidence among its neighbours. They must
believe that Brazil is pursuing this objective, not only
for its own benefit or the desire of national grandeur,
but for the common purpose of economic and social
development, within an atmosphere of political equa-
lity and total respect for the sovereignty of other coun-
tries as well. Up to now, South American neighbours
have harboured some distrust about Brazil’s real moti-
ves to push for integration. They suspect that Brazil’s
 natural inclination to seek national interests could
 possibly be disguised as ‘common aspirations’.
In fact, Brazilian foreign policy objectives are entirely
legitimate and aligned with a better regional and inter-
national environment. They have been expressed in a
set of values as corresponding to their national interests.
Full ‘power’ for Brazil in the international arena is pro-
bably a distant perspective, but real objectives are
much closer. They encompass: democracy, respect for
the rule of law, promotion of human rights and of an
open economic system, assuring equal opportunities
for all, both individuals and nations. Those are the
new frontiers for the advancement of humankind and
Brazil is searching the best way to fully integrate this
new trail.
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gy under Lula. Mimeo.
9| The India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA)
is a trilateral initiative aimed at strengthening South-
South cooperation, promoting themes of mutual interest
in the international agenda, and increasing trade and in-
vestment opportunities among the three respective regi-
ons, with the purpose of alleviating poverty. The conver-
sations began at the G8 Evian meeting in 2003, followed
by trilateral consultations, and were formalised by the
Brasilia Declaration in June 2003. The first IBSA Summit
took place in Brasilia, in September 2006, and the second
one in Tshwane, South Africa, in October 2007. The
 specific areas of cooperation are agriculture, climate
change, culture, defence, education, energy,  health,
 information society, science and technology,  social deve-
lopment, trade and investment, tourism and transport.
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10| CASA stands as the bizarre acronym for the ‘Comunida-
de Sul-Americana de Nações’, or South American Com-
munity of Nations, a Brazilian diplomatic initiative laun-
ched in Peru in December 2004 as a basis for integrating
the existing trade schemes, namely Mercosur and the
Andean Community, and other South American countries
(Chile, Guyana and Suriname) and to act as technical
coordinator for infra-structure undertakings or physical
integration. After two ministerial meetings and a summit
meeting, member countries decided to replace it by
 Unasur, or Union of South-American Nations, for which 
a framework treaty was signed in May 2008 in Brasília,
with a secretariat being established in Quito, Ecuador.
11| The first proposal by President Chávez for Bancosur
mixed the functions of a stabilization fund and a lending
organisation. It had to be corrected upon Brazil’s insi-
stence. It was then structured as a development bank,
with the primary purpose of lending money to the South
American nations for financing foreign trade, infrastruc-
ture projects, productive integration and the construction
of social programmes. It will be headquartered in Cara-
cas, but it is not yet an active institution. Participating
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay,
Uruguay and Venezuela), signed its founding charter in
December 2007. Chile participates as an observer and
Colombia decided to join. Callable capital and contributi-
ons to the Bank‘s initial capital (of around US$ 7 billion)
follow the economic weight of each country, but they
have the same voting rights. All South American coun-
tries are eligible to borrow from the Bank.
12| A recent contribution to the analysis of security pro-
blems in South America can be seen in Hofmeister, 
W. (ed.) (2008): International Security: A European-
South American Dialogue. Rio de Janeiro: Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung.
13| See Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars-
 Brazil Institute (2007): New Directions in Brazilian
 Foreign relations. Washington: Brookings Institution –
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
14| Brazil once gave its approval to something similar to an
‘Economic and Social Security Council’, as proposed by
Jacques Delors, then president of the European Commission.
15| As a consequence of its increasing political importance,
IBSA has attracted the attention of both key developed
countries (which have asked for some sort of consul tation
and dialogue), as well as ‘candidates’ from the  developing
world. Mexico, Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia,  Nigeria and even
China have asked to join IBSA, ranging from observer to
full member status. The three IBSA countries have so far
agreed to strengthen the existing alliance, instead of acce-
ding to the requests for enlargement.
16| The idea of constituting a strategic alliance of the BRICs
was already expressed in Lula’s government programme.
The first informal meetings resulted from a Brazilian
 initiative, but the idea of a formal group was first raised
by the Russian foreign minister. The purpose of the
 dialogue is to foster cooperation in the areas of trade,
energy, environment and development.
17| In that sense, current Brazilian diplomacy sometimes
seems closer to the World Social Forum ideas, with
 rhetorical objections to ‘asymmetrical globalisation’, 
and very far from the lines of action discussed at the
World Economic Forum in Davos.
18| The primary fiscal surplus has remained above 4 per
cent of GDP; reserves stand at over US$ 200 billion, and
FDI into the country in 2007 almost doubled: 37.4 billion
against 18.8 billion in 2006 (99 per cent higher). The
former peak was reached in 1994, when Brazil attracted
US$ 32.8 billion due to privatization programmes. That
figure to a low of US$ 10.1 billion in 2003.
19| Since 2002, Brazil has been experiencing an export
boom, pushed by the growth of the world economy, the
huge and unprecedented world demand for commodities,
especially from China and India, and its effects on world
prices. Brazilian exports have grown almost 17 per cent
on average annually since 2000, while world exports
grew at 11 per cent. From a deficit of US$ 24.2 billion 
in 2000, the Brazilian current account jumped to US$ 40
billion surplus in 2007, an historic record. The balance 
of payments is in remarkable condition, with sustained
current account surpluses from 2003 to 2007, and ex-
change reserves amounting to its total foreign debt.
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 In terms of relative power, there should be no question that Mexico is a candidate for inclusion
within the group of emerging powers or middle powers, given its territorial dimension, demogra-
phic characteristics, economic importance, geographic location, and relative weight in the Latin
American region.
 Yet, it has rarely behaved as such, sometimes assuming a ‘reluctant middle power position’. 
As Guadalupe González argues, ‘Mexico’s internationalism and multilateralism have been erratic
at best. Mexican political leaders have only occasionally defined the country as a middle-power
with a proactive global focus.1
 This is not to say that Mexico is indifferent towards global issues. Its diplomacy has been invol-
ved in all major multilateral and global negotiations. However, Mexico has been distinguished by
its cautious diplomacy and distaste for protagonist roles. In that sense, the country behaves as
an ‘unorthodox middle power’ at best, or a ‘reluctant middle power’ at worse2. Overall, Mexico is
essentially a system-cooperative actor or a status quo middle power, in the sense that it does not
promote a radical reform of the international order, nor does it actively engage in changing the
rules of the game.
 In the following lines we should focus on the reasons that explain Mexico’s reluctance to assu-
me a larger and more active role, one that is concomitant to its place and location in world poli-
tics. Throughout the different sections here presented, we will argue that in the past two deca-
des, Mexico has experienced systemic, regional and domestic transformations that have drastical-
ly changed the strategic environments in which its foreign policy has operated.
 Those changes included the end of bipolarity, the re-emergence of regionalism in the Hemis -
phere, and the democratisation of Mexican politics. To some extent, Mexico’s ambivalence in world
affairs is largely explained by the regional and domestic constraints it faces, stemming mostly from
the strong relationship it has with the US and the ambivalence of its domestic politics.
 In analysing Mexico’s role in global governance we will make use of the biennial survey con -
ducted by CIDE in 2004 and 2006, Mexico and the World3. This survey monitors Mexicans’ opini-
ons, outlooks, values, and general attitudes towards the world. While surveys do not necessarily
reflect the official policy, they do provide data as well as a snapshot that can help analyse and
assess Mexico’s foreign policy.
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GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE
Mexico is a founding member of the International
 Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), and the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB.) Since the
1990s, it joined the World Trade Organization (WTO),
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Deve-
lopment (OECD), the Asian Pacific Economic Coope -
ration (APEC) mechanism, and signed more than 43
bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs).
Mexico also has a highly respected financial and eco-
nomic bureaucracy that has largely adhered to ortho-
dox macroeconomic policies. Many Mexicans have
held, or have aspired to, top positions in these inter-
national organisations. Antonio Ortiz-Mena, former
 Finance Minister in the 1970s, was President of the
IDB. José Angel Gurría, another former Finance Mini-
ster from the 1990s, is the current OECD Secretary
General. The current Finance Minister, Agustin Car-
stens, was the Deputy Managing Director of the IMF.
Hence, in theory, the country does have an explicitly
multilateral foreign policy to deal with economic
issues.
Furthermore, the Mexican public has largely favoura-
ble attitudes towards international economic instituti-
ons: on a scale of 0 to 100, with zero signifying ex-
tremely unfavourable feelings and 100 signifying ex-
tremely favourable feelings, Mexicans rated the World
Trade Organization at 69 in 2006, second only to the
United Nations (UN) (80) and slightly higher than the
ratings for the European Union (EU) and the Organi-
zation of American States (OAS.) Mexican opinion
 towards the International Monetary Fund is also posi-
tive. In 2004, it received a favourability score of 63,
slightly higher than the OAS, but significantly lower
than the ratings given to the UN (75).
However, Mexico has a strong bilateral economic
 relationship with its northern neighbour, the United
States (US), through institutions such as the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and it
tends to rely substantially on those bilateral instituti-
ons, too. Moreover, within the international political
economy organisations, Mexico has played a pivotal
role, not necessarily because of its initiative-oriented
position, but because it was the detonator site of two
major financial international crises in 1982 and in
1994, respectively, leading to an active intervention
of these very same international organisations. Con-
sequently, the relationship between Mexico and the
existing international economic organisations is a
 close one, but is subject to controversy, too.
Mexico’s Position on WTO and IMF
To date, Mexico is the 14th largest economy in the
world in terms of GDP, one of the largest oil produ-
cers and trading nations in the world, by far the most
important in Latin America. Currently, more than 70
per cent of its GDP derives from trade4. But Mexico is
a late-comer to the trade regime. It joined the GATT
in 1986 and became a full member of the WTO upon
its establishment in 1995.
Throughout its modern history (1945-1982), Mexico
had a closed economy, and its growth was dependent
mostly on oil exports. From the late 1940s until the
mid-1970s, the basic thrust of economic policy was
the use of high tariffs, import licensing requirements,
and foreign direct investment restrictions. A severe
downturn in 1982-1983 caused by a drastic drop in
the world price of oil and a rise in worldwide interest
rates forced Mexico to seek financial assistance from
the IMF. A second economic downturn in 1986 cou-
pled with a stock market crash and a devaluation of
the peso in 1987 and 1994 led to a second IMF inter-
vention, in which Mexico opened up its market unila-
terally, through its membership to GATT. Hence, the
relationship with the IMF and the WTO has grown
from necessity more than by choice, accompanied 
by economic crises and severe downturns.
The IMF intervention in the 1980-1990 period had
 important domestic consequences in both Mexico’s
economic institutions and its foreign policy. Perhaps
the most dramatic change was reflected in its bureau-
cratic organisation, whereby international economic
institutional relations are now coordinated and mana-
ged by mostly technocrats and economists as oppo-
sed to diplomats. While the Secretaría de Relaciones
Exteriores (or Ministry of Foreign Affairs) has a re-
sponsibility for managing Mexico’s relations with all
international organisations, leading roles are placed
by different Ministries depending on their compe-
tence.
The Banco de México (Federal Bank) and the Finance
Ministry are paramount in managing relations with
the IMF. The Ministry of Trade and Economics (also
known as Secretaría de Economía) is predominant
with the WTO. Because of the diverse nature of the
WB and IDB’s work, a variety of Ministries work in
tandem with these institutions, including the econo-
mics and finance ministries, the central bank, and 
the social development ministries. This has conse-
quences for Mexico’s foreign affairs, since its frag-
mented policy making means that the country rarely
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has a unified or homogenous position vis-à-vis eco -
nomic, trade, and financial issues. As Andrés  Rozental,
former deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs, argues:
Frequent differences arise between trade negotiators
and foreign policy operators which cannot be resolved
within a single ministerial structure and require arbi-
tration form a higher level. The problem is more acu-
te in the field, where trade offices separate from the
embassies have a tendency to operate on their own,
rather than under the overall supervision of the Fo-
reign Ministry5.
Reform Agenda from a Mexican Point of View
This does not necessarily mean that Mexico does not
favour some kind of reform within these organisati-
ons: Mexico has actively participated in international
committees charged with reforming the international
financial institutions following the Asian financial crises
and has been a leader in compliance with new data
reporting standards to the institutions. Yet, Mexico’s
behaviour in these organisations tends to be quiet
and institutional, rarely triggering international atten-
tion or promoting large coalitions for change. We refer
to this role as a system-cooperative actor.
For instance, the WB has been charging middle-
income countries higher interest rates on loans com-
pared to other lower-income countries (approximately
0.25 per cent higher.) To some extent, the WB is
 responding to the criticism, that its lending policies 
go to large middle-income countries that have access
to international capital markets rather than lending
more to the poorest countries. Mexico has opposed
these efforts to reduce WB lending to middle-income
countries, but it has done it quietly, without openly
opposing such reform.
Mexico’s opposition to such reforms stems from WB
grants via the International Finance Corporation (IFC)
that lends to private companies in developing coun-
tries. Private enterprises in Mexico have been large
beneficiaries of IFC lending. Supporting the reform of
the WB would imply that Mexico will pay less for the
social development and reform-oriented loans than 
its public sector receives from the WB itself.
The Trade Agenda
With regard to trade, Mexico’s overall aim is to con -
tribute to a more open, fair and stable international
system through the actions of the WTO, and at the
same time to ensure that the very significant gains it
has made through its FTAs are maintained. With that
goal in mind, Mexico hosted the Fifth Ministerial Con-
ference Meeting of the WTO in Cancún, in September
2003. There, it tried hard to push for launching a new
multilateral trade negotiation round, Doha; yet it fai-
led because of a stalemate between mostly developed
and developing states. Mexico has traditionally favou-
red a single undertaking given that, in its view, secto-
ral negotiations make compromise and side bargains
difficult. In terms of issues, Mexico believes that the
implementation of market access commitments in
agriculture and textiles has not translated into impro-
ved access for developing country exports; that spe-
cial and differential treatment for developing coun-
tries has not materialised in practice; and that legiti-
mate implementation difficulties by developing coun-
tries should be recognised and allowed for.
In theory, Mexico practices a multilateral policy to-
wards trade; however, in practice it relies heavily on
bilateral agreements to deal with its trade agenda. It
makes liberal use of the WTO’s permitted exception
to non-discriminatory trade policies through its net-
work of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Currently,
Mexico has free trade agreements with 43 countries;
no other country in Latin America has signed so many
of these bilateral trade commitments. In addition to
the US and Canada, Mexico’s network of agreements
stretches from Chile through Central America, to the
European Union, Japan and Israel. It is currently dis-
cussing preferential trading arrangements with South
Korea and other Asian countries. Mexico’s network of
FTA’s has helped to strengthen its position in a varie-
ty of international economic institutions and to play
an increasing leadership role in the international eco-
nomic system.
In spite of Mexico’s large network agreements and
linkage to the WTO, its trade relationships continue 
to rely heavily on the US and the NAFTA. In 1970 57
per cent of Mexican exports went to the US market;
by 2006 more than 86 per cent went to the North
American region. Hence, Mexico’s foreign trade de-
pendence and its foreign trade concentration with the
US have increased substantially. In that sense, Mexi-
co is currently much more concerned about the future
of NAFTA than it is about multilateral trade, because
there are far more stakes involved with its trade with
the US and Canada than with the rest of the world.
Declarations by US President-elect, Barack Obama,
regarding the renegotiation of NAFTA, have only in-
creased Mexico’s concerns about the future of North
American free trade. As we argued in our introducti-
on, Mexico’s role in international trade dynamics is
pretty much determined by the constraints it faces
vis-à-vis the US.
Mexico’s dependence on US trade does not mean that
Mexico is fully indifferent towards the WTO. However,
it is far less involved than Brazil in opening agricultu-
ral markets and eliminating subsidies within the WTO,
although it is greatly affected by agricultural policies,
since it is a net importer of grain and corn. Unlike
Brazil, Argentina or India, Mexico has a weak agricul-
tural sector and has unilaterally eliminated agricultu-
ral subsidies, an issue that has caused much dome-
stic tension among peasants since the 1980s, when 
it joined GATT. Most of its trade with the US takes
place in the form of services and manufactured
goods, which for the most part have been already
opened and negotiated through diverse GATT/WTO
rounds. It also imports most grains, including corn,
from its northern neighbour. Mexico is thus extremely
sensitive to US policies, because they might adversely
affect its regional and global preferences regarding
trade, even thought it believes that bilateral and mul-
tilateral trade liberalisation can be compatible.
Consequently, from this section, it is evident that Me-
xico has not shown the kind of strong internationalist
activism associated with the paradigmatic model of
emerging powers, despite its increasing integration to
the international economy. In sharp contrast to India
or Brazil, the importance of economic issues in Mexi-
co’s agenda has not integrated economic and foreign
policies, leading to increasing levels of compartmen-
talisation in the decision-making process. It is also
unclear whether Mexico uses its leverage and resour-
ces to implement an active reform role in world affairs.
For the most part, Mexico behaves like a status quo
outreach country and implements a mostly bilateral
agenda.
Alternative Regional Structures of Economic
 Governance
Alternatives to the IMF, the WB, and the IDB in Latin
America, such as Banco del Sur, are not supported by
the current Mexican government for a variety of rea-
sons. First, Banco del Sur was proposed by the Vene-
zuelan government with which Mexico has only in the
past months re-established full diplomatic relations
after a series of incidents during the previous admini-
stration. It is unlikely to enthusiastically sign on to
any project sponsored by an ideological rival with
which it has tense relations.
Second, Mexico has a relatively privileged position
within the existing international economic institutions
compared to most developing countries, including
those of Latin America. Although it would enjoy a
 relatively powerful position within any regional orga-
nisation, because of its size, it would be directly con-
fronted with rivalry from Brazil, on the one hand as
the region’s other large economy, and Venezuela, on
the other hand as the region’s largest cash spigot, 
at least as long as oil prices and Venezuelan oil pro-
duction remain at high levels. While Mexico’s foreign
policy seeks a leading role for Mexico in international
organisations, within Latin American institutions it
 generally seeks to be one among equals.
Third, although Mexico’s government is making its
 relations with Latin America a priority of its foreign
policy, after a significant deterioration in its regional
standing during the previous administration, it conti-
nues to emphasise its role as a bridge between North
and South America, and North and South more gene-
rally. Finally, its economic interdependence (or depen-
dence for that matter) with the US makes it unlikely
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that Mexico will support regional alternatives that
 either question standard economic policies or intend
to drive the US out of the region.
This policy appears to be supported by public opinion.
Surveys indicate that 41 per cent of Mexicans say
that their country should prioritise being a bridge
 between North America and South America, while
only 32 per cent want Mexico to prioritise integration
with South America and 18 per cent want integration
with North America to be a priority6.
Therefore, a regional financial institution that relega-
tes the IMF, the WB, and the IBD to secondary status
within the region would diminish Mexico’s influence
on international and regional financial and monetary
affairs. Mexico does not support the creation of alter-
native regional or international structures, although it
would not necessarily oppose the creation of comple-
mentary organisations.
Regional Arrangements of Economic Governance
One has to understand Mexico’s geographic dilemma,
which impedes the country from performing a larger
regional role. Mexico is clearly a member of the Latin
America community: it speaks the language, shares
their social difficulties, and is a constant cultural pre-
sence in Latin America. However, economically and
even politically speaking, the relationship with the
 region has been tepid at best.
Trade with Latin America forms a relatively insigni -
ficant part of Mexico’s total foreign trade. Mexican
 exports to the region were about 2.2 per cent of the
total exports in 2006, compared to 87 per cent of to-
tal exports that went to the US. Trade agreements
 signed with nine Latin American countries have been
largely symbolic and have not been beneficial for Me-
xico, since they have generated mostly deficits. Under
those circumstances, it does not seem realistic that
Mexico would assume an active role in promoting
 regional arrangements on global economic governan-
ce, at least not in Latin America as a whole, which en-
compasses a large universe of countries and enormous
variations within and across all nations. Latin America
is not a homogenous region and neither Mexico nor
Brazil can fully implement regional arrangements of
cooperation on their own.
Given this restriction, the economic relationship that
probably has some regional trends is that with Central
America. Potentially, Mexico could well serve as a
third-party between foreign aid donors and Central
America, since the country has technical expertise 
and knows the region like no other country in Latin
America. Some triangular cooperation agreements
have been formally signed between Japan’s aid
 agency (JICA), Mexico and Central America, mostly 
in the area of natural disaster relief funds, although
this is insignificant in terms of foreign aid and terms
of trade. Other initiatives, such as the Plan-Puebla-
 Panama, are facing the same fate (see section  below).
The most important institutions for Mexico are the 
WB, the IMF and NAFTA. While still very important, the
WTO is perhaps at a second level of importance, largely
because much of Mexican trade relations are conducted
under WTO exceptions through FTAs. Never theless,
 Mexico uses the dispute settlement mechanisms of
the WTO to resolve disputes with both its FTA partners,
when it cannot resolve the dispute through the FTA
mechanisms, and with other trading partners, parti -
cularly in anti-dumping and safeguard cases.
GLOBAL POLITICAL GOVERNANCE
Since its inception, the UN has always played an im -
portant role for Mexican foreign policy. As a founding
member of the UN, Mexico actively participated in the
San Francisco conference that led to the creation of the
world organisation. Mexico had fully committed  itself 
to the Allies’ effort during World War II, and its contri -
bution was rewarded in 1946, when the first  Security
Council (UNSC) meeting took place, in which both Brazil
and Mexico were the only representatives from Latin
America. Since 1946 the two states have participated in
all major UN bodies and have been among the world’s
major contributors to the UN  regular budget.
Likewise, public opinion in Mexico is quite favourable 
to the UN system. In fact, Mexicans feel more warmly
towards the UN than towards any other international
The informal sector still plays an important role in the economy 
of the emerging powers.
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 institution. From a scale of 0 (cold feeling) to 100 (very
warm feeling), the organisation that received the hig-
hest score was precisely the UN, with 75 points. When
asked how important the foreign policy goal of streng-
thening the UN should be, 60 per cent of the intervie-
wers believed that it should be a very important goal,
24 per cent said it should be somehow important, and
only 8 per cent thought it is not important at all7.
Mexican participation in the UN serves several foreign
policy goals: (1) to express a principled and mostly
legal view of world politics, (2) to reinstate its relative
political independence vis-à-vis the US, (3) to build
political coalitions with other partners outside Latin
America, and (4) to promote human rights and eco-
nomic development8.
With regards to the first goal, Mexico’s constitution
 places a special importance on multilateralism in the
constructive, effective, and legitimate, solutions of
 global order problems. The principles of the UN are
enshrined in Article 89 Section 10 of the Mexican Con-
stitution, including self-determination, non-intervention
in domestic affairs, peaceful settlement of disputes, the
prohibition of the threat or use of force in international
relations, and the sovereign equality of states. These
principles were adopted specifically from the UN Char-
ter and form the base of Mexican foreign policy. In that
sense, Mexico is a strong advocate of international pu-
blic law regulated by the UN and its bodies, specifically
the International Court of Justice (ICJ)9.
Second, politically speaking, the UN is Mexico’s pre-
ferred forum to exercise its relative independence
from its northern neighbour, the US. Throughout its
most recent participation in the UN Security Council
(UNSC) in 2002-2003, Mexico opposed US attempts
to authorise the use of force in Iraq. While this mea-
sure probably created political tension with Washing-
ton, it was applauded by a majority of Mexicans who
were against US overall policies in the Middle East.
This has led some scholars and foreign policy experts
to argue that Mexico should probably try to stay away
from the UNSC, because it puts the country in a po-
tential face-off with Washington10. According to this
view, Mexico simply cannot aspire to play a key role
in the UNSC, because in so doing it might find itself
opposing US global interests in issues such as nuclear
non-proliferation, peaceful settlement in the Middle
East, and terrorism. As Peter Smith describes, ‘Mexi-
co’s strategic position has been severely restricted by
the hegemonic power of the US. The simple fact is
this: Those places where Mexico might exert the most
impact are also well within the US sphere of influen-
ce, so Mexico’s performance as a pivotal state is con-
tinually subordinate to the overwhelming presence of
the US.’11 Nevertheless, Mexican diplomats believe the
risks are worth taking, because in so doing it might
offset the impression that the country has drifted away
from the UN because of NAFTA. Mexico sees the UN
as the solution to raw power politics. For this reason,
Mexico will join the UNSC again in 2009-2010. This
will only be the fourth time that Mexico serves in that
position, having served before in 1946, 1980-1981,
and 2002-2003.
In that sense, Mexico sees the UN as an important
vehicle to take a number of bilateral issues it has
with the US to a multilateral level. For instance,
being the country with a high rate of emigration,
Mexico perceives that its citizens are treated poorly
in the US. While migration is a bilateral matter bet-
ween these two neighbours, Mexico partially tries to
address the issue through the promotion of human
rights of migrants on the multilateral front. To give
an example, in 2004, Mexico sued the US at the UN
ICJ in The Hague, alleging systematic US violations
of notification obligations under the Vienna Conven -
tion on Consular Relations12.
Third, the UN is also a preferred forum to build rela -
tionships with countries located outside the Americas.
Mexican diplomats remain firmly attached to the no -
tion that participation in the UN enhances Mexico’s
voice opportunities, as it can relate to other conti-
nents. Unlike Brazil, Mexico has only a few embassies
in Africa and the Middle East, so its only diplomatic
 contacts with those regions tend to be channelled
through the UN system (see table below). In practice,
Mexico does not exercise what is often referred to in
the UN system as ‘capital-to-capital diplomacy’; that
is, diplomatic contacts between the world’s most im-
portant capitals to foster UN initiatives. Instead, Me-
xico’s efforts are concentrated in implementing fo-
reign policy through its UN contacts in the General
Assembly, where the G77 (of which Mexico has not
been a member since 1994) and the Non-Alignment
Movement (made up mostly of African and Asian
states) have a majority of votes. In other words, it
practices UN and multilateral diplomacy to foster
stronger bilateral relationships.
Fourth, Mexico perceives the UN as playing a con-
structive role in promoting development and human
rights. Having been a key actor as facilitator and the
host of the Conference of Financing for Development
(FfD) in Monterrey, in 2002, Mexico is actively invol-
ved in the FfD follow-up process. In particular, it pro-
motes the implementation of the commitments made
within the Monterrey Consensus, as well as the buil-
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ding of new bridges and initiatives to enhance their
impact on sustainable development. Likewise, Mexico
has actively participated in the creation of the Human
Rights Council (HRC) as a subsidiary body of the Ge-
neral Assembly (see section below for more informati-
on on Mexico’s position in human rights).
The UN Reform Agenda
Therefore, Mexico perceives the UN essentially as ser-
ving its multilateral and diplomatic policies. This does
not mean that the country does not promote change
within the UN. In fact, Mexico has become more pro-
active in the UNSC since 2003, although it continues
to debate its role as a non-permanent member. Parti-
cularly sensitive to Mexico is the attempt by the G4
(Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan) to modify the
structure of the UNSC by including more permanent
members. Mexican diplomats have expressed their
 total rejection of such an initiative and have encoura-
ged the creation of ad hoc groups to prevent the G4
from achieving their goals. In particular, Mexico is
 opposed to having Brazil as a permanent member for
the Latin American region, thus creating some diplo-
matic tension and rivalry with the Southern Cone
country. Instead, Mexico favours a reform of the UNSC
that leads to the inclusion of more non-permanent
members for a longer period of time and with the
possibility of re-election.
Mexico’s diplomacy believes that introducing the
 principle of re-election for non-permanent members
would allow a more continuous presence in the UNSC
of countries that are willing to play an active role in
the international agenda, and at the same time it
would guarantee their accountability and transparen-
cy13. In order to prevent the G4 from achieving its
goals, Mexico’s previous president, Vicente Fox, invited
a group of fourteen similarly minded countries (Algeria,
Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Spain,
Japan, Kenya, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Pakistan,
Singapore and Sweden) to form a new grouping, called
‘Friends for the Reform of the United Nations’. Its offi-
cial objective is that of formulating substantive propo-
sals for the UN reform process as well as designing a
diplomatic strategy to push for the evolution of the
UN system. However, it was also seen as a group of
countries openly  opposed to the G4. The group has
submitted documents to the General Assembly and
Secretary- General of the UN and continues to work
together on an ad-hoc basis on reform issues. The
reform  initiative of the previous government continues
to enjoy the support of the current government of
 Felipe Calderon as well as generalised support by the
major political parties.
Informal Global Governance
Mexico sees the G8, the G77 and the G20 as signifi-
cant organs of global governance, but certainly not  
as a replacement for the UN or WTO in any sense.
Smaller groupings can arrive at consensus position
more easily than universal membership institutions
and facilitate bargaining within the traditional inter -
national organisations. As such, they give Mexico the
opportunity to have a greater influence on issues of
global governance than within the cacophony of voi-
ces present in international organisations. But Mexico
is cautious about the role of such groups and at times
has withdrawn from such organisations. For instance,
Mexico was one of the founding members of the G77
and led it twice; first under President Luis Echeverría,
in 1974-1975, and again under President de la Ma-
drid, in 1983-1984. However, Mexico withdrew from
the G77 when it entered the OECD in 1994. These
mechanisms have not proved to be exceptionally 
far reaching. The vast diversity of countries in these
groups has allowed Mexico to reach at best extremely
general agreements. Frequently, these forums merely
reflect agreements already bargained and negotiated
in established organisations, such as the UN.
Multilateral and Bilateral Cooperation
While the Mexican public strongly supports the princi-
ple of multilateralism, as evidenced by the importan-
ce it places in strengthening the UN, Mexicans also
demonstrate some ambivalence in their support for
multilateralism in action. About 46 per cent of the
 public said that when dealing with international pro-
blems, Mexico should be willing to make decisions
within the UN, even when this means that their coun-
try will sometimes have to go along with a decision
that it would not have preferred. By contrast, 27 per
cent disagreed with making decisions on international
problems within the UN and 19 per cent said that 
‘it depends’. However, Mexicans are just as wary of
 bilateral decision-making, at least when it involves
the US. While 42 per cent agreed with joint decision-
 making with the United States to resolve common
problems, 31 per cent disagreed and 18 per cent 
said that ‘it depends’14.
For the Mexican government, multilateralism is 
the best means to reduce dominance by the most
powerful countries. Multilateralism is thus perceived
as a means to reduce the heavy burden imposed by
its bilateral relationship with the US. In other words,
multilateralism and the UN system are consciously
developed further to balance and compensate for the
close bilateral and somehow dependent relationship
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with Washington. As argued before, Mexico has often
tried to take certain issues to a multilateral level,
 although that have been traditionally subject to the
bilateral agenda, for instance immigration.
However, Mexico’s political independence is only relati-
ve and the country’s multilateral orientation is perhaps
strongest on political and security-related issues and
weakest on economic-related issues. Mexico will rarely
openly divert from US positions, unless it has the po-
pular support of domestic audiences, as happened du-
ring the 2003 Iraq crisis in the UNSC. Moreover, Mexi-
co has always pursued an explicitly bilateral trade poli-
cy through its network of FTA’s. Trade is the one issue
that remains highly bilateral in Mexico’s agenda15.
Consequently, Mexico is an archetypical model of a
country that engages in forum shopping and multila-
teralism, in the sense that Mexican diplomacy selects
and discriminates among overlapping multilateral in-
stitutions in deciding where to implement its policies.
Depending on the case and the forum, Mexico will go
unilateral,  bilateral (as in trade issues), multilateral
(as in human rights) or both bi and multilateral (as 
in immigration).
Relations with Emerging Countries
Mexican government policy is not adverse to strategic
partnerships among emerging countries, but not in 
an attempt to create distinct institutions which would
operate independently from the traditional internatio-
nal institutions. One key aspect of this strategy is to
position Mexico as a bridge between the South and
the North, through membership in organisations such
as the OECD and NAFTA. For instance, at the UN Me-
xico forms part of the Group of Latin American and
Caribbean Countries (GRULAC). Unlike all other GRU-
LAC members, Mexico, which joined the OECD in
1994, does not belong to the G77. Mexico sees this
as a privileged, independent position and likes to
think of itself as a mediator between industrialised
and developing countries.
However, in practice, this self-image as a ‘bridge
 between the North and South’ has its limitations and
appears to be merely aspirational. If anything, Mexi-
co’s strategy to portray itself as a bridge has failed 
as a policy, because the country has not been percei-
ved as such by Latin America or any other developing
nation. With the mere exception of Central America,
Mexico City
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Mexico has failed to play the bridge role effectively 
or successfully. Quite the opposite, Mexico has been
 excluded from recent political projects, such as the
South American Community of Nations. Brazil has
 often portrayed Mexico as a country that belongs to
the North, not solely in terms of geographic location,
but also in terms of its foreign relations.
Mexico’s relations with the other G5 countries have
been relatively limited, but friendly, except in the
case of Brazil, with which it has a much more com-
plex, long-standing relationship. Nevertheless, Mexi-
co’s efforts to reach out to other countries are limited
by the small network of embassies abroad. The Can-
cillería (or Ministry of Foreign Affairs), which is usual-
ly underfunded because of the strong federal, bureau-
cratic fights for resources and budgets, has had to
use its limited assets to support Mexican diasporas,
while overlooking other foreign policy issues. Mexico’s
support of its diaspora is administered through a lar-
ge network of forty-seven Mexican consulates in the
US, the world’s largest network of consular repre -
sentations in America. All of these consular offices
 sustain various projects directly targeting the Mexican-
American community, such as buttressing community
organisations, promoting formal education program-
mes in Spanish for US state schools, arranging mee-
tings with leaders of immigrant clubs and Mexican
 politicians, and fostering various cultural and folklore
programmes to enhance ‘Mexicanness’ (mexicani-
dad)16.
Hence, Mexican diplomacy is often driven by the de-
mands of diasporas, who are becoming increasingly
visible in both the US and Mexican politics. This has
important consequences for Mexico’s foreign affairs,
since the country has almost as many consulates 
in the US as embassies abroad (63 consulates, of
which 47 are in the US, and 70 embassies world -
wide). Staff members, resources, money and infra-
structure go directly into North American consular
offices, while diplomatic missions in Africa, Asia, and
Europe are underfunded and understaffed. In some
cases, it is more costly to maintain a consulate in a
US city than an embassy in Africa or Asia. In some
regions, such as Africa, Mexico has barely four em-
bassies, leaving Mexican diplomacy with no formal
links or networks with the strong African community.
Consequently, while Mexico does have relationships
with countries such as India, South Africa or China,
its diplomacy is limited in scope, as it cannot practi-
ce a more global and active foreign policy, like Brazil
or India.
Embassies and Consulates Abroad: 
Brazil and Mexico in Comparative Perspective
Source: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores de México
(Cancillería mexicana) and Ministério das Relações
Exteriores do Brasil (Itamaraty), 2006.
Diplomatic relations with China, India and Brazil are
essentially issue-driven. For instance, bilateral trade
issues dominate Mexico’s relations with China, with
the former accusing the latter of dumping a variety of
goods on its domestic markets, increasing the trade
deficit. China has now replaced Mexico as the US’s
second-largest trading partner.
In the international security sphere, Mexico and China
are frequently in agreement on intervention, with both
countries sharing the principle of non-intervention as
pillars of their foreign policy. Mexico does not support
Japan’s candidacy for a permanent seat in the UNSC,
opening future areas of political agreement between
China and Mexico.
In Mexican public opinion, China is overall well percei-
ved: when asked to rate their feelings toward a list of
sixteen countries on a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 mea-
ning extremely unfavourable feelings, 50 meaning neit-
her favourable nor unfavourable, and 100 meaning ex-
tremely favourable, the average rating by the general
public for China was 66, fifth on the list after Canada,
the United States, Australia, and Japan, and ahead of
Brazil, which scored 57, and India which scored 51.
Embassies in: Brazil Mexico
Latin America and the Caribbean 25 23
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Nevertheless, Mexicans are unsure about whether
 China’s rise is a good or bad thing. When asked if
 China’s economy were to grow as large as that of the
US, would this be seen as mostly positive, mostly ne-
gative, or neither positive or negative, 38 per cent of
the public said that it would be mostly positive, 38 per
cent said that it would be mostly negative, and 16 per
cent said it would be neither positive nor negative.
Leader’s feel strongly that China’s rise would be mostly
negative, 60 per cent responded mostly negative while
only 22 per cent responded mostly positive17.
On the other hand, relations with India used to be
closer, when Mexico led the G77 and when the two
developing countries were leaders of the Six Nations for
 Disarmament in the 1980s (which included Argentina,
Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania). Indian-
Mexican bilateral exchanges, especially within the UN
system, were far more common in the 1970s and
1980s. Mexico’s active role in promoting nuclear dis -
armament and non-proliferation decreased overtime,
while India assumed a quite different role by becoming
an overt nuclear power a few years ago, thus reducing
cooperation levels among both countries in the area of
non-proliferation. Mexico supported sanctions on India,
when it tested a nuclear bomb in 1998. It also opposes,
albeit quietly, the recent US-India nuclear agreement,
because of its exceptions to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, which Mexico strongly supports. Mexico is now
looking at India with a far more economic interest in
mind, evidenced by the recent visit of President Felipe
Calderon to South Asia. Discussions between the lea-
ders of the two countries focused on increasing bilateral
trade and investment. Unlike China, Indian exports
do not directly compete with Mexico’s either in the
domestic market or in the US market, making pro-
gress on trade and investment relatively easier.
Similarly, Mexico’s relations with South Africa are
 extremely limited. Although it maintains an embassy
in South Africa, it is one of only three in sub-Saharan
Africa, and it is responsible for five other countries in
the region. Trade and investment between the two
countries is negligible, at best.
Conversely, Mexico’s relations with Brazil have a lon-
ger and more complicated history. In short, the two
countries are friendly ‘brother’ nations in Latin Ame -
rica, but as the two largest economies in the region,
they, at times compete for influence both in Latin
America and in the international economic and politi-
cal system. Trade between Mexico and Brazil is limi-
ted, but the two countries are direct competitors for
many products in the US market, and they also com-
pete for foreign investment within the region. Some
Mexican multinationals have large investments in
 Brazil, particularly in the telecommunications sector.
Brazilian investment in Mexico is much more limited.
Mexico has been more of a status quo country with
respect to traditional international organisations, whi-
le Brazil has been more supportive of creating alter-
native institutions to complement existing institutions,
and it even advocates for radical reforms, both in the
WTO and the UNSC. Brazil also has more of a vocati-
on for seeking to exercise political and security lead-
ership in the region and endeavours to be the Latin
American representative on the world stage. Mexico 
is more ambivalent about leading the region or repre-
senting the region in the political and security sphe-
res, although it fiercely defends its leadership ambiti-
ons in the international sphere. In 2005, both coun-
tries clashed diplomatically in the UN system, when
Brazil explicitly tried to become a permanent member
of the UNSC, much at the expense of Mexico. Since
then, Mexico has built its UN diplomacy in a way that
challenges Brazil’s dominance at the UN. Hence, Me-
xico will be in the UNSC again in 2009-2010, coinci-
ding with Brazil, who will also serve as a non-perma-
nent member in 2010-2011. This will be the first time
that the two Latin American giants will coincide in the
UNSC since 1946: This may open the door for increa-
sed diplomatic interaction between the two countries,
but it could also lead to more direct confrontations on
leadership roles.
In spite of their mutual competition, Brazil and Mexico
have recently explored different mechanisms to ex-
pand their economic ties. Mexico is now seeking Brazi-
lian investment in the area of oil exploration through a
joint venture between PEMEX and PETROBRAS, since
the latter is an innovator in deep water drilling. Howe-
ver, these investment projects will depend on the suc-
cess of the oil sector reform in Mexico, which at the
present time restricts foreign investment.
The Mexican public judges Mexico’s relations with
Brazil to be that of friends, rather than as partners,
rivals or threats. 53 per cent said that Mexico and
Brazil were friends, compared to 30 per cent who said
the two countries were partners, while 4 per cent said
that the countries were rivals and 2 per cent saw
 Brazil as a threat18.
Regional Governance
Mexico has, like Brazil to some extent, serious diffi-
culties in implementing regional coordination mecha-
nisms. First, in the Latin American region, Mexico has
played a pivotal role in creating and fostering coordi-
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nation groups, such as the Condadora Group in 1983,
the Rio Group in 1986, and the foundation of the
 Ibero American Summit in 1991. Yet, as Olga Pellicer
argues, ‘the vast diversity of countries in the region
has allowed them to reach at best extremely general
agreements that reflect a minimal common denomi-
nator.’19
Second, the relationship between Mexico and Latin
America, as well as that between Brazil and the re -
gion itself, now faces obstacles derived from the
 growing ideological diversity and rivalry. Brazil and
Mexico can do very little to control Venezuela’s Hugo
Chávez’ radicalism, and the gap separating the pro-
Chávez countries (Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua)
from the anti-Chávez regimes (Colombia) is increa-
sing and causing much political tension that probably
requires a third-party intervention from outside the
region.
Third, unlike Western Europe within the EU frame-
work, Latin America is not a homogenous regional
 entity. Attempts to coordinate the region are condem-
ned to failure, because of the diversity and hetero -
geneity of interests, policies, stakes and perspectives.
On the one hand, the Southern Cone of South Ameri-
ca is perhaps the most cohesive sub-area in Latin
America, with Mercosur playing a small role in foste-
ring integration. But even in that sub-area there are
serious challenges posed by Venezuela’s recent mem-
bership to Mercosur and by the lack of free trade poli-
cies practiced by some of its members, including Bra-
zil. On the other hand, the Andean countries in South
America are facing serious dilemmas posed by ideolo-
gical rivalries between Colombia and Venezuela (with
the US affecting the security complex), and by the in-
creasing role of drug trafficking and organised crime.
Finally, Central America is lagging behind most eco-
nomic development indicators (with the exception of
Costa Rica), while crime and domestic violence are
imposing serious governance challenges. Therefore,
not only is the region heterogeneous, but its problems
and challenges with regards to governance are quite
different between sub-regions and across countries.
Clearly, countries such as Brazil or Mexico cannot by
themselves coordinate efforts to overcome such diver -
sity of interests and problems.
Fourth, a regional coordination function is also depen-
dent on US leadership. There is very little Brazil or
Mexico can do without US intervention. Even Brazil’s
most recent UN peacekeeping participation in Haiti is
channelled by US interests in the region. Under such
circumstances, it is extremely difficult to foster regio-
nal powers, because the US is the de facto hegemon
of the region. Ultimately, Washington plays the role
of regional leadership, at times facilitating coopera -
tion, although often causing more problems than
 posing solutions, as evidenced by the failure of Plan
Colombia.
Hence, regional powers are unlikely to exercise coor-
dination functions in Latin America. At best, Mexico
has paid greater attention to the problems posed by
certain specific countries and sub-regions, such as
Central America, Guatemala, Cuba, and to some
 extent Chile. However, none of these instances has
generated a true strategic alliance, conceived as a
programme for political cooperation and orchestration
with the ability to generate substantive and consistent
benefits for all parties. Plans for a strategic alliance
with Chile, with whom Mexico has strong political and
economic affinities, given their pro-free trade ap-
proach, have been derailed by Mexico’s opposition 
to support a Chilean candidate for the OAS Secretary
General position.
INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL ORDER
While Mexico probably shares the vision of the impor-
tance of international development cooperation, it
does not give it high priority, relative to other foreign
policy goals. Helping to improve the standard of living
in less developed countries ranked tenth on a list of
thirteen foreign policy goals perceived to be very im-
portant for the general public20.
Having said that, Mexico’s priorities in this sphere are
the issues of migration and the human rights of im-
migrants. There are approximately ten million Mexi-
cans living in the US, roughly half of whom are un -
documented, and Mexico is a firm defender of their
rights. This priority is reflected not only in relations
with the US, but also in Mexico’s emphasis on this
 issue in many international forums.
Similarly, perhaps moved by its very own democratic
transition in 2000, human rights are now a salient
political issue in Mexico. The country has become an
active promoter and founding member of the new UN
Human Rights Council (HRC). Mexico was elected as a
member of the Council for the 2006-2009 period, and
then presided it during its first year of operation, in
2006-07. Under its presidency, the Council submitted
to the General Assembly the Convention for the Pro-
tection of all Persons from Forced Disappearance and
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indi-
genous Peoples. Mexico favours strengthening the
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HRC as the organ par excellence entrusted with pro-
moting and protecting human rights worldwide. This
position has led the Mexican delegation to the UN to
favour resolutions that have condemned countries 
like Cuba for their human rights record, leading to 
a serious diplomatic stalemate with the Caribbean
country in 2006.
The Role of the Existing Institutions in Social
 Governance Questions
In terms of labour and environmental issues, Mexico
accepts the need for their discussion, but it is oppo-
sed to formal commitments within the realm of the
WTO that would result in disguised protectionism by
developed countries. It thus considers that those
 issues must be dealt with through the International
 Labour Organization and the UN World Environment
Programme21.
Mexico places paramount importance on the role of
the UN as evidenced by its hosting of the Summit and
its commitment to the Millennium Development Agen-
da in Monterrey in 2003. In all matters of internatio-
nal cooperation, the UN is the most important organi-
sation in which Mexico acts. The International Labour
Organization has a lesser role; although it is a large
contributor to the organisation, Mexico has not parti-
cipated actively in recent years.
Fulfilling Commitments on the Social Agenda
Mexicans like the idea of multilateralism and of Mexi-
co being a good international citizen. For instance,
when asked what Mexico should do regarding coun-
tries that do not respect human rights, 58 per cent
said that Mexico should advocate that international
organisations, such as the UN, censor such violations.
They do not necessarily agree with living up to such
commitments. When asked if they agree or disagree
that Mexicans who have been accused of crimes against
humanity, such as genocide and torture, should be tried
in the International Criminal Court, 42 per cent agreed,
43 per cent disagreed and 9 per cent said that ‘it
 depends’22.
Since the arrival of democracy in 2000, the govern-
ment has made compliance with international human
rights commitments a top priority in its foreign policy.
Efforts are being made to harmonise existing local,
state and federal legislation with international human
rights obligations. It is also taking actions to imple-
ment recommendations made by international organi-
sations, including those of the UN and Inter-American
systems, to eliminate racial discrimination, to protect
the human rights of all migrants, including foreign
workers in Mexico, to eliminate torture, and to pro-
tect the rights of children.
Nevertheless, Mexico still has a mixed record on com-
plying with its international commitments in the social
sphere, particularly in dealing with torture and treat-
ment of journalists23. The deterioration of Mexico’s
public security has led to serious violations of human
rights, as the army has occupied police stations in se-
veral cities that were once taken by organised crime.
If anything, Mexico’s position in the UN should serve
to foster the human rights agenda at home, but there
are few signs of improvement.
Mexico is officially committed to opening itself to
 international scrutiny with regard to human rights
and to constructive cooperation with international
 organisations on this issue. Equally important is the
fact that a vast network of NGO’s already exists in
 Mexico dealing essentially with human rights and
 environmental protection. Likewise, Mexico currently
maintains a policy of openness and cooperation with
the international human rights mechanisms and
organi sations. It has extended an invitation to the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to visit 
the country. As of to date, Mexico has received 11
visits from the UN special representative for human
rights and 7 visits from Inter-American procedures.
Nevertheless, the country is still lagging behind 
in complying with all international human rights
 regulations.
Mexico does actively support the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights, which is an autonomous judicial in-
stitution of the Inter-American system, established in
1979 with the purpose of enforcing and interpreting
the provisions of the American Convention on Human
Rights. Mexican jurists have served as judges in the
Court; while the latter has ruled on specific cases of
human rights violations in Mexico. Hence, the coun-
try does grant ample jurisdiction to the Court itself.
But when it comes to promoting initiatives, Mexico
prefers to deal with human rights issues in the global
arena, often discriminating against other regional
 forums.
Mexico is also a signatory to the Kyoto Agreement
and an active participant in international environ -
mental issues, albeit always with the caveat that
 developing countries should benefit from interna -




The administration, the foreign policy bureaucracy, and
the opposition parties in Mexico have not yet worked
out a strategy on Mexico’s vision for its own future:
Mexico could be a leader in the economic sphere, due
to its size and trading patterns. Mexico also has taken
on responsibilities in international jurisprudence and
nuclear non-proliferation, two traditional areas of
 emphasis in Mexican foreign policy. However, there  
is great reticence about involvement in international
 security issues, beyond non-proliferation. Furthermore,
 because Mexico borders the US, has millions of its citi-
zens living there and relies on its trade and investment
flows, its responsibility in the international sphere runs
the risk of damaging its relations with Washington.
This reticence is evidenced by Mexico’s limited partici-
pation as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, whe-
re many fear it may be forced to take positions on is-
sues that go against the interests of the US, and which
may cause problems in its bilateral relations in parts of
the world where Mexico has very limited interests.
Consequently, Mexico tends to operate primarily as
an economic actor, even on issues that are largely
political or deal with international security. For instan-
ce, according to the Global Policy Forum, in 2006,
Mexico was the tenth largest financial contributor to
the UN system, with US$ 32 million , accounting for
1.82 per cent of all the assessment. In fact, Mexico 
is the largest contributor from Latin America and the
Caribbean, providing 52 per cent of the region’s quo-
ta. Likewise, Mexico is among the 15 largest financial
donors to the UN peacekeeping (PK) budget, contri-
buting more than US$ 25 million in 200524.
Therefore, Mexico is a responsible and generous finan-
cial contributor and will rarely miss its quota. It uses its
economic leverage to play in the UN system. Yet, its UN
behaviour has been somehow ambivalent and erratic,
because it rarely participates actively in collective securi-
ty and UN peacekeeping. For decades, Mexico abstained
from participating in the UNSC because of its concentra-
tion of power vis-à-vis the General Assembly (GA) and
because it did not want to openly disagree with the US
(especially during the Cold War era). While the country
has become a more proactive non-permanent member in
the UNSC, there is still wide resistance among the gene-
ral public to engage in collective security.
The debate regarding Mexico’s role in the UNSC is also
convoluted by the fact that the country has a bureau-
cratic setting that impedes an active role. For instan-
ce, in 2001, when Mexico made official its intention to
serve in the UNSC, the Cancillería was hindered by
other federal bureaucrats who overall disagreed with
the policy. As a diplomat involved in the process
 argued, ‘we needed to rectify a position given the
transition to democracy…we needed to express com-
mitment and international credibility.’25 Nevertheless,
the Finance and Economics ministries opposed relea-
sing funds to bargain for votes in the UN, arguing
that such policy would create unintended consequen-
ces, such as having small countries permanently de-
manding aid, whenever Mexico would join an interna-
tional body. The finance establishment then success-
fully lobbied the executive branch and convinced the
President to abstain from granting funds, debt relief
and foreign aid to Mexico’s allies in the UN. In the
 absence of substantial ‘carrots’ for bargaining, Mexico


















UN Regular Budget Payments of Largest Payers,
2006
Source: Global Policy Forum, www.globalpolicy.org/
 finance/tables/reg-budget/large06.htm
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Assembly and had to go for a second round against
the Dominican Republic, which almost won as many
votes as the Mexican delegation. In the end, Mexico
did prevail in the second round of votes, not without
a sour note, given the lack of support provided by the
Finance Ministry itself. The Foreign Ministry is thus
unable to mobilise on its own a candidacy for a non-
permanent seat in the UNSC, unless it has explicit
support from the finance and economics ministries.
This has happened occasionally, as in 1980 and in
2008, when Mexico announced its candidacy for the
2009-2010 period. It is not that bureaucrats in the
economic sector reject international activism per se;
instead they prefer to be actively involved in other
 international economic bodies, such as the WTO and
the Bretton Woods system, where not only the econo-
mic benefits are more tangible, but the policies are
dictated by them and not by diplomats.
Mexico and Brazil in the UN System
Source: Global Policy Forum, www.globalpolicy.org/ finance/tables/reg-budget/large06.htm
MEXICO BRAZIL
Contribution to regular UN budget (2005) $33.5 million (2006) $26 million
UNSC non-permanent member 1946, 1980-81, 2002-03, 1946-47, 1951-52, 1954-55,
candidate for 2009-2010 1963-64, 1967-68, 1988-89,
1993-94, 1998-99, 2004-05,
candidate for 2010-2011.
Contribution to UN PK (2006) $25 million 1,217 troops, 10 police,
0 peacekeepers 30 military observers (13th. from top)
Important UN posts Alicia Bárcena Ibarra, Luiz Carlos da Costa,
UN Under-Secretary-General Deputy Special Representative
for Management, Bernardo of SG for Operations in Liberia;
Sepúlveda, ICJ Judge; Paulo Sergio Pinheiro,
María Elena Medina Mora, Special Rapporteur on Human
Board of Narcotic Control; Rights in Myanmar,
Griselda García, Intergover. Fernando Henrique Cardoso,
Committee for Safeguarding of Chair of the Panel on
Cultural and Tangible Heritage, UN-Civil Society Relations
UNESCO.
Membership in UN Conference on Disarmament, Peacebuilding Commission,
Commissions and Human Rights Council, Law Commission, Human
Committees UNESCO Executive Council, Rights Council, Governing
Int. Seabed Council, UN Commission Council UNEP, Conference
on International Trade Law on Disarmament.
Number of NGOs 15 (out of 3,051) NA
registered with ECOSOC
(consultative status or on roster)
Number of NGOs  13 (out of 1,664) 6 (out of 1,724)
registered with DPI
Number of registered 26 (out of 334) 24 (out of 321)
partnerships with Commission 
for SustainableDevelopment




Mexico does not have significant hard power in the
international political arena. Although Mexico has
 Latin America’s second largest military force, after
Brazil, it spends less than one per cent of its GDP on
its armed forces. Likewise, the military has never had
the appetite to project power abroad, because since
World War II Mexican soldiers have not dealt with
any concrete external military enemies. Mexico is too
small to fight a war against the US and too big to do
battle with its small southern neighbours.
Even if the large border with the US is increasingly
problematic, due to drug trafficking and now terro-
rism, the peril is seen as consisting not in the ex -
treme event of an armed invasion, but in the daily
 socio-economic interaction with the northern and
powerful neighbour. The idea of deploying a large
number of soldiers to UN operations is troubling for
the Ministry of Defence, because these are not seen
as part of their domestic missions. Thus, Mexico has
made a strategic decision to de-emphasise traditional
hard political power.
Indicators of Power for Brazil and Mexico in
 Comparative Terms, 2006
Source: The World Bank Group Data Query, World
Bank, 2006. http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-
 query/; Jane’s Sentinel for Central America and South
America 2006, IIS-Military Balance 2005-2006)
Unlike the other G5 countries, such as China and In-
dia, Mexico has rarely used its military might to serve
international purposes. There are a number of dome-
stic and international reasons that explain Mexico’s
lack of interest in world military affairs.
First, Mexico has been extremely sensitive to external
interference in its internal affairs, with a traditional
distrust of the US and a defensive position regarding
its sovereignty. This makes deep military cooperative
efforts very controversial. Mexico is not a member of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and it
is opposed to joining the US Northern Command. The
country is currently engaged in discussions with the
US and Canada with the Alliance for Security and Pro-
sperity in North America (ASPAN). Mexico wants to
deepen its security cooperation with its North Ameri-
can partners, with a large caveat related to its fer-
vent defence of its national sovereignty.
While Mexico’s government and its public share many
of the same threat perceptions related to security
 issues as do the US government and the American
public, in many ways its cooperation within ASPAN
 reflects its desire not to see the US security perimeter
drawn at the Mexican border, because of potential
disruptions in the growing economic integration bet-
ween the two countries. Mexico thus cooperates on
security issues with the US, only when its trade inte-
rests are threatened by Washington’s security agen-
da. Mexico will not, however, support any engage-
ment or commitment beyond ASPAN, such as suppor-
ting peace missions in Afghanistan.
Second, Mexico’s hesitance to engage its armed
 forces in missions abroad is also driven by domestic
considerations, particularly the evolving nature of civil-
military relations and the complex bureaucratic decision-
making process. In Mexico there is bureaucratic com-
petition and a division of labour between the Cancille-
ría and the Ministry of Defence that goes back to the
1930s. In 1929, when the Revolutionary Institutional
Party (PRI) was founded, a pact was agreed between
soldiers and civilians, whereby the former accepted
the demilitarisation of politics and the latter conceded
institutional autonomy. This pact facilitated the divisi-
on of labour and made possible the emergence of a
consensus, placing special emphasis on civi lian supre-
macy, since there was nothing above the  official par-
ty. By 1946, when the first civilian president was elec-
ted, the military institution had not only been unified
and disciplined, but had also been successfully subor-
dinated to civilian power. In exchange, the armed for-
ces were given institutional autonomy to decide pro-
motions, doctrine, strategy, and of course, military
INDICATORS OF 
HARD POWER BRAZIL MEXICO
GNP (in US$ billions) 794,098 785,468
GNP per capita 3,460 7,310
Foreign direct investment 
(in US$ billions) 18.2 17.4
Population 
(millions of inhabitants) 186.1 106.2
Exports measured as 
a % of GNP 22.7 29.9
Exports (in US$ billons) 96.4 189.
Number of armed forces 
personnel 302,909 192,770
Armed forces per 
1,000 inhabitants 1.8 1.8
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operations26. As a result of this pact, the Mexican armed
forces have their own domestic priorities and have suf-
ficient institutional autonomy to craft their own missi-
ons. Since the military was not in power during the PRI
era, the democratisation of Mexican politics in 2000 did
not modify the civil-military pact itself, it simply altered
party politics, but not  civil-military relations.
The Mexican armed forces’ approach regarding securi-
ty is, for practical purposes, an exclusive doctrine of
national security. Indeed, the rationale and justificati-
on that drives the Mexican armed forces is their role
in national development, consisting essentially of
maintaining control of the intelligence community,
providing public services in rural communities, contai-
ning revolutionary movements, and halting trans-na-
tional organised crime27. To date, the growing influen-
ce of drugs and cartels in Mexico has had an impact
on the armed forces. Increasingly, the military is
being used to deter transnational organised crime
within Mexican borders. In fact, during the past three
years, almost the entire law enforcement apparatus
for combating drug trafficking has been replaced with
military soldiers, and numerous key political appoint-
ments and governmental positions have now been
 filled with Mexican generals and colonels28.
Therefore, although the Mexican democratisation pro-
cess would seem to signal a demise of the national
security state, the armed forces have remained faith-
ful to their old doctrine, obsessed with domestic or-
der, apathetic towards international trends, and oppo-
sed to PK participation. The idea of sending observers
in support of UN peace initiatives is not even openly
debated among the officer corps. As Roderic Camp
argues, ‘the military has not encouraged a free flow
of ideas, nor a natural exchange socially or otherwise
between the officer corps and the civilian leadership,
at least up through 2000’29.
Given these considerations, it was not surprising that
Mexico withdrew from the Rio Treaty (the Inter-Ame-
rican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) in 2001. While
this measure was uncontroversial in Mexico, it took
many of its allies, including the US and Latin America,
by surprise, since it was unilaterally announced wit-
hout previous consultation. The Rio Treaty binds the
signatory nations of the Western Hemisphere to pro-
tect the Americas from outside attack. The heart of
the Treaty is Article 3, which states that ‘an armed
attack by any State against an American [Western
Hemisphere] state shall be considered as an attack
against all the American States, and, consequently,
each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes
to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence.’30
Speaking to the OAS (the treaty’s depositary organi-
sation) in 2001 the then Mexican President Vicente
Fox called the Rio Treaty ‘useless’ and ‘obsolete’. 
Fox made a point: to some extent, the Treaty was
useless, since it was a rather ineffective protection
against Fidel Castro and often provided a legal justifi-
cation for US intervention in Latin America. However,
the reasons to withdraw were never appropriately dis-
cussed or justified by the Mexican government.
To date, Mexico is virtually outside all regional military
alliances and has not promoted an alternative to the
Rio mechanism. This has led many experts, including
the authors, to describe Mexico’s decision as maverick
and poorly informed. If the Treaty had become obso-
lete, then a reform initiative might have been in or-
der, but Mexico gave no signals to engage a reform
process within the TIAR. This move shows that Mexico
is rarely an initiative reformer, although its withdrawal
also puts in question its multilateral vocation.
With regards to PK, Mexico is still lagging way behind
its Latin America counterparts. Mexico has not been
able to provide blue helmets to UN PK missions since
1950, although it did deploy police officers to El Sal-
vador. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has made multi-
ple efforts to deploy troops, but the ultimate decision
on whether Mexico will join a UN force relies on two
strong federal bureaucracies, the Ministry of Defence
(the Army and the Air Force) and the Ministry of the
Navy. The armed forces, however, do not have a uni-
fied voice. The Navy, with more international exposu-
re than the Army, but with fewer personnel, supports
PK participation. A plan within the Navy has already
been devised to allow personnel from that military
branch to join a PK force31. Nevertheless, PK requires
intensive manpower that only large armies can provi-
de, and in this respect the Mexican Army has led the
opposition to such an engagement32.
The Army perceives peace operations as weakening
the military’s ability to respond to its primary dome-
stic roles. The reasons advanced by Army generals 
to abstain from joining a UN force are multiple: first,
it is argued that most Mexican soldiers do not fulfil
the foreign language requirements established by the
UN for observational posts, since mandatory English
courses have never been part of their curricula. Second,
there is a serious concern about over-stretching mis-
sions, when the military is already engaged in multi-
ple operations at home. Third, the military has shown
anxiety about an increased involvement of US military
forces in UN PK operations and regards diplomatic
 efforts as attempts to de-nationalise Mexico’s defence
strategy. Finally, there are questions about budgets
and PK associated costs, such as vaccines, uniforms,
gear, and equipment for the mission, none of which
are subsidised by the UN. As a result, Mexico’s com-
mitment to international PK is still determined by
 domestic forces, especially civil-military relations. 
The fact that the transition to democracy has not
been settled quite yet means that Mexico is still not
able to contribute troops to international endeavours.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Another area where Mexico has retrenched somehow
from the UN system is nuclear disarmament. Mexico
played a leading role in promoting global and regional
nuclear non-proliferation by establishing the first nu-
clear-weapon-free zone in the world, also known as
the Treaty of Tlatelolco, for which Mexico’s UN Am-
bassador Alfonso García Robles shared a Nobel peace
prize in 1982 with Sweden’s Ava Myrdal33. Yet, the
former regional leader on non-proliferation has not
been able to articulate a coherent and comprehensive
policy towards nuclear disarmament since the end of
the Cold War. The options for Mexico have narrowed
somehow, since the agenda is now clearly dominated
by the UNSC, while the UN Disarmament Conference
in Geneva has been paralysed since the 1990s. It is
not clear how Mexico can now use its prominent role
on nuclear disarmament in the UN, unless it plays a
more active role in the UNSC, too.
Consequently, Mexico is more likely to operate as an
economic actor, providing funds to finance several UN
activities. Mexico might someday assume more roles,
using its military power to support peace and stability,
but much will depend on domestic factors, as well as on
the availability of appropriate international conditions.
Hard and Soft Power Influence
Similarly, Mexico rarely uses its economic hard power
to influence other countries, even though it is one 
of Latin America’s most important economic forces. 
It does not impose conditionality terms on trade or
 investment, nor does it offer or negotiate special in-
vestment benefits for Mexican multinationals. Mexico
has the largest concentration of multinationals in
 Latin America, who invest heavily in the region, such
as Bimbo, Televisa, Telmex, and Cemex. This has often
caused tension with Mexican companies, such as
 Cemex, the world’s largest cement company, because
the business sector often feels its interests are not 
well defended or protected by Mexico’s foreign policy,
especially when dealing with countries that have threa-
tened to nationalise Mexican companies abroad, such
as Venezuela.
Instead, Mexico seems to emphasise its soft power,
not only as a good international citizen and multilate-
ral country, but also as a major exporter of culture.
Mexico is more widely known for its television pro-
grammes (also known as telenovelas) and cultural
heritage, which it proudly showcases around the
world. The country’s renowned artists, from Diego
 Rivera to Frida Kahlo, and its diverse gastronomy
have increased Mexico’s image as a cultural power. 
It is partly because of this reputation, that Mexico is
the largest recipient of tourism in Latin America and
one the top ten sites for world tourism. Unfortunate-
ly, the Mexican government is less capable of trans-
forming such power resources into concrete govern-
mental actions in the area of global governance.
 Mexico’s soft power thus remains just soft.
Mexico City: massive urbanization is one of the great




Traditionally, Mexico has sought to be a recipient of aid
to help address its own problems of poverty, inequali-
ty, and social and economic exclusion. However, since
its accession to the OECD in 1994, Mexico has received
less aid and has now become a net aid donor.
Mexican international assistance is largely limited to
international humanitarian assistance, particularly
within Latin America as a whole, and especially to
Central America and the Caribbean. This pattern of
international humanitarian assistance reflects Mexi-
co’s interests in the region. It is a very powerful
country relative to its Southern neighbours, and is 
to a large extent one among equals within South
America. The amount of aid provided so far is still
very small, totalling less than US$ 80 million from
2000-2006. Instead, Mexico has offered technical
 assistance and human expertise, deploying engineers
and technicians to natural disaster areas.
Recently, it has provided humanitarian assistance
with the deployment of Navy officers. The first of
 these was in early 2005 to aid the victims of the
 Tsunami disaster in Southeast Asia. This was then
followed by the deployment to Mississippi to assist 
in relief operations in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.
This type of aid is rarely quantified, but it involves
human resources which the Mexican government 
has financed.
Within Latin America, Mexico is most willing to assu-
me wide ranging leadership responsibilities in Central
America and the Caribbean, most notably through its
Plan Puebla-Panama. It is less willing to act as a lea-
der within South America, where its power is balan-
ced by that of Brazil. 
Indeed, perhaps the most important regional coope-
rative initiative that Mexico has carried out is the Plan
Puebla-Panama. Proposed by Mexico’s President Vicente
Fox in 2001, it attempts to foster economic develop-
ment across the Mesoamerican region to increase
integration, extending from Puebla in Mexico, to Pana-
ma in Central America. The Plan includes projects grou-
ped into eight initiatives designed to increase the
competitiveness of the region. The Plan Puebla-Pana-
ma is the foremost Mexican cooperative initiative in
the region. Its plan projects aim to work with existing
regional and international institutions, such as the IDB
and the WB for financing and im plementation. The Plan
is complementary to the economic development work
done by the international economic institutions. Never-
theless, the lack of development funds to finance such
an ambitious project has halted its full implementation.
The construction of highways, airports and develop-
ment infrastructure is still way behind schedule. Not to
mention the fact that narcotics and crime in the whole
region have  diverted many of the funds that were
otherwise  destined for development.
Likewise, Mexico’s ambivalent role in Latin America
fosters an equally ambivalent opinion among Mexi-
cans. Surveys indicate that the public is not convin-
ced about the desirability of a plan to promote the
development of southern neighbours, if this entails
fewer resources for the development of other regions
in Mexico. In 2004, only 36 per cent of Mexicans said
that providing aid to Central America would benefit
the country a lot or somewhat, while 55 per cent said
it would benefit the country only a little or not at all.
Surprisingly, even Mexicans living in the South and
Southeast were not convinced that it would benefit
Mexico, only 37 per cent said that Mexico would
 benefit a lot or somewhat, while 48 per cent said 
the benefits would be little or none. In 2006, when
asked how strongly they believed that Mexico should
provide economic resources to help develop the
 countries of Central America, only 24 per cent said 
a great deal, while 22 per cent said somewhat, 31 
per cent said not very much, and 15 per cent said 
not at all34.
VALUE SYSTEM
Mexico’s value systems and legal and social systems
are Western and liberal in origin. As such, most of the
values of the world’s traditional powers are shared by
Mexico. Mexico differs from many Western countries
in its explicit non-interventionist, pacific foreign poli-
cy, which in some ways has a greater resemblance to
Chinese non-interventionism and Japanese pacifism
than to that of the United States or Western Europe.
However, not all Asian countries are non-interventio-
nist, nor are they all fierce defenders of the pacific
resolution of conflicts. To the extent that the rise of
‘Asian values’ is a significant force in the globalisation
process, Mexico is a firm defender of the Western
 values of democracy and liberalism.
Mexico is living an historic moment in which significant
changes in the work of organisational systems are
 taking place. Therefore, the debate about Mexican
 values becomes important, and even more so because
many Mexican multinational firms have started intro-
ducing changes in their organisations that attempt 
to take into account and adapt to the values and
 behaviours of Asian countries receiving their export
products.
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Furthermore, the country also has a very heteroge -
neous population that constantly questions Western
values. For decades, there has been a stereotype
 related to the Mexican ‘essence’, which was strongly
identified with the Mexican Revolution in the 1930s.
In fact, most literary essays, philosophical reflections
and studies about the character and psychology of
the Mexican ‘essence’ focused on cultural practices
performed mainly by the Mexican working class and
mestizos and not so much by European Mexicans. The
social revolt of the Zapatista movement in the 1990s
questioned some of these European values and raised
concerns about the significance of globalisation over-
all. After all, the Zapatista movement made itself pu-
blic the same day NAFTA entered into force. To date,
many intellectuals from the political left question Me-
xico’s position in North America and have advocated 
a more Latin American or non-Western foreign policy.
However, this has not translated into a clear non-
 Western policy, in part because the political left is still
part of the opposition, as it has never won elections
at the executive federal level.
The most important normative criteria influencing
 Mexico’s actions at the international level are those
enshrined in the Constitution: the self-determination
of peoples and nations, non-intervention in the inter-
nal affairs of other states, the pacific resolution of
conflicts, the prohibition of the threat or use of force
in international relations, the sovereign equality of
states, international cooperation for development,
and the struggle for peace and international security.
In addition to these codified criteria, the current go-
vernment and the previous four governments have all
included an explicit endorsement of the desirability of
free and open markets, or economic liberalism, as the
best means to achieve increased welfare. Since Mexi-
co has seen the arrival of democracy in 2000, political
liberalism has also stood behind Mexico’s rhetoric and
actions to shape the globalisation process.
CONCLUSIONS
The preceding sections have offered an ample view
containing economic and political factors which might
impinge on Mexico’s role as an active G5 country.
There is no doubt that Mexico faces a large number
of obstacles, including a broad sense of scepticism
and ambivalence among the public with regard to the
form of foreign policy that the country should exerci-
se. Will Mexico become a major player in the interna-
tional system? Is Mexico a reliable emerging power?
The answer lies in three evolving and related circum-
stances.
First, while Mexico has behaved essentially as a very
responsible actor within the international system for
several decades, the US continues to be of such over-
riding importance for Mexican diplomacy, that very
little thought is given to its role as a middle power in
the global system. Mexico’s external behaviour is thus
restrained by the fact that it interacts in a region im-
mersed with large asymmetries of power and econo-
mic interdependence. The extent to which Mexico will
assume an active role in world affairs will depend on
how the political leadership defines its relationship
vis-à-vis Washington.
Second, contrary to countries like Brazil, Mexico’s
 foreign policy does not pursue a regional hegemonic
role. Given its particular geographic location, midway
between the North and the South, Mexican diplomacy
finds it particularly difficult to articulate a regional
leadership role. Instead, it will attempt to portray
 itself as a bridge between the rich and the poor, the
North and the South. Yet, even this role is limited by
the fact that other countries must legitimise and ac-
cept such function. To date, there are few signs that
countries in the South or in Latin America will view
Mexico as a channel or bridge to the North.
Third, the extent to which Mexico can assume a lead-
ership role in economic and political governance also
depends on how it handles its own domestic transiti-
on. The country has not fully graduated from its recent
democratisation experience, and several key actors
have yet to understand and assimilate the conseque -
ces of the transition to democracy. Democratisation
trends have been affected by a number of factors,
 including military reserve domains and bureaucratic
pressures, all of which exercise an influence on Mexi-
co’s commitment to international organisations and
global governance.
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 South Africa is a committed multilateralist and an active global citizen. It is also committed to 
a global governance structure that is fairer, reflects changing power configurations and the con-
cerns of developing states (for example, effective global solving of socio-economic issues and a
departure from orthodox solutions, which have not always had the desired positive outcome).
 Its global governance agenda is closely linked to its African agenda (peace, stability, poverty
eradication) and to its Global South agenda of deepening South-South cooperation at all levels.
 South Africa’s modus operandi has been to develop coalitions with other states to take these
issues forward. Sometimes these coalitions are within the South and on other occasions South
Africa has built bridges with the North.
 Over the last 14 years (since 1994), there has been a shift in South Africa’s foreign policy away
from emphasis on its role as a bridge builder to one that is overtly about the Global South. The
consequence of this development has been the emergence of a more confrontational engagement
at times with the North. However, South Africa’s engagement at all levels is far more complex;
the country plays different roles in different circumstances.
 South Africa is small in comparison to the other Outreach/Group-5 partners. For example, in a
2006 study of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) by Goldman Sachs South Africa does
not make it into the ‘Next 11’ group, which includes Nigeria. The key reasons for South Africa’s
participation in the Group 5 include:
– Its preponderant role and position in Africa
– Its ‘soft’ power, i.e., what it has achieved domestically through a peaceful transition and tried
to replicate elsewhere, which has given it moral standing and credibility. This is the one ele-
ment that distinguishes it from the other members of the G5. Global actors listen to South
Africa because of this, but equally have certain expectations about how it will behave on the
global stage.
– Its own desire to be engaged in global matters (more than any African state). But this can




The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), Johannesburg
57
 However, a key challenge for South Africa conti nues
to be acceptance by other African states of its leader-
ship role on the continent. There is only a grudging
acceptance of this role, although very few other Afri-
can states have the capacity to underwrite the conti-
nent’s political and economic frameworks. South Africa
has been extremely conscious of these perceptions
that it is the ‘big brother’ and is careful not to fuel
them. There is an inherent contradiction in this,
though, which results sometimes in South Africa’s
being overly cautious on issues where it could be
 leading. 
 South Africa’s global standing has been high since
1994. However, its more recent foreign policy actions,
especially in the UN Security Council, have created
fissures in this perception among elements of the in-
ternational community. A barometer of South Africa’s
‘global standing’ now is likely to be quite different
from what it was in 1994. In many respects South
Africa has lost some of the initial lustre of the honey-
moon ‘miracle transition’; perceptions of it are gradual-
ly becoming less sanctified and more normal, although
the feeling in some Northern countries, that it has not
lived up to its reputation, reflects that the ‘honey-
moon’ is not forgotten.
SOUTH AFRICA ON THE GLOBAL STAGE
SINCE 1994
Since its return to the international fold, South Africa
has not shirked from active engagement in global
 affairs. Although in comparison to the big emerging
powers of China and India, South Africa is a midget –
economically and demographically – it is clearly a
 pivotal or anchor state in its immediate region and 
on its continent. In addition, South Africa has a track
record of participation in the debates and negotiations
on new international regimes, most notably its lea-
ding role in the Ottawa Treaty on landmines and also
on nuclear non-proliferation. Under the Mbeki admini-
stration, this engagement increased further, with
South Africa also being invited to the G8 summits as
part of what some now bill the Outreach Five or the
G5 of China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa.
Indeed, South Africa has the structural and human
resources to engage constructively in Africa, and it
has the capacity to back up its ambitious foreign poli-
cy. As an emerging African power, with political and
economic clout, South Africa has assumed responsibi-
lity to keep the continent on the international agenda,
to help create effective continental institutions, to act
as a champion of the developing world and to push
for a more equitable global order. This role is partly
self-ordained and partly assigned, if somewhat grud-
gingly, by the continent.
South Africa’s participation in global affairs has been
guided by its key foreign policy principles, identified
as strategic priorities of the Department of Foreign
Affairs in their 2007-2010 Strategic Plan,2 namely:
1. Consolidation of the African Agenda
2. Strengthening of South-South Cooperation
3. Strengthening of North-South Cooperation
4. Participation in the Global System of Governance
5. Strengthening of Political and Economic Relations
Strategic priority four, i.e., participation in the global
system of governance, specifically motivates partici-
pation in the system so as to give the Global South
an equal voice with the developed North. In addition,
the objectives of its South-South and North-South
 cooperation also play a key role in its participation 
in the global governance system.
However, the strategic priorities of consolidating the
‘African agenda’ (which is sometimes difficult to defi-
ne), and reforming the global governance system
present something of a dilemma. Much of the legiti-
macy for South Africa’s actions on the international
scene derives from the country’s acceptance and
 recognition as an African state representing the con -
tinent. However, from the viewpoint of the other Afri-
can nations, this is not unanimously the case. As a
result, this makes it difficult for South Africa to fulfil
its strategic priorities of consolidating the ‘African
Agenda’ whilst at the same time contributing towards
the reform of global the governance system as a
weighty representative of the African continent. This
is perhaps not easily appreciated by the Global North.
South Africa’s membership in the G5 is largely a
 result of the legitimacy it has among industrialised
countries as a leader in Africa, but a status emana-
ting from the North can be a sword of Damocles in
terms of how it plays out in the intra-continental
 dynamics in Africa.3
South Africa’s global profile has much to do with the
fact that President Mbeki was largely a foreign policy
president. Although the general focus of South Afri-
can foreign policy after Mbeki’s departure from go-
vernment (which occurred unexpectedly in September
2008) is unlikely to change dramatically, it is still an
open question as to whether his successor4 will main-
tain the same level of engagement outside of the
country – at least initially. 
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South Africa’s own domestic challenges and short -
comings are also a potential constraining factor in
how it will choose to engage at the global level in the
 medium term. The country’s multilateral engagement
has mushroomed since 1994, but while this good glo-
bal citizenship is to be welcomed, it has not always
occurred with a proper assessment of how its involve-
ment plays into its national interest. The need to be
more discerning in the areas in which South Africa
engages in the multilateral sphere is linked to its abi-
lity to mitigate the substantial domestic challenges it
faces. Invariably, success at home will affect how it 
is viewed by its peers in Africa, but also more broadly
by the rest of the international community. Percepti-
ons of its global standing will be absolutely crucial to
its future involvement and influence on the debates
necessary to shape a new global institutional order.
This paper sets out to investigate South Africa’s posi-
tion and engagement in different global governance
forums, as well as in its region and continent. The
 paper is divided into five parts. It begins with an ana-
lysis of how South Africa sees its responsibility in the
international arena. The second section discusses the
values that South Africa espouses and which may, or
may not, play themselves out in the way it conducts
its international engagement. This is followed by a
discussion of South Africa’s global economic and poli-
tical governance involvement. The study ends with a
brief interrogation of South Africa’s position on an
international social order.
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Although countries such as China and India are often
billed as emerging economies, their global significan-
ce has become broader than simply their economic
relevance. These big emerging economies, as well 
as some smaller ones such as South Africa, have not
eschewed participation in the global debates on pres-
sing issues. Rather they are increasingly determined
to make their mark in the formulation of new interna-
tional rules. 
When he was deputy secretary of state, Robert
 Zoellick, noted that the US was encouraging China to
be a ‘responsible stakeholder’, as it became a major
global player. This meant that it would work with the
US and others ‘to sustain, adapt, and advance the
peaceful international system that has enabled its
success. […] Without always pursuing the same poli-
cies, we can still pursue the same policy goals with
complementary approaches’5.
It is the expectation of both the US and the EU that
the emerging powers will become responsible stake-
holders in the international community. This concept
is a key element in understanding international
 responsibility. However, the term may well mean
different things to these countries. When enunciated
in the context of China it referred to the expectation
by the US that this rising country would be willing
and able to cooperate in the ‘delivery of international
public goods such as economic stability, non-prolife-
ration, peacekeeping and regional security’6. As an
emerging power it should not be expected to be a
free rider in the international system, but rather
work to strengthen it.
However, responsibility implies an acceptance of cer-
tain underlying objectives and values, which a coun-
try with suitable capacity undertakes to meet and to
protect. When the term is used by the US or by the
EU, it is understood to imply those values and objec-
tives that are vital to their world view and particular
interests. Even before it became accepted that
 Fukuyama’s much-touted ‘end of history’ and the tri-
umph of the liberal international order did not reflect
the reality of the post-Cold War environment, non-
Western countries did not necessarily share the same
sentiments on the system and values that should be
underpinning it. Thus, it must be stated at the outset
that perceptions about what kind of behaviour consti-
tutes international responsibility may differ between
Western states and emerging powers.
South Africa takes its role on the global stage very
seriously. Unlike China and India, South Africa’s
 economic significance in global terms is very small
(except in the context of the African continent). 
Its desire to be part of shaping the new global order
is driven largely by its political determination to be
 active on the international stage. In addition to this,
its economic and political dominance in Africa means
that it is also given a seat at the global table on these
matters by others, including the West, as an impor-
tant representative of the continent.
In its ten-year review of the South African state,
under taken in 2003-04, the Presidency noted,
South Africa has, since 1994, sought to contribute
 towards the strengthening of a democratic, transpa-
rent and rules-bound international political and eco-
nomic order to advance the interests of developing
countries. This has informed South Africa’s position
on issues of international security, the environment
and trade.
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However, South Africa’s perspectives on what inter-
national responsibility means are often very different
from what the US or indeed Europe regards as beha-
viour befitting a ‘responsible stakeholder’. This has
become very obvious in the votes in the UN Security
Council since South Africa joined in January 2007 as
a non-permanent member. Although human rights
and democracy have been regarded as important
 values determining South Africa’s actions since 1994,
South Africa has adopted an approach in international
forums that approximates that of China and Russia
regarding non-interference in the internal affairs of
states. At the UN Security Council South Africa has
thus voted against the resolution initiated by the US
on Myanmar, opposed sanctions against Iran and
 Sudan, and sought to avoid discussion of Zimbabwe
(especially after the March 2008 elections there, the
presidential results of which were not announced for
several weeks). 
In taking positions on these issues, which have see-
med to go against the grain of advancing peace and
security, South Africa has repeatedly emphasised that
more punitive measures would be counterproductive
to efforts aimed at crafting a sustainable settlement
in those countries, especially since regional organisa-
tions were already exerting efforts in these matters.
South Africa would like to see itself as a rule maker 
in the international system – the apex of international
responsibility. Responsibility cannot be detached from
having the right to create input in an evolving interna-
tional system. However, it is likely that in the case of
South Africa this rule-making may be constrained by the
country’s need to heed solidarity with Africa, a factor
which plays less of a role in Brazil, India and China. 
Soft versus Hard Power: 
South Africa’s Political Strategies
At the heart of South Africa’s foreign policy is its Afri-
can Agenda. South Africa has realised that it cannot
insulate itself from developments in its geographical
neighbourhood and that much of its prosperity rests
on its ability to create surrounding zones of peace
and stability, which in turn make growth and develop-
ment possible. 
In sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa has the largest
economy (about US$ 290 billion in 2007/08)8, while it
has 63,000 military personnel – Angola has 108,000
and Rwanda has 70,0009. Since 1994 South Africa
has been at the forefront of enunciating a vision for
the continent’s internal as well as external challenges.
Former President Mbeki in particular was a visionary
in giving content to the ‘African Renaissance’ through
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development  (Nepad)10.
South Africa has used alliances with other key African
regional leaders to propel the formulation of new
 intergovernmental structures in its region and the
continent, which would reflect the vision of an Africa
better able to deal with its challenges and those
 posed by an increasingly globalised world into which
Africa was asymmetrically integrated.
South Africa: a young generation representing the strong
 demographic  development of the countries in transition.
In doing so it has used largely its soft power. South
Africa does not consider that its hard power should be
wielded unilaterally. With the exception of the inter-
vention in Lesotho in 1998, its military power is de-
ployed within African or UN multilateral frameworks.
It has deployed troops in peacekeeping missions,
among others in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC), Burundi and Sudan since 2001.
Both its military (hard power) and its soft power are
elements of its objective of creating peace and security
on the continent. South Africa’s own peaceful transiti-
on and negotiated settlement have given it the global
prominence and the legitimacy to contribute towards
conflict resolution. Indeed, this is seen as one of South
Africa’s ‘key exports’. South Africa has become invol-
ved not only in conflict resolution in Africa, but also in
Northern Ireland and the Middle East, and many of its
eminent constitutional lawyers have worked on crafting
constitutions for states emerging out of conflict (for
example in Rwanda and also more recently in Iraq).
Some of these initiatives outside of Africa have also
 taken the form of ‘second track’ diplomacy.
Arguably, much of South Africa’s soft power comes
from its particular historical experience, which elevat-
ed South Africa’s global standing among developed
and developing countries. Its ability to punch above
its weight and be heard has been largely due to its
willingness to engage, but also the willingness of
 others to see it do so. Often, the developed world 
has given South Africa more stature and responsibi -
lity than its own neighbours in the region may want
to recognise. And this is the dilemma of its foreign
engagement. It is for this reason that South Africa
emphasises for example, that its presence in the UN
 Security Council (UNSC) provides an opportunity to
voice the concerns and interests of the Africa group,
as well as those of the G77.
Its position in the Security Council and in the UN
 Human Rights Council has tended towards emphasi-
sing that it is not the West’s lapdog, and that it is 
not opposed to standing up to the P3 in the Security
Council, that is the US, the UK and France11.
However, at the global level, South Africa has made 
a valuable contribution to norm setting, especially
 during the late 1990s. First, it is the only country to
have given up its nuclear arsenal voluntarily. It made
a significant contribution to the review and extension
conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as
to the negotiation of the Ottawa Convention on land-
mines. But at the same time it jealously guards its
right to have a civilian nuclear capability. Its positions
at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),12
and also its advocacy of the right of developing states
to develop civilian nuclear capability are important
elements of its engagement in this regard. It has 
also been very critical of the ‘nuclear club’s’ own non-
compliance and double standards in adhering to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. South Africa is also a
member of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group. The country
has also worked to transfer its own expertise in nuclear
energy to other African states in order to build up
their own peaceful nuclear energy capabilities.
South Africa’s Regional Responsibility
South Africa’s strategy in terms of shouldering regional
responsibility has been to help build effective regional
and sub-regional institutions. This has been the case
both in the establishment of the AU, as well as in
streamlining the SADC Secretariat to make it more
effective. Nepad was also largely President Mbeki’s
brainchild. South Africa is the only country in the
 region (and possibly the continent) that has the eco-
nomic, political and military clout, capabilities and
 expertise to fulfil this agenda. The country has been
one of the largest contributors financially to AU insti-
tutions since its creation in 2002.
However, concerns about being characterised as a bul-
ly or a regional hegemon have meant that often South
Africa has avoided overemphasising its leadership role
within the continent. It has always sought to act in
concert with other powers such as Nigeria and Algeria. 
South Africa is ambiguous in its bilateral dealings 
with the rest of Africa. It remains acutely aware of
the fact that its pre-eminence as the partner of choice
for governments and organisations outside Africa is a
source of resentment in some quarters on the conti-
nent. As a result, South Africa is careful to act with
the African bloc wherever possible, despite the fact
that its interests often differ from those of other Afri-
can states as a result of its own more developed eco-
nomic status, and its different historical and political
 experience. It is also reluctant to offer open criticism
of other African leaders, as is seen most clearly in the
case of Zimbabwe’s president. This undercuts South
Africa’s moral stance at the very moment it is trying
to promote principled approaches. South Africa’s
 actions often reflect a need to ingratiate itself with
the leaders of other African states, to assure them 
of its African credentials.
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South Africa’s strong commercial presence in the
rest of the continent further complicates this rela -
tionship. Its investments are not always regarded 
as making a positive contribution to individual eco -
nomies, especially because they are often more
competitive than local businesses (the retail sector
has been singled out in particular). The South Afri-
can government is also equally sensitive to the role
that its national companies play in the region, and
has spoken about developing a code of conduct for
their operations.
Regional Responsibility on Security Issues
South Africa’s identification of itself as an African
state since 1994 and its recognition of the vastly
transformed local and international conflict environ-
ment underpin the country’s foreign policy with re-
gard to security. Pretoria acknowledges this, saying
that:
[al]though South Africa acknowledges its global
 responsibilities, the prioritisation afforded Africa in
South African foreign policy makes Africa the prime
focus of future engagements. South Africa has an
 obvious interest in preserving regional peace and  –
stability in order to promote trade and development
and to avoid the spillover effects of conflicts in the
neighbourhood13.
A formative factor in South Africa’s approach to secu-
rity policy is the country’s own experience of peaceful
transformation from apartheid to democracy. Since
1994, South Africa has been involved in a number of
conflict resolution attempts: Burundi, the DRC, Côte
d’Ivoire and Sudan (Darfur). To this may be added
Zimbabwe and Lesotho. The record is mixed, but it 
is not without notable interim successes. In Burundi
and the DRC South Africa’s efforts have resulted in,
first, a restoration of political contestation in both
countries, and second, successful elections. These
have produced fragile but nonetheless functioning
 governments. South Africa’s biggest challenge now,
however, is to ensure that these fragile political
 settlements stay on track. In Zimbabwe the power-
sharing agreement negotiated by President Mbeki,
which was announced in September 2008, provides
an opportunity for the political impasse to be broken
in that country, but at the time of writing it had yet
to be fully implemented. With President Mbeki’s resig -
nation, which followed a few days after the signing 
of the agreement, the role that a new South African
 government may want to play is unclear. The efforts
in Côte d’Ivoire and Darfur have thus far been un -
successful.
A major constraint is that, despite all its resource
 allocation to conflict resolution, South Africa has limi-
ted institutional back-up for its senior political leaders
when mediating conflicts to ensure that the agree-
ments of the peace process are implemented.14
South Africa has also actively promoted institution-
building through the creation and reform of new se-
curity architecture for Africa. The AU Peace and Secu-
rity Council (PSC), which aims to ‘promote peace, se-
curity and stability in Africa’, officially came into being
in July 2002 and South Africa was elected as an inau-
gural member. South Africa has financed many of the
PSC’s initiatives, including the AU’s first peacekeeping
operation, the African Mission to Burundi (AMIB).
The AU’s security function is supported by nine
smaller, overlapping regional economic communities.
While full economic integration is the primary ambi -
tion of these structures, most of them include co-
ordinated security components, such as SADC’s Organ
on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS). However,
since the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security
was adopted by SADC, the Organ has exerted very
little influence over the member country to which it
might be thought to matter most – Zimbabwe.
Perhaps the most significant constraint on South
 Africa’s responses to conflict in Africa is its own am bi -
valence. While Pretoria has provided a bold vision 
and vigorously supported the building of Africa’s new
 diplomatic and security architecture, there remains 
an element of hesitation, possibly a legacy of South
Africa’s apartheid past. As Flemes notes:15
In particular the former frontline states are highly
sensitive to any behaviour that reminds them of the
apartheid regime’s aggressive policies of regional
 hegemony. Hence a pronounced articulation of
 Pretoria’s claim to regional leadership would imply 
a high risk of isolation.
This may help to explain why South Africa has been
proactive and persistent in building multilateral struc-
tures at the AU level and taking a lead in mediating
conflicts further north, while showing reluctance to
provide the same energetic leadership within its own
sub-region.
South Africa has used its position as a non-perma-
nent member of the UN Security Council to address
some of the weaknesses in that global body’s inter -
action with regional structures to resolve conflicts. In
March 2007 South Africa presented a concept paper
on the link between the UN and regional organisati-
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ons (Chapter VIII of the UN Charter), especially in
the areas of conflict and peace-building, for debate 
by the Council. Underlying the motivation for such an
engagement between the UN and regional organisa -
tions is South Africa’s advocacy for a larger voice for
the global South, i.e., the global South will sort out
its own problems; it will implement its own diplomatic
mechanisms to deal with conflicts; and it will be trea-
ted as doing the regional job on behalf of the Security
Council.
In April 2008 Resolution 1809 was adopted16, which
focused essentially on cooperation between the UN
and the African Union. In addition, one of the out -
comes of South Africa’s initiative since 2007 has been
to establish annual meetings between the UN Security
Council and the AU Peace and Security Council.
Regional bodies are an important component in South
Africa’s solution to problems of global security. It will
therefore tend to deflect issues of global insecurity to
respective regional bodies rather than address them
in the Security Council. Indeed, regionalism allows
South Africa to be seen as a partner in resolving con-
flicts and reduces the chances of its being seen as a
new hegemonic leader. This, linked with negotiated
settlements between parties, reinforces the image
South Africa wants to create of itself as a mediatory
power promoting peace and stability. The challenge
for South Africa is to help redefine security concepts
in the area of overlap between regional organisations
and the UN, and indeed in the area of collective secu-
rity when it comes to the nexus between security,
 development and democracy. 
South Africa is currently listed as the seventeenth-
 largest contributor to UN peacekeeping operations
globally. South Africa has also taken part in IBSA
(see also below), Atlassur, and NATO naval exercises
in the South Atlantic/South Indian Ocean. 
As of May 2008, South Africa had over 3,000 troops
deployed on various AU/UN missions. These included
missions to Burundi, the DRC, Cote d’Ivoire, Sudan,
Uganda, Eritrea/Ethiopia and Darfur17. However,
peace keeping operations are, and will continue to be,
constrained even further by a drop in GDP spending
on defence from the current 4.4 per cent to 1.9 per
cent in 2009 (projected)18. Operations will be further
restricted by the high incidence of HIV/Aids in the
South African National Defence Force19.
On global security issues South Africa’s view is that
tackling poverty and underdevelopment is the most
important challenge. The international system is not
only challenged by global security issues such as
 terrorism, organised crime, drugs, human trafficking,
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) and small arms. It is also challenged by secu-
rity issues that are critical to the South such as poverty,
underdevelopment, pandemic and communicable
diseases (such as HIV/AIDS). These issues cannot be
separated from one another. The US’s focus on the
war on terror has meant that the security debate has
become very narrowly focused, and has indeed made
the world a more dangerous place. This is largely the
position taken by South Africa, although it has colla-
borated on some intelligence and terrorism issues
with the US and others. 
South Africa as a Development Cooperation Partner
South Africa’s foray into development cooperation
 began fairly modestly but has mushroomed over the
last several years. However, this has occurred often
on an ad hoc basis, without an overarching frame-
work. A 2007 study20 by SAIIA found that South
 Africa’s development assistance (DA) lacks a coherent
policy framework. South Africa currently does not
have a development aid agency. The African Renais-
sance and International Development Fund Act, pas-
sed in 2000, is the primary structured vehicle for aid
disbursements. The objectives of the African Renais-
sance Fund are to foster:
 cooperation between SA and other countries, in
 particular African states;
 the promotion of democracy and good governance;
 the prevention and resolution of conflict;
 socio-economic development and integration;
 the provision of humanitarian assistance; and
 the development of human resources. 
However, the Fund represents only a small percen -
tage of the DA given by the South African government
(about 3.8 per cent in 2002 and 3.3 per cent in
2004). Disbursements by the African Renaissance
Fund  accounted for around R50 million of overall DA
in 2004/05, R150 million in 2005/2006, and around
R300 million in the 2006/07 financial year. In addi -
tion, the growth in South African imports has resulted
in an increase in the Southern African Customs Union
(SACU) transfers to Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho 
and Swaziland (‘BNLS states’) from R3.2 billion in
1994/95 to R23.1 billion in 2007/0821. These are not
strictly speaking development cooperation funds, but
there is a debate currently within government about
whether these should be converted into funds meant
specifically for development rather than for running
costs of its other SACU partners. 
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The majority of South Africa’s DA comes from govern -
ment departments, parastatals (e.g. Eskom), statu -
tory bodies (e.g. Independent Electoral Commission),
government agencies (Council for Scientific and Indu-
strial Research (CSIR)), as well as politically and
 institutionally affiliated but financially autonomous
 government agencies (the Industrial Development
Corporation of South Africa (IDC) and the Develop-
ment Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA)). South Africa’s
estimated DA contributions as a percentage of GNI
are at 0.17 per cent (2004). South Africa prioritises
DA to African countries. The South African govern-
ment’s financial aid to the rest of Africa could be con-
servatively estimated at some R19 billion in 2007,
and peacekeeping and training are the main areas 
in which South Africa gives support22.
South Africa has shown a willingness to cooperate
with other donors and multilateral bodies and is
 increasingly involved in trilateral or tripartite part -
nerships. However, South Africa has to balance its
 in volvement in trilateral assistance with the desire to
remain politically independent in the eyes of other
African countries,. There is also the issue of capacity
constraints, and the absence of effective monitoring
systems. 
At the 52nd National Conference of the African
 National Congress (ANC) in 2007, the ANC supported
the creation of a South African Development Partner-
ship Agency (SADPA), and it is likely that this will
materialise in the medium term. A white paper on
development cooperation is under way. A key theme
raised by policy makers and political commentators
in South Africa is the necessity of elucidating a cen-
tral objective of having a development cooperation
programme. While the Department of Foreign Affair’s
(DFA) African Renaissance Fund is guided by the
 legislation that established it, the lack of a centra -
lised and coherent approach across government





The rise of non-Western actors on the global stage,
with growing global influence and increasing ability to
shape the globalisation process, undoubtedly has im-
plications for the type of value system that will domi-
nate a new world order. 
South Africa’s world view is dictated by its historical
experience and its position as a developing state. This
experience was based on the value of negotiations,
which are inclusive rather than exclusive, and conci-
liatory rather than confrontational; the imperative of
removing apartheid at the global economic and politi-
cal level, much as the country had done at the natio-
nal level; and the value of human rights as encom-
passing not only civic political rights but also socio-
economic rights.23
If the UN Charter is considered to reflect the values
which underpin the current global order, South Africa
would regard itself as supporting those values. How -
ever, South Africa believes that the West practises
double standards when it comes to upholding these
values. Thus while the UN Charter and the compositi-
on of the General Assembly convey the sense that
equality of states is the basis of the system, the UN’s
actual operations (especially in the Security Council)
reflect the unequal power relations. An examination
of South Africa’s pronouncements illustrates the im-
portance of equality and greater global justice in its
values discourse.
When the new South African government came to
power peacefully after the elections in 1994, enor-
mous expectations were placed on it internationally 
to promote peace, good governance and respect for
human rights in its foreign policy. This human rights
based foreign policy has in time given way to a more
fragile balancing act between principle and pragma-
tism. In recent years, the refusal of South Africa to
condemn Robert Mugabe and the political and eco -
nomic chaos his regime has caused in Zimbabwe, as
well as its failure to support the vote against human
rights abuses by the military junta in Myanmar at the
UN Security Council (mentioned above) have high-
lighted the contradictions caused in South Africa’s
 foreign policy by this balancing act. While the prag-
matic handling of South Africa’s foreign policy allows
the country to engage with a range of actors with
very different value systems, this has also raised
questions, not only among states but also among civil
society actors in Africa and elsewhere, about South
Africa’s commitment to human rights and good go-
vernance 
For South Africa the overriding factors in the discussion
about value systems are those of poverty and inequa -
lity at the global level because of a skewed system of
global institutions which favour the strong over the
weak. South Africa’s actions in various global forums
reflect the growing importance of this perspective in
its thinking. For example, the unwillingness of Nor -
thern countries to discuss socio-economic rights in the
Human Rights Council, focusing rather on political
rights in selective countries (Zimbabwe and Myan-
mar) is perceived as insensitivity to the plight of the
poor, and as double standards. South Africa, partly
because of its own experience, prefers an approach 
to so-called ‘rogue’ regimes that engages rather than
isolates. 
However, viewed from a different angle, South Africa’s
consistency in this regard could be called into questi-
on, given that the country based its own domestic
 construction of a national identity on human rights
 credentials earned through its exceptional transition 
in 1994 and its policy of reconciliation.
As a middle power, South Africa supports a rules-
 based multipolar world order. Since 1994 South Africa
has positioned itself as a bridge between developing
and developed countries as well as working hard in
numerous international forums to fashion consensus
between emerging countries on global political and
economic governance structures. It has also expan-
ded efforts in creating, and becoming part of, parallel
structures of rising economies. South Africa has been
directing its efforts towards creating a more inclusive,
democratic system of global governance that enjoys
greater legitimacy. More recently, however, its
bridge-building role may have been undermined by
the strong, sometimes contrary positions it has taken
in UN forums, which have been criticised by the West
for not being helpful in efforts to build consensus.
GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE
Global economic governance is the set of norms and
institutions along which rules are generated to manage
the global economy. The actors are not only states
themselves but also intergovernmental organisations,
business, and non-governmental organisations.
According to Stiglitz, ‘[t]he failures of globalisation
can be traced to the fact that in setting the rules of
the game, commercial and financial interests …have
prevailed within the international economic institu -
tions’24, and that the most fundamental change that 
is needed ‘to make globalisation work is a change in
governance regarding the international economic,
 financial and trade institutions25. 
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Although the global economic governance institutions
that emerged after the Second World War were the
strongest of the bodies created, they are experiencing
a severe crisis of legitimacy today, with both their
credibility and their efficacy being questioned. 
Since 1994 South Africa has taken a keen interest
and participated fully in these institutions, especially
in how to reform them so that they are more legiti-
mate and take into account the new global realities. 
The Bretton Woods Institutions26
While some analysts and actors in the developing
world argue that the Bretton Woods institutions have
outlived their usefulness, becoming relics of a post-
World War Two order that no longer pertains, South
Africa’s position is that these institutions can play an
important role, but not as they are currently constitu-
ted. South Africa has been very engaged on this issue
since 1994. The minister of finance, Trevor Manuel,
has been an active proponent of their reform, both
through the IMF and also South Africa’s participation
in the G20 Finance meetings. 
In an address he gave at the World Editors’ Forum in
2007 he remarked:
If we accept the reality that the integration of the
world’s economy has outpaced its institutions by far,
then we must also accept that equilibrium will not be
possible without institutions capable of constructing
the policy consensus. And, in order to do this, the legi -
timacy of the multilateral institutions is paramount.
Yet, there is very little disagreement on the fact that
the IMF and World Bank are constrained by a huge
deficit of democracy27.
Reform also entails changing the practice of appoin-
ting the heads of these two institutions, in which the
US appoints the World Bank president and the Euro-
peans appoint the IMF Managing Director. In referring
to the appointment of Bob Zoellick as World Bank
president, Minister Manuel noted:
The problem is that the US administration lacked the
courage that its candidate needed by way of support.
It relied on what Joe Stiglitz recently described as
”the appointment of the President of the World Bank
is perceived as a birthright of the USA.” And so, the
legitimacy of both the institution and the candidate
are compromised. On the voting structure of these
organisations too, we must pose serious questions.
[…] The United States holds 18 per cent of the share-
holding, and while there has been some variation to
the shareholding structure, the USA as the biggest
shareholder still has veto power. The presidency of
the World Bank should not be determined merely by
its citizenry.
South Africa has also sought to emphasise its African
identity in the Bretton Woods institutions. It was very
telling for example, that when South Africa was read-
mitted into the IMF it was invited by the Swiss group
to become a member. This group comprises a very
small number of countries28 and membership of it
would have allowed South Africa to hold the mana-
ging director seat more frequently than in the Africa
group. However, the government preferred to join the
Africa group.
The reform of the Bretton Woods Financial Instituti-
ons is primarily pursued by the South African National
Treasury. The Treasury’s core objective with respect
to reform of the Bretton Woods institutions includes
the following:29
 Reform of the process whereby the heads and senior
management of the two institutions are selected,
moving from an approach whereby the US and
Europe nominate leaders of the Bank and Fund
 respectively, to a merit-based approach in which
developing countries have a say; and a process
which is more transparent.
 Increasing the voice and representation of develo-
ping countries in decisions taken at the two institu-
tions. However, it is not clear whether this extends
to the G2430 position of increasing the voice of all
developing countries or simply those of ‘systemi -
cally significant’ developing countries.31
 Putting both institutions’ funding bases onto a lon-
ger-term, sustainable track in light of the fact that
their erstwhile principle clients in the middle-income
countries group no longer access both institutions’
lending facilities. Here we should note that a few
years ago the South African government was oppo-
sed to the IMF’s proposal to sell its gold reserves in
order to finance its longer-term needs. That positi-
on has since moderated owing to the IMF’s evident
funding problems and the currently high gold price.
 Addressing the needs of low-income countries by
broadening support strategies beyond macroecono-
mic adjustment to microeconomic reform, and
being more sensitive to local particularities, i.e.,
avoiding a ‘one-size fits all’ approach.
 Improving the effectiveness of the Fund’s surveil-
lance of the global economy.
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 Supporting the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative,
through monitoring its implementation and ensuring
it does not fall off the agenda. Related to this is the
need to develop domestic revenue sources indepen-
dent of unpredictable aid flows. This is captured in
the ‘fiscal space for development’ agenda.
 Harnessing the World Bank’s resources and exper -
tise to building supply-side capacities in African coun-
tries, notably through provision of trade-supporting
 infrastructure. Similarly, harnessing both the Fund
and Bank’s resources to build African capacities to
govern their own economies.
These issues are taken up directly with the Fund and
the Bank, and with other member states in a variety
of forums such as the joint Fund-Bank Development
Committee which Minister Manuel chaired recently; and
the Commission on Growth and Development of which
Minister Manuel is a member. However, the G20 Finance
forum seems to have become the primary locus for
pursuing South Africa’s objectives in this regard.
The G20 of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Gover-
nors was co-chaired in 2007 by the South African
 National Treasury and the South African Reserve Bank.
In the communiqué which followed the meeting of the
G20 Finance in Hermanus, South Africa, in 2007, it is
noted with respect to Bretton Woods Institutions re-
form that the G20 Finance has contributed ‘to a con-
vergence of views among the IMF’s members’. This
refers to the G20 Finance position that reform should
enhance the representation of ‘dynamic economies,
many of which are emerging economies’. It also
 notes progress made in adopting a new income model
for the Fund and in designing a new liquidity instru-
ment for managing financial crises; and it reaffirms
G20 Finance support for overhauling selection pro -
cesses for senior management at the Fund and Bank,
including the positions of Managing Director and Pre -
sident, respectively. South Africa has played a very
 active role on the issue of IMF reform, and is viewed
by other countries as an honest broker in the process.
At the time that South Africa assumed the chair of
the G20 Finance, many  hoped that it would be able 
to broker an agreement on quota and governance
 reform, because the country stands to lose from any
new formula or ad hoc quota increase that is currently
being discussed.32
The World Trade Organization
As a committed multilateralist, South Africa has favou-
red the development of a global trading system within
an effective multilateral framework. Thus its involve-
ment in the WTO processes has been a particular
 focus of its foreign trade policy. Nevertheless, this
engagement needs to be understood in the context 
of South Africa’s commitment to work towards the
elimination of ‘global economic apartheid’, more spe-
cifically the unequal terms of trade that developing
countries have had to endure.
Its approach has thus been characterised by the
 building of issues-based coalitions with like-minded
states within the WTO. Most notable was South Afri-
ca’s role, together with Brazil and India, in putting
 together the Brazil-India led G2033 grouping of deve-
loping countries pushing for reform of agricultural sub-
sidies at the Cancun Ministerial Conference. Despite
predictions of its demise, the grouping has managed
to stay together and has played a key role in ensu-
ring that developing countries insist on reforms in the
North’s agricultural subsidy system. While some may
attribute to this the lack of progress with the Doha
Round, it has also been a case of greater assertion by
key emergent developing countries of their interests.
However, it is important to note that South Africa
also participates in the Australia-led Cairns group, 
the primary focus of which is reform of agricultural
tariff regimes in the developed world.
Even more than within the G20 agriculture, South
Africa has played a leading role in another informal
coalition within the WTO, the Non-Agricultural Market
Access (NAMA) 11. This has been motivated by the
resistance of the Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI) to major cuts to its industrial tariff regime, for
two reasons: to protect policy space to implement its
newly minted industrial strategy; and because it sees
the cuts being demanded as disproportionate to the
agriculture reforms on offer by developed countries.
The NAMA-11 group is led by South Africa but inclu-
des its G20 alliance partners, India and Brazil.
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Overall, both the G20 and the NAMA-11 have had
substantial impact on negotiations in the Doha
Round, to the extent that initiatives emanating from
developed countries have to take these two groups
into account and be tailored accordingly. This is re-
flected in the fact that the pivotal countries in these
groups – Brazil, India, and to a lesser extent South
Africa – are consistently invited into closed-door con-
sultations. The G20, in particular, has been able to
put forward middle-ground positions towards which
the agriculture negotiations – the most fraught of all
– have gravitated. Although the Doha Round negotia-
tions ground to a halt in Geneva in August 2008, on
the technical issues the major negotiating players are
not far apart. Negotiations stumbled largely because
of politics and the electoral cycles of the US and India
in particular34.
In the WTO, South Africa also operates in the African,
Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) group space, with par -
ticular emphasis on Africa. Hence South Africa is a
member of the Africa group. However, unlike South
Africa’s relations with Brazil and India, which are
 relatively uncomplicated, its relations with the Africa
group have been fraught at times. Mostly this revol-
ves around the fact that South Africa is a major in -
vestor on the continent, and hence has an array of
offensive interests in keeping with its middle power
status. Yet the Africa group’s overall orientation is
largely defensive, since most of its members are
 least-developed countries (LDCs). These countries
wish to maintain preferential access into northern
markets by retarding agriculture market access libe-
ralisation; defend what is left of their industrial tariff
protection (a goal shared by the South Africa); and
resist servi ces liberalisation and further regulatory
 reform. Hence South Africa finds itself caught between
a foreign policy logic built around notions of African
solidarity, and market access imperatives pushing  
supporting its companies in their penetration of the
continent.
One may argue about the specific positions that South
Africa may have adopted in the WTO negotiations;
 however, the process of developing small coalitions
around common issues, where South Africa has played
an important and leading role, has yielded positive
outcomes by contributing to shifting the power dyna-
mics within the WTO membership. In the wake of the
impasse over the Doha Development Round, South
Africa has continued to pursue and explore regional
free trade agreements. However, it has assiduously
 insisted that it would not negotiate on issues that
have not been embarked on within the WTO multi -
lateral framework, such as the ‘Singapore issues’.35
South Africa’s Participation in Regional
 Arrangements
South Africa is a member of the two significant re -
gional organisations in Southern Africa; the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) and the
Southern African Customs Union (SACU). Although
only the former is recognised by the AU as a building-
block of an African Economic Community, SACU pro-
vides a stronger base for a regional economic com-
munity for Southern Africa than SADC. SADC laun-
ched a free trade area in August 2008, but there are
still many obstacles to realising its benefits in real
terms, especially as it moves to harmonise macro-
economic policies. Attainment of a SADC customs
 union by 2010 is also a highly ambitious timeframe
because of the wide gap between policy and imple-
mentation. In contrast, SACU has the potential to
 become the key economic organisation in a Southern
African regional economic community (REC), provided
progress is made in the short to medium term on
harmonising policies among member states.
Although the most recent renegotiation of the SACU
agreement, which came into force in 2004, means
that in principle South Africa’s domination of trade
policy formulation and also negotiations is being
 reduced as the customs union becomes more demo-
cratic in its decision-making, the disagreements
among SACU members36 over the signing of the inte-
rim economic partnership agreements (EPAs) have
potentially undermined the chances of its operating
as the engine of integration in the region.
South Africa, the dominant regional power, views
 regional integration via SACU as a priority. Therefore,
South Africa may choose to use its influence to sup-
port SACU’s economic integration agenda, but to
 entrust non-economic issues to SADC. It is not clear
whether the other members of SACU (the BLNS)
 support this approach. 
A SACU that accommodates more members would
consolidate the regional institutional architecture in
South Africa. This might be an alternative to accep-
ting the EU-inspired design of the EPA. Political
 differences within the region remain an obstacle to
negotiations. Other states are generally suspicious 
of South Africa’s intentions, and they are therefore
unwilling to join an arrangement (SACU) which may
make them financially dependent on South Africa.37
However, it is also true that South Africa was instru-
mental in organising the SADC Free Trade Agreement
(FTA) and putting pressure on recalcitrant members
to sign the FTA. Given the various integration sche-
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mes that are being developed in the eastern and
Southern African regions, the regional architecture 
of which South Africa is a part will be affected. 
From a development financing perspective, South
Africa has two key institutions which provide financing
to the region and beyond: the Development Bank 
of Southern Africa and the Industrial Development
Corporation. The IDC has signed memoranda of
 understanding and various other formal agreements
with individual African development finance institu -
tions,  including Banque de Developpement du Mali,
the National Development Corporation of Lesotho and
the Namibian Development Bank. Relationships have
also been established in information shared with
 other international development finance institutions,
namely Brazil’s Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento
Econômico e Social and the China Development
Bank.38
South Africa’s Perspective on Alternative Regional
or International Structures
South Africa is committed to a rules-based internatio-
nal system. This means that in the long run alternati-
ve, or parallel, structures should not be the objective.
These may be necessary in the short term and provi-
de alternative options in the face of stagnating reforms
at the global level. However, they are not the basis
upon which a stable rules-based multilateral system
can be built.
Nevertheless, South Africa is a strong proponent of
the view that the continent should not rely only on
external funds, whether aid or investment, to address
its developmental challenges. In this regard it sees a
role for institutions such as the African Development
Bank, its own Development Bank of Southern Africa
(see above), and the mobilisation of African funds, 
for example to deal with infrastructural needs. South
Africa has been at the forefront of finance innovations
to mobilise African funds. Together with Ghana, it
was instrumental in setting up the Pan-African Infra-
structure Development Fund, which was launched at
the AU Summit in Accra in July 2007. The Fund’s aim
is to create a ‘sustainable infrastructure platform for
the continent’.39 Its size is US$1 billion, and includes
private and public investors, mostly from South
 Africa.
South Africa is supportive of regional integration in
Africa but favours the existing SACU as the basis for
broadening economic integration in its subregion. South
Africa also supports the creation of regional financial
institutions and is a key player within the African
 Development Bank. In terms of international trade
and finance institutions, South Africa advocates the
reform of existing institutions such as the IMF and
World Bank. However, this does not mean that South
Africa is adverse to alternative international formati-
ons, such as the G20 Finance or the NAMA 11 within
the WTO, particularly if these can be used to build
consensus for action within existing international
structures. Indeed, this has been a key mode of
 engagement by South Africa at the global level. 
Relevant Institutions: Global and Regional
From the preceding analysis it is clear that South
Africa does not aim to overthrow the international
economic order as reflected in its institutions. How -
ever, it believes that these are due for a major over-
haul, so that they become more legitimate and reflect
the changing world. Achieving this not only requires
working within these global institutions, but also the
creation of alliances among developing states to spe-
arhead changes. There is also space at the regional
level for better mobilisation of institutions and resour-
ces to address developmental issues.
Regarding the IMF, South Africa is fiscally secure and
is unlikely to need IMF loans again. South Africa is
not a large recipient of development assistance, and
as a result multilateral loans through the World Bank
group are also unlikely to be of any great significance
to the country. However, the IMF and the World Bank
remain vital from a governance perspective, especial-
ly in Africa, and as such have special relevance for
South Africa. The G20 Finance is regarded by South
Africa as an important institution in bringing about
the reform of the IMF and the World Bank.
In the same vein, the WTO, as a functioning rules-
based multilateral trading regime, is regarded as central
to achieving equitable global trade, a priority of the
South African government. 
South Africa’s engagement with the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has
also accelerated in recent years. South Africa is cur-
rently at the level of ‘enhanced engagement’ with the
OECD (as are India, China and Brazil) and the Trea-
sury is considering OECD overtures to take things for-
ward. However, the implications of full OECD mem-
bership are still being considered. Among the issues
that need to be weighed up are the potential benefits
that could accrue from membership, such as improve-
ment in credit ratings as well as OECD best practice,
versus what would be seen in some quarters as
‘cooption by the North’.40
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South Africa still considers SACU to be the most im-
portant institution in the regional context. SACU has a
better chance of deepening and broadening economic
integration in Southern Africa than SADC does, and it
will allow South Africa greater control in the shaping
of that process. 
African institutions are crucial in South Africa’s vision
of more effective regional and continental governance,
which is why it has played a key role in devising the
architecture of the African Union and indeed being one
of the five major financial contributors to its running,
hosting the Pan-African Parliament, and pushing in the
early 2000s for a more streamlined SADC Secretariat.
Naturally, the AU and Nepad are important institutions
for South Africa, given the emphasis placed on the
African Agenda in its international engagements.
The most notable developing country alliances as
 vehicles for global change are first, the IBSA dialogue
forum (see below), although to date nothing specta-
cular has evolved out of it. However, it reflects a more
strategic thinking on the part of Brazil, India and
South Africa about how to push for global reforms in a
more coordinated manner.
Second, South Africa places great store by its inclusion
as a member of the G5, which has been interacting in 
a more systematic way with the G8. This interaction
with the G8, which in the case of South Africa began 
at Okinawa in 2000, provides it with an important plat-
form to engage with the key Northern actors on mat-
ters close to its foreign policy agenda, and which are
specifically related to Africa and to the reform of global
governance system. However, the engagement in the
forum of an ‘outreach 5’ has also helped to consolidate
a new grouping of the G5, which will operate outside of
the G8 format. This gained impetus during 2008, with
the decision that the G5 leaders should also meet sepa-
rately and independently of the G8 and its agenda.
South Africa is faced with an internal contradiction
when considering its economic interests in the future.
The advanced nature of its economy means that often
South Africa has more in common with emerging and
developed countries than it does with the economies
of most other African states. The country also has a
number of domestic imperatives, such as addressing
the high rate of unemployment and a large unskilled
workforce, which are vital for the continuing growth
of the South African economy.
Consequently, South Africa is required to balance
what is in its own best national interest against the
risk of alienating itself through its economic and trade
policies from the rest of the Africa group. It is also
essential that South Africa maintains its legitimacy 
as the interlocutor for Africa in informal and formal
global economic governance forums, since it is this
reputation which provides it with a seat at the table
and with the ability to influence the discourse on glo-
bal economic governance reform. South Africa’s di-
lemma is that, although it participates very actively 
in many of the forums focusing on the big emerging
powers and is seen as representing the interests of
Africa there, other African states do not necessarily
see South Africa as their ‘mandated’ spokesperson.
This contradiction is not likely to disappear in the
 future.
GLOBAL POLITICAL GOVERNANCE
The 20th century, often described as the bloodiest
and most violent in history, was also the century 
that saw the concrete movement towards establishing
international institutions based on evolving norms of
international behaviour, ‘to promote peace, curb ag-
gression, regulate diplomatic affairs, devise an inter-
national code of law, encourage social development,
and foster prosperity’.41 The United Nations (UN) has
been the pre-eminent institution of global cooperation
since 1945, and while it has many shortcomings, in-
cluding the composition of its Security Council that
reflects a different historical period, it is still regarded
as an important legitimating  forum. The transnational
nature of many of the world’s new challenges means
that institutions of global governance, such as the
UN, are more necessary than in the past. However,
as the world changes from the circumstances that
prevailed in the immediate post-war period, visions 
of the structure and role of such an institution have
also changed, and new global and regional powers
have an interest in shaping their transformation.
South Africa acknowledges the importance of the Uni-
ted Nations as the global body with legitimacy to play
a constructive role in dealing with the many problems
facing the world, especially those that are transnatio-
nal in nature, such as international terrorism, global
pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria
and the SARS virus and including the challenges po-
sed by climate change. 
However, it is because South Africa appreciates the
importance of the United Nations that it emphasises
the necessity of UN reform to make it more inclusive,
equitable and hence more legitimate. At the annual
meeting of the General Assembly in September 2007,
President Mbeki emphasised with frustration the need
of the United Nations to reform, if it is to meet the
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targets it has set itself regarding the reduction of
 poverty and the uplifting of the poor, when he said:
Because the nations of the world are defined by the
dominant and the dominated, the dominant have also
become the decision makers in the important global
forums, including at this seat of global governance.
Accordingly, the skewed distribution of power in the
world, political, economic, military, technological and
social, replicates itself in multilateral institutions,
much to the disadvantage of the majority of the poor
people of the world.
Indeed, even as we agree on the important program-
mes that should bring a better life to billions of the
poor, the rich and the powerful have consistently
sought to ensure that whatever happens, the existing
power relations are not altered and therefore the status
quo remains…
President Mbeki went on to say that:
… [T]he cold reality is that it will be difficult for the
UN in its present form fully to implement its own de-
cisions and therefore help the poor achieve urgently
the MDGs [Millennium Development Goals].
Indeed, until the ideals of freedom, justice and equa-
lity characterise this premier world body, the domi-
nant will forever dictate to the dominated and the in-
terests of the dominated, which are those of the ma-
jority of humanity, would be deferred in perpetuity42.
South Africa therefore views the reform of global
 governance institutions, such as the UN, as an im -
portant process of redistributing power in the world
system. But it also sees this as a way of increasing 
its own influence in the world. A greater distribution
of power amongst nations will mean a greater role for
emerging middle powers such as Brazil, India and in-
deed South Africa. These countries are already regar-
ded as significant drivers (politically and economical-
ly) of their regions, which in turn increases the global
political and economic significance of these countries.
It is therefore in South Africa’s strategic interests to
be seen as fighting the cause of the ‘dominated’ of
the world (and specifically of Africa). Deputy foreign
minister Sue Van der Merwe noted in 2006:
It is clear that it is only through a reformed UN that
threats and challenges facing humanity can be collec-
tively confronted. Such a reform should be meaning-
ful, strengthen the ability of the organisation to im-
plement its mandates effectively and enable it to
 serve the interests of the collective membership. 
A stronger UN that responds more effectively to our
 collective needs is in our common interest. We there-
fore remain seized with the issue of the reform of 
the UN43.
A recent statement by African National Congress
(ANC) President Jacob Zuma indicates that the im -
portance of the UN to the South African government
is unlikely to change, even though there is now a new
president at the helm: 
South Africa’s foreign policy recognises that in order
to achieve a better life for all, development and secu-
rity are best addressed through adequate attention to
all global threats facing humanity. I believe that no
organisation other than the United Nations has pro-
ven its ability to play this role effectively44.
South Africa’s Vision for Reform of Global
 Institutions
South Africa wants to make the existing institutions
of global governance more inclusive and democratic
so that the Global South, the interests of which South
Africa articulates frequently, has a stronger voice and
a say at the table. This is reiterated constantly by
many of South Africa’s senior political leadership. In
2007 South African Finance Minister Trevor Manuel
said that:
The major problems of the world affect all its citizens
and we can only begin to develop solutions to these
problems when we change towards a more inclusive
system of global governance. There is a need…to recog -
nise the interdependence and interconnectedness of
our changing world, more importantly, to design a set
of institutions and governance arrangements to meet
the needs of everyone45. (emphasis added)
Earlier in 2005, South Africa’s Foreign Minister Nkosazana
Dlamini Zuma emphasised the necessity of restructuring
global power relations: 
[A]s agents of progressive change we shall continue
our engagement with the global debate directed to-
wards the restructuring of the existing global power
relations, particularly through the reform of the global
multilateral institutions such as the United Nations,
Bretton Woods institutions and the World Trade Or-
ganization. To this end the department has actively
participated in the debates on UN reform, particularly 
on the reform of the UNSC, in order to make the UN
more effective in dealing with the new challenges as
well as to make it more transparent and democratic.
71
Needless to say, as an African country we have
 worked with other countries on the Continent, to 
shape and determine the Common African Position
with  regard to the United Nations reform as a whole.
 Consequently as an African country we shall pursue
Africa’s goal to be fully represented in all decision-
making organs of the UN, particularly in the Security
Council, which is the principal decision-making organ
of the UN in matters relating to international peace
and security46.
UN Reform
South Africa has been an active advocate of UN
 reform and was nominated by former Secretary
 General of the UN, Kofi Annan, to serve on the task
team that advised him on UN reform. South Africa
has supported the African position on UN Security
Council reform as set out in the Ezulwini Consensus,
despite originally favouring a position similar to that
of the G4 (India, Brazil, Germany and Japan) which
called for the creation of additional permanent seats
without the veto. 
The Ezulwini Consensus calls for two permanent seats
for Africa with veto rights, if the veto right is to con -
tinue to exist, as well as five non-permanent seats.
These representatives from Africa would be selected
by the African Union. Furthermore, South Africa is in
favour of reforming the UN beyond just the Security
Council. South Africa has revelled in the lead it has
allowed itself to take of the G77 and China in spear-
heading UN reform. These reforms are varied, and
 include improving the procurement system of the UN,
better human resource management and the creation
of the UN Ethics Office to highlight and guard against
instances of corruption within a UN system that has
been tainted, among other things by the Oil for Food
Scandal as well as sexual violence perpetuated by UN
peacekeepers in the DRC. 
South Africa also supported the creation of the Peace
Building Commission and the Human Rights Council,
and it seeks the revitalisation and strengthening of
the General Assembly. In addition, South Africa is 
in favour of the reform of the secretariat and the
strengthening of ECOSOC47. This is in line with the
importance South Africa ascribes to socio-economic
rights, not only civic and political rights, which many
Western countries emphasise.
As a member of the Security Council in the period
2007-08 South Africa has placed on the agenda the
exploration of links between the UN and regional orga-
nisations, especially in conflict resolution. Its point 
of departure is that the UN should provide financial
assistance to delegate some of its political and deve-
lopmental tasks to regional organisations which share
the same goals and interests as the UN. The South
African argument is that such action would not only
increase the efficiency of the UN, but also increase
and strengthen its cooperation with regional organi -
sations as per chapter VIII of its Charter. 
Another issue is the financial constraints that the UN
faces. South Africa has expressed its concern regar-
ding nations who contribute to the financial constraints
by withholding critical funding, and it has ‘adopted the
position that this problem must be addressed urgently
in order to avoid paralysis’.48
The reform of the UN system is the strongest theme
of South Africa’s foreign policy, and it is consistent
with its efforts to ‘re-establish norms and principles 
of multilateralism within the UN Security Council’.49 As
a non-permanent member of the UNSC, South Africa
has been critical of the disproportionate power of the
P5, which has been perceived as undermining the
multilateral nature of the UN. South Africa has acted
as a de facto spokesperson of both the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM) and the G77+China group in its
 efforts to increase and strengthen multilateral enga-
gement within the Security Council50. 
South Africa’s commitment to the reform of the UN
can also be seen through its membership of The Four
Nations Initiative on Governance and Management of
the UN, along with Chile, Sweden and Thailand51. This
Initiative, which finalised its work on 1 October 2007,
looked at the management of the UN Secretariat, and
the way that it could be reformed and strengthened
from a member state and governance perspective. 
In this initiative South Africa showed again one of its
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strengths in the global system, which is its ability to
work with countries across any developmental divide.
Equally important is the fact that other countries see
the value of South Africa playing such a role. 
However, South Africa’s voting as a member of the
UN Security Council in 2007-08 has raised questions
among states in the North, but also among civil society
in both North and South, about its ability to build
 consensus among different positions, as well as its
commitment to issues such as human rights and
democracy. South Africa’s positions on why it oppo-
sed voting against the Myanmar resolution brought 
by the US, as well as a resolution on Zimbabwe’s
post-2008 election violence, have come across as
 legalistic and pedantic on the big issues of principle.
It has argued that the Security Council’s mandate is
to address issues inimical to international peace and
security, and that neither of these countries poses a
threat to that. It argues that the problems in both
countries are internal issues, and that their respective
neighbours are working with them to resolve the mat-
ter. Given that the ANC had strongly advocated for
apartheid to be taken up by the UN and the Security
Council during the liberation struggle, this line of argu-
mentation rings of hypocrisy in many circles, including
countries that had supported the current South Afri-
can government in international forums, such as the
UN. Ironically, the National Party government at the
time kept insisting that the issue of apartheid was an
internal matter.
Significance of Informal Groupings
South Africa’s approach to informal groupings is 
best characterised by Minister Manuel’s comment
 regarding the G20: ‘[…] no forum is too unimportant.
We’ve got to get our voice heard.’52 These forums 
are important because they can build up consensus
around particular issues among key players whether
in the developing world or in the developed world. 
The South African government’s position is that it
should engage with both formal and informal institu -
tions and work in both arenas towards reforming the
global governance architecture. As unfair as many
may regard the present division of global power, any
sort of substantive reform requires carving out con-
sensus with those who created the rules, in order 
to move into rule-making. Indeed, this is one of the
paradoxes of South African foreign policy. South
Africa advocates the equal representation of both 
the developed and developing world in institutions
such as the UN. It does, however, also participate 
in forums that are fundamentally exclusive, limited 
to the membership of the big developing countries,
such as the G5, the G8 or IBSA. 
Furthermore, in the absence of progress in the formal
institutions, South Africa’s participation in informal
groupings where North-South dialogue can be pursued,
such as the Outreach 5 (O5 or G5) and the G20 Finan-
ce has provided the country with a different avenue
for more informal interaction at the most senior level. 
It is through these and other institutions that push
the South-South perspective, such as the Africa-Asia
 Strategic Partnership, Non-Aligned Movement (NAM),
IBSA, the G77+ China etc., that South Africa applies
pressure to help push through reform in the traditional
international organisations.
South Africa furthermore sees participation in these
South-South initiatives as a strategic move towards
cementing its own role in the global arena. In co-
chairing the Asian-African Sub-regional Organisations
Conference in Bandung in 2003, South Africa aimed
to indicate its economic and political clout, not only
within Africa, but also within the Global South. South
Africa’s challenge, however, is to prioritise which in-
stitutions or groupings provide the most desirable and
effective vehicle for its objectives. Its involvement in
all of these forums at the current level makes real
impact difficult because of capacity constraints, but
also because not all of these institutions or groupings
are very effective.
IBSA’s creation was underpinned by the need to joint-
ly strategise on how big developing countries could
advocate change more effectively in the UN and the
global trading system. The grand vision behind IBSA
is a G8 of the South.53 Given its size, this is concei -
vably a more effective vehicle for the global transfor-
mative agenda than the G77 or NAM (see also below,
Alliances of the developing South). 
Thus, there are two challenges that South Africa has
to be aware of. The first is that seeking to deepen its
South-South engagement may increase South Africa’s
involvement in a number of initiatives, whose overall
impact in terms of South Africa’s objectives is mini-
mal. The second is that there are pitfalls to being
 associated with an exclusivist grouping, such as G8-
Outreach, G13 or L20. This is linked to South Africa’s
relations with African and other developing countries.
Such clubs perpetuate a two- or three-tiered world;
yet it is difficult to see how global governance can
advance in the absence of strong leadership from
such clubs. As these engagements become more in -
stitutionalised, how the ‘club’ determines its function
and mandate will be critical to how it is perceived.
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 Legitimacy may be assured, if such a club is seen as
a vehicle for supporting the formal multilateral frame-
work and strengthening a rules-based international
system. 
Bilateral versus Multilateral Cooperation
South Africa sees both bilateral and multilateral enga-
gement as imperative to the pursuit of its global gover -
nance agenda.54 In the area of global governance
 reform it is clear that South Africa also leverages its
good bilateral relations with key players to discuss
these issues.
South Africa has pursued a number of strategic bila-
teral agreements, particularly with key development
partners in the North. The signing of bilateral arran-
gements is most often strategic and used to elevate
the bilateral relationship to one of greater political
and economic importance. An example of this is
South Africa’s Strategic Partnership with the Europe-
an Union, signed in October 2007. This relationship
was elevated to Summit level in July 2008. The dis-
cussions between the EU and South Africa in the con-
text of the Strategic Partnership were broad-ranging
and included reform of the Bretton Woods institutions
and nuclear non-proliferation. 
The importance of multilateralism in South Africa’s
 foreign policy objectives is evident from its willingness
to chair a number of multilateral bodies over the last
14 years, as well as the sheer number of multilateral
summits that South Africa has hosted. These include
UNCTAD IX in 1996, the 12th Summit of NAM in 1998,
the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in
1999, the United Nations Aids Conference in 2000,
the World Conference on Racism in 2001, the foun-
ding Summit of the African Union in 2002 and the
World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002.
South Africa has also been very active in the regional
multilateral domain, working with other African coun-
tries in building up the sub-regional and continental
security and political architecture. ‘For South Africa,
multilateralism is not an option but the only choice
that can guarantee durable peace which underpins the
fight against poverty and underdevelopment’, accor-
ding to deputy foreign minister Sue van der Merwe.55
However, as with the active engagement in most
South-South initiatives, South Africa sometimes dedi-
cates much energy to multilateral initiatives often
with the prospect of marginal tangible benefits, at the
expense of cultivating bilateral relations (both in the
North and South) which provide more concrete out -
comes – in both spheres.
Role of Strategic Partnerships among Emerging
Countries
South Africa believes that, while sharing each other’s
domestic challenges and concerns, the emerging
South (and most specifically the G5) can collectively
push for a more equitable global order with the redis-
tribution of power between the North and the South.
This is more possible in the current international envi-
ronment, because economic power in particular has
begun to shift dramatically. This has meant that even
among the developed states there is a greater reali-
sation of the need to bring about change, unwilling 
as some might be. 
On strategic partnerships with the South, President
Mbeki noted:
One of the messages communicated by the collapse of
Doha talks is that, for countries of the South to rea lise
rapid development including fair trade, economic deve-
lopment, job creation and poverty eradication, these
developing countries, should, first and foremost, form
strong partnerships and strategic alliances that would
unlock the vast resources and economic opportunities
within and between their countries and regions.56
President Mbeki saw alliances with Southern countries
as a useful platform for discussion between key lea-
ders of the South, and as an innovative means of
keeping his African agenda alive. Over the course of
his administration, Mbeki increased cooperation with
these countries at both the bilateral and multilateral
level, aiming to use the alliance at a global level to
enhance the security and development of South Africa’s
immediate region. In order to accomplish its peace
and security interventions on the continent, for exam-
ple, South Africa requires the assistance and coopera-
tion not only of African states and its traditional part-
ners, but also from its counterparts in the South. 
Although relations with several Latin American
 countries have long existed,57 a deliberate policy of
building relations in Asia has been pursued by South
 Africa. Countries such as China and India have recei-
ved particular attention.58 South Africa has bi-national
commissions with most notably China, Argentina,
Brazil, India, Cuba and Iran. These Commissions
provide a formal platform on which a variety of issues
can be discussed by various government ministries.
These extend well beyond the traditional political and
diplomatic issues, and include expert bodies with spe-
cialist functions on science and technology, agricultu-
re, education, trade and industries, customs, arts and
culture and environmental sustainability.
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The India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Forum, initiated
in 2003, is an important example of the potential for
strategic partnerships between emerging countries 
at Summit level. This forum has allowed these three
countries to enhance their cooperation on issues of
mutual concern, as can be seen by their cooperation
in the WTO Doha Round. There are currently 14 sec-
toral working groups operating within the Forum,
 ranging ambitiously from climate change, human
settlement development, to health and corruption.59
Even with the limited membership of IBSA, it is nota-
ble that it has taken a considerable amount of time 
to build trust in the viability and value of the group.
It is for this reason that there is an implicit recogniti-
on that large groupings of the past, such as the NAM,
are too unwieldy and include countries with interests
that are too divergent for them to be effective.
India, the most sceptical partner in IBSA since its
 inception, has only recently affirmed its confidence in
the grouping as voiced by the Indian Prime Minister
after the IBSA Summit in Pretoria in October 2007.
South Africa, like Brazil (the main initiator of the
 initiative), has enthusiastically supported the concept
from the outset. It views it as providing another
channel for South-South cooperation among the three
countries while strengthening bilateral relations with
these important players in their regions. 
A recent and notable development is the establish-
ment of new South-South groupings by key individual
emerging economies, notably China and India, with
Africa. South Africa participated in the recent India-
Africa Forum in Delhi in 2008, as well as the Forum on
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing in 2006.
However, the closer engagement of these emerging
powers in the African space could in future also pose
a threat to South Africa’s influence in the region and
requires a strategic and considered response. It may
present a golden opportunity to pool resources with
these emerging players to act in a mutually beneficial
way for them and the region, but it is also likely to
witness rivalry in areas of overlapping interest.
South Africa’s Relations with the Other G5
South Africa’s bilateral relations with the G5 countries
are largely positive. While South Africa has a high-
profile political engagement with both India and Brazil
through the IBSA trilateral forum, its engagement
with China is more complex. Deep relationships with
leading countries of the Global South serve another
purpose for South Africa, although this may not be
articulated. Acceptance by powers in the Global South
plays a legitimising role for South Africa’s position as
a leader in Africa, although it is not sufficient on its
own to remove the ambiguity with which many coun-
tries in Africa view South Africa. 
South Africa and China 
For South Africa the relationship with China is extre-
mely important. A reflection of this importance is the
soon-to-be-signed Partnership for Growth and Deve-
lopment between the two countries. In the words of
the deputy minister for trade and industry, Rob Davies,
the discussions in the context of the partnership have
no comparison with any other engagements.60 The
partnership discussions include agreements on long-
term access to resources in return for investment 
and market access for value added and beneficiated
products. 
However, notwithstanding the importance of the rela-
tionship, it is viewed with suspicion by various sectors
of South African society. Reasons for this include a
surge in China’s global export growth. As many impor-
ted items are in so-called sensitive sectors (such as
clothing, textiles, footwear, and leather), widespread
opposition grew, not just to a potential trade agree-
ment that had been mooted but to trade with China
 itself. Nevertheless, Chinese investment in South
 Africa was estimated at US$130 million in 2007, alt-
hough it is difficult to confirm the actual figure, since
the South African Reserve Bank provides figures by
 region. In particular, Chinese FDI reached new heights
with the announcement in November 2007 that the
 International Construction Bank of  China would be
purchasing a 20 per cent stake in Standard Bank worth
R36.7 billion (US$5.6 billion). South African invest-
ments in China are estimated to be about US$400
 million. However, planned negotiations for a trade
agreement with China have been shelved since 2005.
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South Africa and India 
Historically ties between the two countries have been
good, although both sides agree that the commercial
relationship can be improved. In 2006, the South
African government estimated Indian investment in
South Africa to be in the region of R10 billion (or
about US$1.4 billion), making India one of the top
ten investing countries in South Africa. The Indian
government estimated foreign direct investment re-
ceived from South Africa up to January 2005 as only
US$ 9.43 million. However, this figure was expected
to grow. There are already about 40 South African
companies with investments in India. Sasol is the
company with the largest potential investment at
 between US$6 billion and US$8 billion.61
India and SACU committed to negotiating a bilateral
preferential trade agreement in 2000, but formal
negotiations are expected to begin only in 2008.
Such an agreement would fit in with a mooted IBSA
trilateral trade agreement, which would be based 
on the narrow, shallow agreements already in place
between SACU and Mercosur, and between India and
Mercosur.
South Africa and Brazil 
The political relationship between South Africa and
Brazil is very strong, especially after President Lula
da Silva came to power in Brazil. Both countries sha-
re positions on the need to change power relations
globally as they manifest themselves in the global
 governance architecture.
Nevertheless, despite being part of the trilateral IBSA
alliance, there appears to be little foreign direct invest-
ment by Brazil into South Africa or South Africa into
Brazil. This can be partially explained by the  similar
nature of the Brazilian and South African eco nomies,
which limits the areas in which companies would have
a comparative advantage. According to the Brazilian
Central Bank, South African investment in Brazil in
terms of stock held in 2005 was US$3.69 million. The
South African Consulate General in Brazil estimates
that there are approximately 12 South African com-
panies with operations in Brazil, mainly in the mining,
financial, IT, beverages, steel, paper & chemicals sec-
tors. SACU-Mercosur negotiations are close to comple-
tion, and have been in this state for over three years
now. As of December 2007, agreement on tariffs for
certain product lines (in the auto sector) was yet to
be reached, and some rules of origin issues remained
outstanding.
South Africa and Mexico 
Despite the fact that the countries have many problems
in common, the relations between South Africa and
 Mexico have little substantive bilateral content. Mexico’s
membership of the North American Free Trade Area
(NAFTA) and its overwhelming pre-occupation with its
northern neighbour, the US, leave little space for relati-
ons with geographically remote South Africa. The relati-
ve lack of interest is reciprocated by South Africa which
has other preoccupations. The position is more positive
in the multilateral arena where both countries are mem-
bers of the G5 and the G20 Finance and share similar
views on disarmament and non-proliferation issues.
INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL ORDER
The composition of an international social order aimed
at giving globalisation a ‘human face’ has featured
much in public debate, not least in South Africa,
where the ANC government’s alliance partners, the
trade union federation COSATU and the South African
Communist Party, have often advocated strong anti-
globalisation positions, and the rights of workers and
the poor and marginalised.
Global social order can be defined as ‘the values and
subsequent norms that are espoused within the over-
all value systems of a group or community’. There
are two ways in which social order can be attained:
either through outside influence and control; or
through individuals willingly adhering to norms and
values, to which they have grown accustomed and
have internalised. To realise a more social shape of
globalisation, non-economic values need to be taken
into account and form an integral part of public poli-
cy. These would include strategies to improve and
provide social justice and human rights regulations,
universal access to healthcare, consumer protection
to its citizens, as well as, among other things, protec-
tion of the environment.62 South Africa’s definition of
an equitable social order includes policies to prevent
the marginalisation of disadvantaged and vulnerable
communities, and to adequately reverse the negative
impacts of globalisation on these groupings. Invaria-
bly, in an environment where the gap between the
haves and the have-nots has grown, moving towards
a global system that adheres to minimum social stan-
dards is important for global stability. Amartya Sen’s
‘capabilities approach’ to poverty, which emphasises
that poverty is more than just about income depriva-
tion, forms an important exegesis to this challenge of
a social order, i.e., poverty concerns a person’s broa-
der freedom to enjoy a healthy and long life, to be
educated and to participate in political life.63
76
In 2001, President Mbeki proposed a Global Partner-
ship for Africa’s Development at the World Economic
Forum Meeting:
The continued marginalisation of Africa from the
 globalisation process, and the social exclusion of the
vast majority of our people constitute a serious threat
to global social stability. Simultaneously the establis-
hing of sound governance at the global level remains
incomplete, but is essential for the sustainability of the
globalisation process. Implementation of our program-
me will not only be a major step forward in developing
effective global governance but also make a profound
contribution to the future welfare of the entire globe64.
It is clear that South Africa perceives a link between
global governance reform and the aim of giving glo-
balisation a ‘human face.’ Indeed, the argument is
that more representative and democratic global insti-
tutions, such as the World Bank, would be in a better
position to address the developmental challenges
 facing Africa. The reduction of poverty and the attain-
ment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
are perceived as being vital to creating a socially just
global order. The fight for greater emphasis on socio-
economic rights in the global arena forms part of this
debate. South Africa often wants to reinforce this
point in forums such as the Human Rights Council.
Significance of International Organisations in
 Attaining a Global Social Order
The UN, the World Bank, the WTO and other global
governance bodies are very significant for South Afri-
ca. Its desire to work to reform these institutions, as
discussed above, attests to this. Yet, application is
 often more elusive than the political commitment. 
In a recent report by the South African Human Right
Commission, it was pointed out that South Africa has
not yet ratified at least four international treaties that
protect human rights, including one on the protection
of migrant workers. Treaties and protocols that have
not been ratified include the International Convention
on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members
of their Families (ICRMW), the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCAR),
the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Tor-
ture (OPCAT) and the International Convention for
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappea-
rance (ICPED). In other instances where South Africa
has ratified treaties, the country has not submitted its
reports to committees, or has done so after the dead-
line. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) was rati-
fied in December 1995, but as of May 2007, South
Africa’s second and third period reports were overdue
(due dates were January 2001 and January 2005).
South Africa also failed to present its second and
third country report on the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, due in 2002 and 2007 respectively. The
ICRMW establishes the rights of people who work or
plan to work in a country of which they are not a natio-
nal, but South Africa has not signed or ratified it. 
South Africa has ratified all the core conventions of
the International Labour Organisation and has strong
labour laws domestically that protect the rights of the
worker. The chair of the ILO is South Africa’s Minister
of Labour, Membathisi Mdladlana. 
Social Order and the Environment: 
the South African Position
Sustainable development and climate change mitigati-
on and adaptation are increasingly becoming a crucial
element of the global social order. This is particularly
relevant to Africa, where the poor are the most vul-
nerable to the negative impacts of climate change.
The World Bank states that the old paradigm of ‘de-
velopment versus environment’ has now evolved into
the paradigm where ‘better environmental steward-
ship is essential to sustain development’65.
Within the South African context and in light of the
growing concerns of the impact of anthropogenic clima-
te change, it is crucial that the South African govern-
ment continue to factor in environmental sustainability
in the economic plans and strategic frameworks. In-
deed, as President Mbeki said, ‘If we do not succeed 
in building a climate change regime that balances ad-
aptation and mitigation, underpinned by the transfer 
of technology and financial resources, we will place an
unmanageable burden on future generations.’66
South Africa is a signatory of the United Nations Frame -
work Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC), as
well as the Kyoto Protocol. South Africa hosted the
World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD)
in Johannesburg in 2002 and has been active in the
debate on climate change so far. Indications are that
South Africa will be instrumental in the drafting of the
post-Kyoto framework and will become an advocate
for Africa in these discussions. It has assumed the
role of lead negotiator among African states at dis-
cussions on climate change and the environment, but
emphasises that developmental priorities should not
be ignored in the process. Thus it advocates common
but differentiated responsibility. At the Bali confe-
rence in 2007, South Africa consistently pushed for
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increased funding for adaptation to developing coun-
tries through the UN body. In September 2007 at 
a meeting on energy security and climate change,
South Africa’s minister of environmental affairs and
tourism, emphasised that, 
[..] multilateralism must prevail. An ambitious and
equitable framework must work for all parties. It must
balance our stabilisation and sustainable development
objectives and our mitigation and adaptation respon-
ses. It must deal with the unintended consequences 
of these responses. And it must be underpinned by 
an empowering technology and financing framework
that allows developing countries to reach economic
and human development goals quicker and cleaner
than developed countries did67. (emphasis added)
South Africa forms part of the G77+China in the nego-
tiations leading up to the Copenhagen meeting in
2009. The bloc’s position is that member countries
should not agree to binding targets on carbon emissi-
ons individually.
South Africa’s carbon foot print is disproportionately
large in comparison to the rest of the continent (ma-
king up approximately 35 per cent of Africa’s total
emissions).68 At the national level, South Africa com-
pleted a National Country Study Programme in 1999,
aimed at providing a national inventory of greenhouse
gas emissions, and determining how climate change
would impact on biodiversity, agriculture, and water
supply in South Africa. South Africa has embarked on
a  national strategy to guide the country’s response to
climate change. The policy proposes a number of
priority actions relating to pollution and waste ma-
nagement, energy, agriculture and water. The strate-
gy identifies the development of renewable energy
sources as a priority. It also calls for the rapid deve-
lopment of a national authority, within the department
of minerals and energy, to facilitate implementation of
a Clean Development Mechanism, which encourages
rich countries to finance projects that reduce emissi-
ons of greenhouse gases in poor countries in return
for credit against their own emissions targets. (South
Africa has the highest number of clean development
mechanism projects in Africa.) Other specific needs
identified are implementation of a national air quality
monitoring network and assessment of technologies
needed for climate change-related projects. The plan
also highlights the need for more education, training
and awareness initiatives about climate changes.
 However, the challenge of having to meet escalating
demands for power generation mean that in practice,
South Africa is building more coal-fired power stati-
ons, while exploring alternative energy sources. 
Social Order and the Access to Medicine
South Africa, together with Brazil and India, has  argued
strongly for greater access to affordable me dicine for
developing countries. Indeed their strong positions
 taken at the Doha Development Round to push for
TRIPS (Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights) flexibilities, as well as the pre-
sence of generic pharmaceuticals in India and Brazil
has pushed medi cine prices down considerably in cer-
tain cases. IBSA, given the large demand for affordab-
le medicines in their own countries, and coupled with
their emerging power status globally, are in a unique
position to firstly, forge ways of bringing down the high
costs of pharma ceuticals, secondly, to impart  expertise
to neighbouring states, so that they too may start ta-
king advantage of TRIPS flexibilities and thirdly, to re-
sist moves by developed states to impose TRIPS+ me-
chanisms on developing countries that render TRIPS
flexibilities pointless.
South African civil society actors have played an in-
strumental role in many key global debates, such as
intellectual property rights of pharmaceutical compa-
nies and the right of access to medicines in develo-
ping countries. 
CONCLUSION:  PURSUING A GLOBAL
 GOVERNANCE STRATEGY
South Africa has demonstrated willingness to take a
leading role in the field of developing an international
social order through its participation in the multilateral
areas highlighted above, as well as at a continental
 level, where the establishment of the AU (and its pro-
gramme, Nepad) has provided greater impetus to con-
tinental developmental projects. Both of these conti-
nental bodies are founded on the premise that African
states will take ownership in adopting and implemen-
ting the principles of good governance, transparency
and, accountability, and in return developed countries
will work in partnership with Africa and these home-
grown initiatives to uphold the same principles. 
However, a fairer international social order cannot be
uncoupled from a more equitable one at the national
level. South Africa has played a leading role in the
evolving discourse around good governance, but has
also been subject to criticism when it has been seen
to abandon these ideas in favour of more ‘pragmatic’
approaches to regional relations. South Africa has
been hesitant to criticise repressive governments in
Africa, whether it is Zimbabwe or Sudan. 
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The country’s pursuit of global governance reform 
in all its aspects is informed by its aims to achieve 
a more equitable system of global governance that
would distribute power more evenly between develo-
ped and developing states. However, the underlying
assumption is that a more equitable distribution of
power will also allow for a socially just system which
will be more capable of addressing poverty and un-
derdevelopment globally. 
Since the advent of democracy in 1994, the people 
at the helm of South Africa’s foreign engagement
have largely been the same. Even during the Mandela
administration, Thabo Mbeki as deputy president was
very involved in all aspects of government and indeed
foreign policy. Under the Mbeki administration foreign
policy was largely driven by the Presidency, given the
President’s own particular interest in this area. It is
too soon to make precise predictions about the impact
of President Mbeki’s early departure from office in
September 2008 on the country’s foreign policy. South
Africa’s new president is expected to hold this office
until mid-2009, after which the new president is likely
to be Jacob Zuma, the president of the ANC. It is  un -
likely that there will be any substantive policy changes
in this interim period, given also that the Foreign
 Minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, is still in place. 
A post-2009 administration is not expected to with-
draw from the international stage, although the focus
of foreign policy may shift and a greater prioritisation
may ensue that reflects national interests more closely.
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 There is a growing recognition that the system of global governance needs reform. The present
system of global governance is more or less a continuation of the arrangements made immedia-
tely after the Second World War more than 60 years ago. This does not correspond to the
changed ground realities. The global economic, strategic and social order has many different and
more dynamic players than at the time of the formation of the United Nations and its allied agen-
cies.
 It is, in our view, important to fully appreciate the rationale for reforming or restructuring
 international institutions that are presently responsible for global governance. The current and
ongoing rise in the share of emerging economies in global output has to be recognized and the
necessary adjustments made both in the market place (where they take effect more naturally and
quickly) and in the structure of the institutions regulating and safeguarding the global economy.
 A failure to achieve these adjustments and institutional changes could generate thoroughly
avoidable consequences similar to those in the first half of the twentieth century. It is neither
wise nor even practical to wait for the time when one of the current hegemonic or dominant
powers has to face a real threat to its economic solvency, as the UK did at the end of the Second
World War, before the new global governance order is successfully established.
 India has emerged as an important global player. Its worldwide second largest population,
 likely to emerge as the largest within the next three decades, makes it a natural comparator with
China. While India is clearly far behind China currently in economic terms, the possibility of its
overtaking China, because of the underlying structural features of the two economies, is always
held out. Thus, the world and especially the OECD countries see India as an emerging global eco-
nomic power that should be given the corresponding space and responsibilities in any emerging
global governance structure.
 The willingness and desire on the part of the current world powers to give India a greater role
in global governance and recognize it as a major global player finds a strong resonance among
the elite segments of the domestic establishment within India. The country’s political class, since
the time of Gandhi and Nehru and its elite bureaucracy, including the elite of the diplomatic
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 This desire of the Indian elite to play a global role,
has received a substantial boost from the strong eco-
nomic performance starting with the reforms of 1991
and more so in this decade. India has been thrust in
the same league as China, Brazil, South Africa and Me-
xico, all of whom have significantly stronger economies
as reflected in their significantly higher per capita inco-
mes. The Indian negotiators, comprising politicians,
diplomats and bureaucrats, have found themselves to
be members of the ‘international high table’ in several
forums, an opportunity which is completely reconciled
with their own aspirations for a larger global role. This
represents an optimal outcome that suits both the
 global agenda for restructuring governance and the
 Indian elite’s perception of its global role.
 However, there are several reasons why this out -
come is unlikely to come about. These range from
 India’s weak economic position as reflected not only
in the low per capita incomes but also in India’s low
share in the global economy and trade, to the lack of
capacity within its external relations departments to
tackle important issues of global governance. Hence,
India may have to seriously consider the trade-offs
between devoting greater policy attention to comple-
ting its own unfinished reform agenda, thereby pro-
moting rapid and inclusive growth, or allocating more
resources to tackling issues in global economic and
political governance.
 Thus, while India has strong credentials to contri-
bute to this global undertaking, its ability to play its
due role in addressing emerging global challenges is
highly constrained by its present economic weaknes-
ses in terms of low per capita incomes, large num-
bers continuing to live in unacceptable poverty and
India’s relatively low shares in global trade and invest-
ment flows. It is important, therefore, for the global
community to reinforce India’s own efforts towards
overcoming this critical weakness as quickly as possi-
ble. We will then have a credible India contributing its
considerable talents to addressing the present-day
global challenges.
INDIA ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE
With its recent spurt in economic growth and a clear
break from old ideological bias towards central plan-
ning and strategic links with the erstwhile Soviet Uni-
on, India has emerged as an important global player.
Its second largest population, likely to emerge as the
world’s largest within the next three decades, makes
it a natural comparator with China. While India is
 clearly far behind China currently in economic terms,
there is always a conceivable possibility of its overta-
king China because of the underlying structural featu-
res of the two economies. India’s success in training
its large human resource base in complex technical
skills, and thereby its emergence as the sole surplus
provider of technically trained labour, is seen as its
major strength in coming years. The country’s suc-
cessful breakthrough in information technology and
software industry, combined with the greater strength
and global reach of its private enterprise, has promp-
ted some experts to think of the 21st century as be-
longing to India rather than China in terms of their
relative economic prowess.2 This is further reinforced
by the finalisation of the Indo-US nuclear deal that
will provide India with access to frontline technologies
and the prospect of overcoming its energy deficit in a
sustainable manner. Thus, the world and especially
the OECD countries see India as an emerging global
economic power that should be given the correspon-
ding space and responsibilities in any emerging global
governance structure.
The willingness and desire on the part of the current
world powers to give India a greater role in global
 governance and recognise it as a major global player
finds a strong resonance among the elite segments of
the domestic establishment within India. The coun-
try’s political class, since the time of Gandhi and Neh-
ru, and its elite bureaucracy, including the diplomatic
elite, has always had global leadership aspirations.
This is reflected in the organisation of the first Asian
Relations Conference in New Delhi in 19473 and In-
dia’s leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM),
which continues in some form even today. The coun-
try’s leaders, both the politicians and to a greater ex-
tent the senior bureaucrats (always used in this paper
to include the country’s elite in the diplomatic corps)
are strongly attracted to a role in the global arena, as
they see it as a continuum from the early days of In-
dia’s independence, when it was clearly one of the
spokespersons of the developing world. This global
role also allows the leadership to achieve greater job
satisfaction, especially when the domestic situation
often does not permit them to achieve the develop-
ment objectives which should have the highest priori-
ty. Playing a leadership role on behalf of developing
countries is seen by the Indian diplomats as an im-
portant part of their job description and mandate.
This is, in one sense, an outcome of India’s self per-
ception of being a truly independent nation state,
with a global role and not willing to be aligned with
any other power as its junior partner. An independent
nation state with aspirations for a global role neces-
sarily has to seek and create its own constituency.
India has actively sought this constituency in other
developing countries. If this has on occasions requi-
red adopting a stance opposed to or contrary to de-
veloped countries, India has not hesitated to do so. 
This desire of the Indian elite to play a global role has
received a substantial boost from the country’s strong
economic performance, starting with the reforms of
1991 and more so in this decade. Having achieved an
average annual growth rate of more than 8 per cent
since 2003 the Indian economy has emerged as the
second fastest growing economy in the world. This
growth performance with its concomitant growth of
the middle classes and their demand for technology,
natural resources and investment has made India an
attractive market and destination for global corporati-
ons seeking fresh expansion opportunities. The ‘good
India story’ has taken roots and changed perceptions
about India both in corporate boardrooms and in
OECD policy-making circles. This has given additional
clout to the Indian elite in its quest for a larger global
role. They have been thrust in the same league as
China, Brazil, South Africa and Mexico, all of whom
have significantly stronger economies as reflected in
their significantly higher per capita incomes. The Indi-
an negotiators, comprising politicians, diplomats and
bureaucrats, have found themselves to be members
of the ‘international high table’ in several forums, an
opportunity which completely responds to their own
aspirations for a larger global role.
For the world community India’s rise as one of the
leading emerging economies, and the Indian elites’
desire for a larger global role, presents both a chal-
lenge and an opportunity. This represents a challen-
ge, as they have to now adapt to dealing with an
even more assertive and demanding India as a nego-
tiator in different forums, often leading the develo-
ping countries or their G77 or G30 groupings. India’s
rise also presents an opportunity because it has given
the global community a counterpoint to China’s bur-
geoning economic growth and global influence. India
can now be held up as an alternative model of deve-
lopment that combines democracy, free market and
rapid growth. This is best reflected in the slogan
adopted by the Indian delegation at the annual mee-
ting of the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2006
which extolled the ‘Incredible India’ as the ‘fastest
growing free market democracy’.
The global community will thus like to see India
emerge as a viable and alternative model which can
also be used to set off some of the more difficult
 demands that a resurgent China can be expected to
make as it continues to grab greater shares in global
markets and trade. Moreover, a possible coalition
 between India and China, the two rising economic
 giants, in united demands for a greater share in glo-
bal governance in line with their economic clout could
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make the change far too drastic and compressed in
time for the global community and international or -
ganisations to handle in an incremental manner that
allows restructuring while keeping intact the basic
features of the international institutions and organi -
sations. In this framework, there is a convergence of
interests between the Indian establishment and the
western developed economies as represented by the
OECD: according to this scenario, India, together with
China, will emerge as a major global player and will
be willing to shoulder greater responsibilities in ensu-
ring an orderly global transition. Given India’s longer
and more rooted democratic institutions and traditi-
ons, there could naturally be more expectations from
India on this account.
There are however, several snags in this otherwise
near optimal outcome. The first, and the most impor-
tant, is the inherent and long standing asymmetry
between the global aspirations of the Indian elite and
the material basis for achieving these aspirations.
With still a 2 per cent share in global gross domestic
product (GDP), that rises at most to 4-5 per cent in
terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) numbers,
 India is nowhere the size of the economic giants like
the US, EU, Japan and China. This is also reflected in
India’s mere 1 per cent share in global trade which
has not increased despite the much greater openness
of the Indian economy since 1991. India may, there-
fore, be a large and populous country, but it is not 
a large economy in the global context. And in the
present world a necessary condition for achieving the
status of a global strategic player, economic strength
and dynamism is a necessary condition. Why then
should India be one of the leading voices either in
global economic governance or international negotia-
tions? Could it be that the Indian elite sees its role on
the global stage as a substitute for the more difficult
task of pushing policy reforms in a country where,
because of its sheer heterogeneity and diversity, such
reforms can be successfully pushed only through buil-
ding complex coalitions and persistence which are
both difficult to manage?
It can be argued that by trying to ‘punch above its
economic weight’ India does not always adopt or arti-
culate positions which necessarily correspond to its 
real national interests. Two examples should suffice to
highlight this paradox: Until almost the very end of the
Uruguay Round, Indian negotiators took the position
that India will not negotiate services and will not allow
it to be on the agenda of the Round. India’s own inte-
rest, as some of us had argued at that time, would be
in the services sectors, if these were opened up to pri-
vate investment and given the country’s comparative
advantage in highly trained manpower. Ultimately the
Indian position crumbled in the face of sustained pres-
sure from OECD countries and the last minute deserti-
on by major emerging economies. India’s strength in
services has since been borne out. In our view India
adopted the anti-services position more to secure its
leadership of G77 than to serve its own interests.
It can, however, be argued that there cannot possibly
be any harm in India being able to punch above its
weight in the global arena, because of its soft power
and standing amongst developing countries. This
brings India some additional advantages of stature
and more importantly in concessional financial flows
and a more than proportionate role for Indians in
 international organisations. There is, nonetheless, a
cost involved in letting its finite political and gover-
nance capability be used up in pursuing these global
issues. Thus, while these are benefits or advantages
not to be sneered at, it is not clear whether the costs
and benefits are necessarily more positive when let-
ting some of its best talents be focused on internatio-
nal affairs, rather than having them address the do-
mestic constraints on more rapid and inclusive growth
and improving the delivery of public services. 
Second, in the current Doha Round, India’s opposition
to lowering the coefficient for determining the bound
level of tariffs for non-agriculture manufacture pro-
ducts is not in line with its own declared policy of uni-
laterally lowering these tariffs (applied rates) to ASE-
AN levels. Once again the real beneficiaries of any
agreement that keeps tariffs higher for manufactures
would be the African and other least developed coun-
tries (LDCs). And again India has adopted the positi-
on to secure leadership among the LDCs. This beha-
viour often results in India taking positions contrary
to the OECD countries and in sharp contrast to China,
articulating them vociferously on behalf of developing
countries. Other negotiating partners do not quite
 understand India’s position and see it often as being
dilatory. China, as is noted by several observers,
cleverly adopts a very focused approach of serving 
its national interests by remaining relatively silent
and in a way letting Delhi handle the promotions itself.
Third, another hurdle in achieving a greater degree of
convergence between India and developed economies
on issues of global governance is the different per-
ception of India’s role in South Asia. Until recently,
the US and European countries did not see India as
the regional leader. Attempts to bolster Pakistan as 
a counterweight to India in South Asia clearly reflect
this policy stance of the US, the EU and even Japan.
China in any case has always had a policy of a close
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strategic alliance with Pakistan that was, and still is,
aimed at balancing India’s influence in the region.
This stance clearly caused considerable consternation
in Delhi which, quite correctly, demanded an asym-
metric approach with a bias in its favour from deve -
loped countries. While there has been a marked shift
towards India in recent years, the South Asian policy
of developed countries is still evolving. India is unli-
kely to pull its weight in efforts to restructure or reor-
ganise global governance institutions and practices
until it is convinced that its own dominant position is
unequivocally accepted by the leading global powers.
Fourth, India’s long-standing and in some ways speci-
al relationship with Russia and its precursor the So-
viet Union still has an important position in determi-
ning its world view and relations with other countries.
In recent years this has changed to become far more
balanced as compared to the past, but it will always
remain one of the major considerations for India
 while deciding on its attitude and approach towards
international institutions and governance issues.
Finally, there is the issue of sheer capacity constraint
within India’s foreign affairs and diplomatic establish-
ment to be able to play any enhanced role in global
governance. The elite Indian diplomatic cadre from the
Indian Foreign Service is completely overstretched
even now, and sometimes it is unable to handle rou -
tine issues. And there is a clear weakness in crucial
areas of long-term goal setting or strategic thinking.
As in other countries this needs both a development 
of internal capabilities and a more effective interface
with think tanks and policy experts outside the system.
While some serious efforts are being made to rectify
the situation, much still needs to be done.
From the above discussion it can be surmised that
the necessary conditions for India to play a more
 proactive and constructive role in global governance
in future are: (i) sustaining rapid economic growth
without neglecting inter-regional and inter-class equi-
ty issues; (ii) being unequivocally recognised as a
 regional leader and also accepting the responsibilities
that come with that role; (iii) reducing its energy de-
pendence on a few selected countries, especially Iran;
(iv) achieving an even greater distance from Russia,
especially in the area of defence and strategic equip-
ment as well as technology; and (v) developing a
greater capability to design and articulate its longer
term strategic objectives and the coherence to pursue
them. Developed countries can help address these
constraints on India’s expected and enhanced future
role in global governance.
GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE
The basic structure of the existing multilateral and
 regional institutions of economic governance repre-
sents the immediate post-World War II demographic
and economic realities and needs thorough reform to
 reflect the world realities and challenges of the 21st
century. The distribution of ownership shares, votes
and chairs in the IMF, the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank as well as their restrictive leader-
ship selection processes and the way of financing of
their operations have to undergo considerable
change.
The Bretton Woods Twins
Despite the recent approval for increases in the quota
and voting shares of some emerging economies inclu-
ding India, the fundamental imbalance in the gover-
nance structure of the IMF and the World Bank, the
so-called Bretton Woods twins, remains. The two-year
exercise starting in 2006 has now produced a ‘minus-
cule shift’ in the allocation of voting power of about
2.7 per cent in favour of emerging-market countries4.
The countries who currently dominate the IMF have
strong geo-political interests in preserving their quota
and vote shares. Changes towards redressing the se-
vere ‘democratic deficit’ in the governance of multila-
teral institutions are painfully slow. It appears that
getting a larger, more proportionate share for emer-
ging economies in the IMF’s governance will be an
 arduous and long-drawn-out process. And even if that
was achieved, the special relationship that the IMF
has with the US Treasury may still remain intact. This
central feature will continue to sustain the perception
in emerging economies that the IMF and the World
Bank will continue to remain instruments of US fo-
reign policy. This may well drive emerging economies
both in Asia and Latin America to embark on alterna-
tive arrangements, such as regional monetary funds,
over which they can have more democratic oversight
and which will be seen as exclusively devoted to
handling the problems of that specific region5.
The IMF’s role or functions should continue to be (i)
macro surveillance of countries, (ii) exchange rate
supervision, (iii) financial sector advice and (iv) stand-
by financing in times of crisis. With the growth of coun-
try reserves and the adoption of reasonable prudent
macro policies, the crisis-focused role of the IMF has
declined. Prior to the global financial crisis culmina-
ting in 2008 this could be seen as an ironical outcome
for the IMF which had lost its business and its raison
d’être, because economies had effectively implemen-
ted its counsel, and have thus effectively insured
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themselves against crisis. This has meant that the
IMF’s loans to its member countries have sharply de-
clined in the past decade, and its income has dwind-
led bringing financial stress for the organisation that
became rather acute in 20076. A change of the insti-
tution’s mission in the wake of the global financial
crisis in 2008 has to be awaited. As the present Mana-
ging Director of the IMF said at the time of taking up
office in 2007, the IMF cannot have a financing model
that relies on countries getting into crisis. A new mo-
del will have to rely more on emerging economies 
for its capital needs, and this should also bring about
commensurate changes in its governance structure. It
is indeed a paradox that several European economies,
which are significantly smaller in size, though clearly
not in per capita terms, than several emerging econo-
mies, continue to have larger quotas and a role in the
governance. This situation needs changing.
The IMF should remain the main institution to handle
global financial crises, because it is the only instituti-
on with universal participation and the technical capa-
city, built up over decades, to anticipate and handle
macro imbalances. In fact its capacity should be even
more sharply focused on monitoring and handling
macroeconomic imbalances and crises. Its foray into
long-term structural development issues and poverty
eradication through the Enhanced Structural Adjust-
ment Facility (ESAF), the Structural Adjustment Faci-
lity (SAF) and other instruments should be wound
down and handed over completely to the World Bank
and the regional development banks. However, the
IMF will have to sever its special relationship with the
US Treasury, if it desires to regain its legitimacy and
credibility among emerging economies.
According to the current dispensation, the Director 
of the IMF can only be a European. The mode of
 selection of the Managing Director of the IMF must 
be changed from a pre-selected European candidate
to open application. Europe itself is currently overre-
presented in the IMF with a combined voting power 
of 23 per cent and a combined eight chairs on the cur-
rent 24-chair board. The high European voting shares
and chairs have to be reduced as the European coun-
tries are clearly over-represented according to any
parameters.
The financial sector crisis in the US and Europe in
2008 has underlined the fact that the IMF’s super -
visory capability has to be strengthened and its man-
date made more enforceable also in non-borrowing
and developed economies. The IMF has recently intro -
duced an updated policy framework for bilateral and
multilateral surveillance. In the IMF’S first multilateral
consultation on global imbalances, which it carried
out in 2006, and which brought together China, the
Euro zone, Japan, Saudi Arabia and the US, the Fund
insisted that the imbalances were due to the unsu-
stainable fiscal policies of the US and the maintenan-
ce of an undervalued exchange rate by China. How -
ever, neither the US changed its fiscal policies, nor did
China appreciate its currency. This raises questions
about the effectiveness of the Fund’s multilateral
 surveillance7.
Regional Development Banks
The role of the World Bank and the Asian Develop-
ment Bank should remain that of project financing
agencies and development policy advisers. However,
the effective undertaking of these functions by these
institutions would require a governance reform which
gives greater weight to emerging and developing
countries in their management and which results in
more merit-based management and staffing patterns.
Even in regional banks, the positions of the President
and Vice Presidents are earmarked for particular
countries or regions. This needs to be changed as
well8. These regional development banks have spaw-
ned very large bureaucracies and rather cumbersome
and involved modalities for designing projects and
disbursing the finances: it is now important to stre-
amline their working to the greatest extent possible.
The World Bank and the Regional Development Banks
presently serve three major functions: monitoring the
development experience to identify constraints and
requirements; designing and executing development
projects and mobilising the necessary financing for
them; and building capacities within developing eco-
nomies through technical assistance. Other functions
also include encouraging regional cooperation and
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promoting the work of the private sector. It needs to
be considered that there is merit in creating different
agencies for the three primary functions performed
by these banks9. In the present setup, technical assi-
stance, which in many developing economy members
is perhaps as important as project financing, gets
rather short shrift and is relatively neglected. There is
a culture of ‘fund and forget’ in the case of technical
assistance projects, as the existing system does not
really reward this kind of work. 
A greater focus on capacity building will help address
a paradox in which the regional development banks
find themselves at present: they are unable to lend to
poor developing economies because of a lack of ab-
sorptive and implementing capacities. Therefore they
have become dependent on borrowing by middle in-
come or large emerging economies. The latter can
easily mobilise these funds from the private financial
sector, but choose to continue borrowing from the
World Bank or the Regional Development Banks to
create the required influence in the management of
these organisations. As a result, nearly all the policy
leverage that development agencies had over these
larger emerging economies has virtually disappeared.
This may not be such a bad outcome, especially if
one was to believe the reports on the continuing ero-
sion of professional talent in multilateral and regional
development banks. Yet it is clear that neither len-
ding resources are optimally allocated, nor is the poli-
cy influence achieved to the desired degree. The way
forward is to focus much more on technical assistance
and building up analytical and implementing capacity
instead of treating this as a ‘side activity’ while kee-
ping the volume of lending as the main and often
only criteria for evaluating individual staff or organi-
sation’s performance. 
Trade Arrangements
India has been a strong advocate of strengthening
the multilateral system to solve global problems.
 While multilateral trade liberalisation based on the
non-discriminatory ‘most-favoured nation’ principle
maximises welfare for all, the world has unfortunately
moved towards creating many preferential trade ar-
rangements and customs unions which could lead to
trade diversion away from non-members to member
countries. While still strongly wedded to multilatera-
lism, India itself is now pursuing regional and bilate-
ral trade, investment and financial arrangements with
regional groupings as well as individual countries. In
this way it can offset the loss of being a non-member
and develop a safeguard against the inordinately slow
progress in liberalisation of the multilateral trading
regime. As with other countries, there is also some
strategic element in pursuing these bilateral and re-
gional arrangements.
In recent years, however, India has been a vocal sup-
porter of the idea of an Asian Economic Community
(AEC). The Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
set out the vision for an AEC at the third India-ASEAN
Business Summit in October 2004 when he said:
‘Such a community would release enormous creative
energies of our people. One cannot but be captivated
by the vision of an integrated market, spanning the
distance from the Himalayas to the Pacific Ocean,
 linked by efficient road, rail, air and shipping services.
This community of nations would constitute an ‘arc of
advantage’ across which there would be large scale
movement of people, capital, ideas and creativity.
Such a community would be roughly the size of the
European Union in terms of income, and bigger than
NAFTA in terms of trade. It would account for half the
world’s population and it would hold foreign exchange
reserves exceeding those of the EU and NAFTA put
together.’
Manmohan Singh’s vision of an AEC is an outcome of
India’s ‘Look East Policy’ launched in 1992 when India
was granted the status of a sectoral dialogue partner
by ASEAN. India’s efforts, which received significant
support from Japan, Australia and New Zealand, have
not found favour with China and Korea. Both these
countries have expressed a clear preference for pur-
suing the more limited ASEAN+3 regional formation
under which the Chiang Mai Initiative, the Asian Regio-
nal Coordination Agency and the Regional Bond Market
Initiatives have already been launched. The Japanese
position changed under former Prime Minister Fukuda
expressing a strong preference for the ASEAN+3 rather
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than the AEC which was supported by his predecessor
Abe. The AEC could over time expand to include other
Asian countries in South, West and Central Asia and
bring in all of Asia and Oceania within its ambit. This
would then become the third economic pole of the
world economy after the EU and NAFTA10.
Having seen all its major trading partners clambering
on to regional and bilateral trade arrangements (RTAs
/ BTAs) India has also decided not to be left out of
this current trend. It has already signed three BTAs
with Sri Lanka, Thailand and Singapore. These have
been instrumental in increasing the two-way trade
and investment flows between India and these coun-
tries. India will also sign an Indo-ASEAN Free Trade
Agreement11. The South Asian Free Trade Agreement
(SAFTA) is already in place. However, this has not
helped to increase the share of intra-SAARC trade
flows, primarily because of the continuing stalemate
in economic relations between India and Pakistan, the
two largest economies in South Asia. However, with
India adopting a qualitatively more positive approach
towards SAARC and accepting the asymmetric respon-
sibilities that come with its dominant position in the
region, greater progress is likely in coming years.
 Negotiations are at an advanced stage for a free trade
agreement with BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for
Multi-Sector Technical and Economic Cooperation)
countries which include Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka,
Bhutan, Nepal and Myanmar. India is likely to start
negotiations for a regional trade agreement with the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. In addition
to this, India has signed bilateral free trade agree-
ments with a number of countries in the region. India
would further explore possibilities to strengthen eco-
nomic relations with countries and groupings within
the Asian region with a view that all these sub-regio-
nal and bilateral relations will ultimately merge into a
broader regional economic architecture in the form of
an Asian Economic Community.
South-South-Cooperation
India would like to promote greater South-South
 economic cooperation covering trade, investment 
and technology flows12. Trade and investment flows
among developing countries have reached a critical
mass, so that new institutions and the strengthening
of existing institutions for South-South cooperation
will contribute towards realising substantial gains in
terms of growth, employment and poverty reduction
within developing countries. Therefore, in its quest for
leadership among developing countries, India should
redouble its efforts to make institutions such as
UNCTAD, UNIDO, UNESCAP more effective. On the
other hand, it should support the call for a thorough
revamping of these and other UN institutions that
seem to have strayed sometimes almost completely
from their original mandates. Another approach would
be to focus greater efforts on further cooperation
amongst the larger emerging economies, termed as
BRICSAM, BRIC or G5, and institutionalise the inter-
action and cooperation amongst them. It is perhaps
not so well known that about 70 per cent of tariff
barriers that developing countries face are from other
developing countries. Recent studies show that full
trade liberalisation of intra-developing country trade
could bring about US$ 130 billion as welfare gains
 separate from merchandise and services13. Therefore,
India should concentrate its efforts and lead by ex-
ample in reducing these tariffs. 
GLOBAL POLITICAL GOVERNANCE
India was one of the founding members of the UN at
a time when UN membership was a third of its cur-
rent level and an overwhelming majority of the UN
membership, including India, was under colonial dis-
pensation. India recognises the importance of the UN
in preserving global peace and stability and in solving
the variety of problems confronting the world com-
munity. However, there is a general consensus that
the effectiveness of the UN has weakened considera-
bly over time, and it needs sweeping reform to per-
form its tasks.
There are three aspects of reform of the UN system:
(i) broadening the Security Council membership, (ii)
activating the dormant Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) into an effective global economic and soci-
al policy coordinating body, and (iii) streamlining the
many fragmented UN agencies14.
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India’s official line has been to insist that a compre-
hensive reform and expansion of the Security Council,
to make it more ‘democratic, representative and re-
sponsive’, and revitalisation of the General Assembly
lie at the heart of the UN reform. India, with partners
from Africa, Latin America and Asia, tabled a resoluti-
on in the UN Assembly on September 11, 2007 spel-
ling out the principles on which the Security Council
has to be restructured15. These principles include: ex-
pansion in both permanent and non-permanent cate-
gories of membership, greater representation for de-
veloping and developed countries that is reflective of
contemporary world realities and improvement in the
working methods of the Security Council. India has
also suggested that the revitalisation of the General
Assembly must restore and enhance the role and aut-
hority of the organ as originally envisaged in the UN
Charter. We should note in this regard that the serio-
us and sustained effort by India in the last few years
to gain a permanent seat in the Security Council have
not been successful. The country did not receive
much support for its bid to the Security Council even
from other developing countries. This brings back the
issue discussed earlier in the introduction of whether
India should continue to pursue these efforts for a
larger role in global governance or wait until it has
much greater claim on this position by virtue of its
larger share in the global economy and international
trade and investment flows.
The principles of multilateralism, sovereign equality 
of states, non-intervention in the internal matters of
each state, non-use of force and the right of self-
 defence in the event of an armed attack are core to
the UN system. The UN Charter lays down a central
role for the UN in the fields of social, economic, cultu-
ral and human rights. However, important decisions
affecting the international community are taken outsi-
de the UN, in groupings like the G8 and through de-
fence arrangements like NATO. The reform of the UN
lies not just in changing its functions and structures,
but more importantly, in restoring its legitimacy and
central role in the multilateral system.16 India will
continue to push for restoring the UN mandate and
not letting it be diluted by developed countries which
tend to take major decisions outside the multilateral
framework. 
Informal Global Governance Forums
The United Nations and its specialised agencies, inclu-
ding the IMF, the World Bank, regional development
institutions, and the WTO, were set up to address the
global issues and challenges. The summits of the
G7countries, created in the mid-seventies to tackle
the imbalances among the world’s major industrial
countries through coordination, were expanded to the
G8 with the inclusion of Russia in 1998. It has now
turned into a consultation forum and steering group
discussing global economic and political issues, such
as global economic imbalances, global warming and
environment issues, global terrorism and security,
global poverty, debt and aid, global trade negotiati-
ons, energy security, nuclear proliferation, reform of
the UN and the various international institutions. The
late Joseph Gold, a former IMF legal counsellor, aptly
called the G5, G7 and G8, an ‘extra-territorial autho-
rity’17. Although there has been considerable debate
and discussion on the role of the G8 internationally,
in India there has not been much discussion18, nor
does there appear to be any officially stated position
on the G8.
We feel that the G8 serves a useful purpose as an
 informal body for discussions on global issues, but
that the G8 as currently constituted is not up to the
task. A more representative apex forum needs to be
created for meeting the present global challenges ef-
fectively. It is also believed that the summit reform 
is an essential prerequisite to reforms of such multila-
teral institutions as the IMF, the World Bank and the
UN which are currently badly stuck in a stalemate. 
A broad-based more representative summit of world
leaders would be able to provide the critical push for
kick-starting the stalled reform of international insti-
tutions19.
China has now become the world’s fourth largest
 economy in terms of GDP at market exchange rates
and the second largest in terms of GDP at purchasing
parity prices. India is the 12th largest economy and
fourth biggest in terms of PPP-GDP. In 2006 and
2007, over two-fifths of the growth of the global eco-
nomy was contributed by China and India taken to-
gether. Developing countries as a whole now account
for more than two-thirds of world output growth mea-
sured in terms of purchasing power parity. They re-
present over 85 per cent of the world population and
possess nearly two-thirds of international foreign ex-
change and gold reserves. Overall, therefore, the si-
gnificance of the emerging economies, especially of
the G5, is today greater than in the past. The design
of global political and economic governance and rela-
ted institutions must reflect the enhanced role of the
emerging economies. The present system of inviting 
a few members of developing countries to the annual
summit meetings of the G8, the so-called ‘G8-Outre-
ach’, is a step in the right direction, but this should
pave the way for offering a formal membership to a
larger representation of countries for full participation
in the decision-making process. A ‘two-tier’’ system
appears discriminatory, as it denies an equal partner-
ship role to the invitees.
Reform of the G8
Basically, the G8 has to be expanded to include more
members. How many more? The basic principles to
be considered for arriving at an optimum number of
countries for inclusion are universality and managea-
bility: the larger the number of countries, the more
representative it will be of the global membership,
but a very large number could make it unmanageable
as reaching a consensus through informal interactions
becomes ineffective. In striking a balance between
these two principles of inclusiveness and practicality,
it is thought appropriate to enlarge the G8 to about
16 countries at the most by adding another 8 coun-
tries and representatives of groups of countries to the
present G8. Besides including the five large emerging
market economies (G5), one could include the atten-
ding heads of regional groups in Africa, Asia and Latin
America as is done in the case of the head of the Eu-
ropean Union. Legitimacy will be maximised by giving
a representation to the large number of small coun-
tries in these three continents accounting for a large
proportion of the global population20. This G16 will be
large enough to represent diversity and small enough
to facilitate a meaningful exchange of views.
There have been suggestions to convert the current
forum of G20 Finance Ministers to the summit level.
Most agree that the G20 Finance has done a good job
in dealing with the global financial crises. However,
we also support the view that the G20 should conti-
nue with its finance focus and should not be elevated
to an apex body to deal with a much wider range of
issues facing the global economy. 
Bi- and Multilateral Engagement
India no longer considers multilateralism and bila teral
cooperation as mutually exclusive alternatives. The 
Indian strategy is to move forward in the direction of
multilateral, regional and bilateral coopera tion with
equal enthusiasm. This is a break from the policy it
upheld until the 1980s and a response to the world
reality of the proliferation of regional trade blocs.
India has bilateral free-trade or preferential-trade
agreements with countries such as Sri Lanka, Bhutan,
Nepal, Afghanistan, Singapore, Thailand and Chile.
Negotiations are under way with countries such as South
Korea, Mauritius, Japan, Russia, Indonesia,  Malaysia and
Israel. India is already part of the South Asian Regional
Free-Trade Arrangement (SAFTA) and the Asia-Pacific
Trade Agreement (APTA). The country will sign a free
trade pact with ASEAN. Negotiations have started to
conclude free-trade agreements with BIMSTEC, GCC
and the combined IBSA-MERCOSUR-SACU entity.
South Asian integration efforts through the SAARC
founded in 1985 have yielded limited results mainly
due to problems in Indo-Pakistan relations. SAFTA,
which became operational in 2006, is expected to
give a major boost to intra-trade within the region
which is currently one of the least integrated regions
in the world. It has now been decided to expand the
scope of SAFTA to services and also to reduce the
 negative lists of sensitive items. However, Pakistan’s
reluctance to grant India the ‘most-favoured-nation’
treatment in violation of WTO rules is a major hin-
drance. As the largest economy in the region, India
has shown readiness to accept asymmetrical respon-
sibilities, including opening her markets to South
 Asian countries without insisting on reciprocity and
implementing a unilateral duty-free access to her
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markets for the least developed countries in the regi-
on21. It now appears that India has seriously taken it
as a foreign policy challenge to realise the vision of 
a South Asian community characterised by ‘a smooth
flow of goods, services, peoples, technologies, know -
ledge, capital, culture and ideas’22.
While the IMF and the World Bank as institutions of
global economic governance suffer from unequal dis-
tribution of votes between the developed and develo-
ping countries, the WTO which works on the principle
of ‘one-country one-vote’ has turned into a remarka-
ble institution overseeing the trade flows of goods as
well as services and the international intellectual pro-
perty regime. The fact that the world trade body has
recognised the rising economic weight of developing
countries is reflected in the replacement of the ‘old’
quad consisting of the US, the EU, Japan and Canada
by a ‘new’ quad consisting of Brazil, India, the US
and the EU in driving the negotiating process at the
Doha Round23.
India has played a key role at the G77, the largest
group of developing countries within the UN, in arti-
culating the collective interests of developing coun-
tries, enhancing their joint negotiating capacity on
major international economic issues and promoting
South-South cooperation for development. An impor-
tant achievement of South-South-cooperation has
been the formation of the G20 in the context of the
WTO led by Brazil, India, South Africa and China
which has been able to shape the course of trade
 negotiations at the Doha Round.
Relations to the other G5-Countries
India and China had troubled relations following the
1962 border war and the presence of Tibetan exiles
given asylum in India. Relations have improved in
 recent years and the two countries established what
is called ‘the strategic and cooperative partnership for
peace and prosperity’ in 2005. Significantly, the two
countries agreed upon ‘A Shared Vision for the 21st
Century’ during the visit of the Indian Prime Minister
to China in January 2008. This vision recognises that
India-China relations affect not only the wellbeing 
of the people of the two countries, but also have an
impact on the region and whole globe. Therefore the
two countries should work together ‘in creating a
world of positive externalities and mutual prosperity,
rather than one based on balance of power calculati-
ons and animosity’24. The best signs of the strengthe-
ning relations between India and China can be seen
in the remarkable growth in trade between the two
countries crossing US$ 40 billion in 2007-08, from
practically nothing at all in 2001-02. Now China has
overtaken the US as India’s largest single trading
partner. Investment flows and the movement of per-
sons for work and tourism between the two countries
have also been rising in recent years. There have
been talks about a free-trade agreement between the
two countries, and the Commerce Ministers of the two
countries will take further steps in this regard25. India
and China have been cooperating with each other in
regional and multilateral forums, and the close coope-
ration between the two countries has been most evi-
dent in the recent Doha Round negotiations26.
India and South Africa have been strategic partners,
and there has been strong cooperation between the
two countries on multilateral issues particularly on 
the reform of the UN and the WTO Doha Round. India
sees the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Economic
Cooperation set up in 2003 as an important step in
South-South cooperation. Trade among these three
countries has been rising fast. It crossed US$ 10 billion
in 2007 and is targeted to reach US$ 15 billion by
2010. A trilateral FTA among the three countries may
not be technically feasible, because Brazil and South
Africa are members of customs unions MERCOSUR
(Southern American Common Market) and SACU
(Southern African Customs Union) respectively.
 Therefore, IBSA would have to evolve into a free
trade arrangement among India, SACU and MERCOSUR.
The talks on an India-SACU-MERCOSUR FTA already
commenced in 2007. Besides integrating the three
continents, IBSA is also evolving into a collective lead-
ership for the developing world by articulating common
positions on important international issues, such as UN
Reform, multilateral trade talks, climate change and
terrorism27. India and Brazil entered into a ‘strategic
partnership’ in 2006. Indo-Mexico relations were ele-
vated to a ‘privileged partnership’ in 2007.
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INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL ORDER
A largely closed economy until the mid-1980s, India
opened itself up slowly in the mid-1980s and faster
since the 1990s. India benefited enormously from glo-
balisation as the growth rate of the economy rose from
an average 3.4 per cent per annum during 1950-80, to
5.6 per cent during 1980-2000 and 7.2 per cent during
2000-08. Poverty has also gone down with the per-
centage of people below poverty line declining from
44.5 per cent in 1983-84 to 36 per cent in 1993-94
and 27.5 per cent in 2004-05. Inequality has wide-
ned, but the level of inequality in India remains lower
than that in several other countries including the US,
UK, Brazil, China, Mexico,  Russia and South Africa28.
While globalisation brings in several benefits, it is also
seen to exacerbate inequalities between countries and
within the populations of each country. This is quite
contrary to the promise of globalisation which was
expected to result in greater convergence both across
countries and across income segments within coun-
tries. Now it seems that the more interdependent and
interlinked the world economy, the more it is prone to
instability as the contagion effects spread faster and
wider. This could be seen both in the East Asian Crisis
of the late 1990s and now in the case of the global
 financial crisis. India recognises, from its own experi-
ence, that globalisation has substantial benefits and
growth-raising potential, especially for developing
economies. At the same time it is important to recog-
nise and address the deleterious effects of globalisati-
on and minimise its ‘backwash’ effects, for instance
the brain drain, cultural domination and the decimati-
on of local traditions and ways of life, which currently
dominate in some developing countries. In this speci-
fic context India is in favour of setting up an interna-
tional institutional mechanism under the UN system
to contain the ill effects of globalisation. The Indian
constitution in fact safeguards local systems, culture,
art and language. Similarly, institutions have to be in
place at the global level to protect local systems from
the onslaught of globalisation.
The eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
adopted by the world leaders gathered for the Millen-
nium Assembly at the United Nations in September
2000, provide the broad contours of an international
social order. These bind the world to a series of quan-
tified and time-bound steps to reduce extreme pover-
ty, illiteracy, disease, human deprivation and environ-
mental degradation. The first seven goals imply sharp
cuts in poverty, illiteracy, disease and atmospheric
pollution and the eighth goal is a commitment of glo-
bal partnership between rich and poor countries to
work together to achieve the first seven goals. But
the achievement of the internationally agreed MDGs
has been tardy: the latest IMF-World Bank Global
 Monitoring Report indicates that most countries will
fall short on these goals. Strenuous efforts are requi-
red from both the poor countries and the donor rich
countries on the one hand, and better coordination
among the UN specialised agencies (UNDP, FAO,
IFAD, UNEP, WHO, UNPF, UNICEF), World Bank and
the IMF, on the other, to achieve uniform and accep-
table social development goals across developing
countries. However, after their eight years of existen-
ce, it is also time to review the relevance and effec -
tiveness of the MDGs as social development goals. 
At the same time the reasons for which these goals
could not be achieved should also be identified and
responsibility assigned.
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Apart from focusing its policy attention on removing
unacceptable poverty and human degradation at
home, India’s major concern has been peace and
 prosperity in its neighbouring countries in South Asia.
India would like to see herself as a partner to all her
neighbours for promoting regional cooperation and
 inclusive economic growth. India could then emerge
as a force for stability, security and economic prospe-
rity, rather than being seen solely as a regional hege-
mon29. India would like her neighbours to develop
confidence and their shed fear of their big neighbour.
India benefits from the growth and stability of its neigh -
bours and the neighbours benefit from the growth and
stability of India. The country would devote increased
attention to developing friendly relations with the South
Asian countries.
An emerging middle class creates new demands in the 
G5 countries.
As the biggest country in South Asia constituting over
three quarters of the regional GDP and population,
India’s position is overwhelming, and it is necessary
for India to reassure her neighbours through words
and actions. There has been criticism in the past that
India has not been doing enough to instil confidence
into her neighbours. Recently India has decided to
take up asymmetric responsibilities without insisting on
reciprocity. The country has offered duty-free access to
its markets to the least developed countries in the
region which include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan,
Maldives, and Nepal. She has also pruned the sensiti-
ve list for these countries. India is committed to the
vision of a South Asian Customs Union and a South
Asian Economic Union which should be realised in a
step-by-step manner30.
India’s willingness to assume regional responsibility 
is seen in her contribution towards reconstruction and
development in Afghanistan. India has so far commit-
ted assistance to the tune of US$ 1.2 billion. Indian
companies and personnel are engaged in the massive
rebuilding of the war-torn country under extreme
 security threats and attacks. The projects undertaken
by India included both the economic and social infra-
structure spheres, for instance power, road, irrigati-
on, education and public health31.
India as an Emerging Donor
India has been engaged with countries in Africa, and
India’s multifaceted ties with the continent predate
the colonial era. Under the Indian Technical and Eco-
nomic Cooperation (ITEC) programme, about 40,000
African students have been trained on professional
courses in Indian educational institutions through In-
dian scholarships. India has just completed the full
roll-out of the ‘Pan-African E-Network Project’, under
which the major universities in Africa are linked with
the major universities in India, and the major hospi-
tals in Africa are linked with super-speciality hospitals
in India. The first India-Africa Forum Summit held 
in New Delhi in April 2008 laid the foundations for 
a further deepening of Africa-India relations. India
stands committed to be partner in Africa’s develop-
ment by helping to build capacities, in both human
resource base and production base. In particular,
 India offered her assistance in ushering in a ‘Green
Revolution’ in Africa through all-round capacity buil-
ding in the production, storage and transportation 
of agriculture produce. In addition, India announced
duty-free access to her markets for exports from all
50 least developed countries, which include 34 Afri-
can countries. India extended lines of credit to African
countries totalling US$ 2.15 billion during 2003-08
and these have been raised to US$ 5.4 billion for the
next five-year period. India will also undertake pro-
jects in African countries against grants in excess of
US$ 500 million over the next five to six years. In
this connection it may be noted that India has been
providing assistance to developing countries in the
form of technical cooperation and training, and this
amounted to US$ 382 million, mostly in the form of
grants, during 2006-0732. Thus, while India will con -
tinue to remain a borrower of concessional funding
from MDBs, and also perhaps from other developed
countries on a bilateral basis, it will increasingly com-
bine this with its role as an emerging donor to less
developed countries both in South Asia and Africa.
This is not internally inconsistent or contradictory, 
as several countries routinely follow a two-handed
approach to achieve their own development targets
and at the same time contribute to the welfare of
poorer economies.
India is a hugely diverse country with different castes,
creeds, ethnicities, religions, languages, cultures, etc.,
but it has managed to achieve a ‘collective identity’
and has created an open society on principles of
New Delhi 
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 democracy, pluralism and common development. As
India grows economically and its status rises in the
global arena, it can play a balancing and bridging role
in the world. It should try actively to bridge the divi-
des and differences between rich and poor nations,
east and west, powerful and less powerful33.
VALUE SYSTEM
The present-day world is characterised by a contra-
diction: on the one hand, we have increasing integra-
tion of individual economies into the world economy,
a process normally referred to as globalisation. This
also has other features, such as extensive connectivi-
ty through the telecom revolution; shortening of geo-
graphical distances, because of the ever increasing
size of jet airliners; large volumes of capital moving
across borders; shrinking of the global market place
through the use of the internet; and the ever increa-
sing ecological interdependence across countries. 
But, on the other hand, there appears to be an in-
creasing divergence across countries and communi-
ties in terms of cultural, social and religious fields.
And there is also the emergence of a ‘hyper power’
which does not regard all of the universally applicable
‘values’ as being relevant to its own decision making
and acts arbitrarily. Both these features, which milita-
te against the very core of global integration, have to
be addressed as early as possible. Clearly there is ur-
gent need for establishing a universally acceptable set
of values, without which the world could descend into
major chaos and strife. 
A step forward in addressing the problem of religious
extremism and divergence would be to adopt India’s
unique definition of ‘secularism’: Unlike in the West,
where secularism clearly implies the state of ‘a-reli-
giosity’, the Indian constitution has interpreted secu-
larism to mean the ‘non-discriminatory support by the
government to all religions and faiths.’ This allows for
a relatively peaceful and stable social order, in which
all the religions have the freedom to operate in their
respective communities. India’s relatively successful
sixty-year experience in the peaceful evolution of its
complex multi-ethnic, multi-religious society, demon-
strates that the Indian definition of secularism is
more suited to the current times. Secularism, or
equal support from the state to different faiths and
religions, should form the basis for conducting inter-
national relations as well.
India believes that the ‘Panchsheel’, or the five prin -
ciples of peaceful co-existence which India and China
jointly came out with in the early 1950s, can still pro-
vide a value-based framework for relations between
nation states. The five principles are: (1) mutual
 respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sover-
eignty, (2) mutual non-aggression, (3) mutual non-
interference in each other’s internal affairs, (4) equa-
lity and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful co-existen-
ce. India would like to maintain friendly relations with
all countries, to resolve conflicts through peaceful
means, and promote multi-polarity in world relations.
India believes in strengthening and reforming multi -
lateral institutions and mechanisms for collectively
addressing global challenges, such as terrorism, the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drug-
trafficking, global warming and the spread of diseases
like HIV/AIDS. No one country, or small group of
countries, can tackle these challenges on their own.
We need to pool our scientific and technological ad-
vancements and the collective wisdom of the world 
in defeating the ills of poverty, disease and environ-
mental degradation on our planet.
India is committed to the strengthening of multila -
teral institutions including the United Nations. In par-
ticular, the Security Council should reflect the vast
 increase in membership of the UN, from 50 countries 
in 1945 to 192 countries at present, and the changed
geopolitical and economic realities of the contempo -
rary world. India with its large population, the largest
democracy in the world, its dynamic economy, its
long history of contribution to international peace-
keeping34 and other regional and international causes,
deserves to be a permanent member of the UN Secu-
rity Council along with the representative countries 
of Africa and Latin America.
Although India has nuclear weapons, it remains
 committed to a nuclear weapon-free world, a cause
strongly espoused by its leadership over the years. 
As a responsible nuclear power with an unblemished
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record on non-proliferation, India has earned increa-
sing international recognition as a partner against
proliferation.
India has given the highest priority to closer political,
economic and cultural ties with her neighbours in
South Asia. This demonstrates India’s commitment 
to promoting not only economic cooperation but also
a pluralistic, multi-cultural and multi-ethnic society,
despite the current increase in religious and social ex-
tremism across the world. India has a vision of South
Asia bound together by its common ancient civilisation
and commercial ties that can overcome its historical
divisions and work towards a collective pursuit of
peace and prosperity. The country has to take on
 additional responsibilities for the success of SAARC
because, by connecting the diverse ethnic groups
within India with their counterparts across the borders,
this would greatly strengthen India’s multi-religious,
multi ethnic and pluralistic society. This pluralistic
 polity will be further preserved and nurtured if the
various ethnic and religious communities within India
can freely interact with their communities across the
Indian borders and as a result feel less isolated or
pressurised as a minority within India. This would
also contribute to a greater enrichment of the cultural
diversity that is a hallmark of the South Asian sub-
continent. This is an important reason for India to
support SAARC, as its functioning has the potential 
to facilitate India’s ongoing modernisation.
India’s relations with the US have entered an ele -
vated level in recent years. The current phase is
 characterised by an attempt to ‘correct the strategic
historical imbalance’ with the US. It has moved bey-
ond a bilateral partnership towards a global partner-
ship anchored on common values and common inte-
rests35. This can also be the basis for India’s growing
rela tions with Europe. The common values that will
 underlie heightened cooperation between India and
OECD countries include fighting terrorism and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. There
has been a convergence of views on strategic and
 security issues and on opportunities for India-US
 cooperation in defence, science and technology,
 health, trade, space, energy and environment.
India seeks to promote multi-polarity in international
relations and to strengthen forces of multilateralism
which support the interests of developing countries and
contribute to stability in the region and the world as a
whole. Towards this end India is endeavouring to crea-
te stronger ties amongst the more dynamic and larger
emerging economies. This is exemplified in its support
for forging a coalition of the developing world.36
Finally, Indian traditions have always aspired to
 create a harmonious relationship between man and
nature. The concept of man in nature is much closer
to the Indian ethos than that of man conquering na-
ture. This has direct relevance to evolving the much
needed value system for ecological balance and nature
conservation. From the Indian viewpoint this can only
be achieved, if there is a shift from a definition of wel-
fare as continuous growth in material produc tion to
one that lays greater emphasis on fulfilling a balanced
human welfare function which includes varying levels
of material, intellectual, cultural and spiri tual compo-
nents. We may also have to move away from a sense
of continuous competition among communities cou-
pled with the achievement of higher  levels of mate -
rial consumption to a more cooperative stance: one
which tries to pursue the achievement of commonly
evolved and universally accepted welfare goals across
nation states and communities.
CONCLUSION
The challenge of changing both the content and form
of global governance is central to the future stability
and prosperity of the global community as it adjusts
to accommodate the rise of emerging economies. 
This challenge has to be addressed successfully. The
objective of any such effort must go beyond accom-
modating the new global players in the structure of
global governance. It should also include establishing
a set of universally accepted norms for interaction
amongst nation states. Attention also has to be given
to achieve inter-generational equity, which has to
start by collectively addressing the immediate chal-
lenge of ecological sustainability. India has strong
credentials to contribute to this global undertaking.
These credentials are based upon its traditions of
 harmonious relations between man and nature and 
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its sixty-year history of successfully developing a
 democratic, multi-ethnic and pluralistic social order.
This experience can be of immeasurable value to the
global community at its present juncture. However,
India’s ability to play its due role in addressing the
global challenge is highly constrained by its present
economic weakness in terms of low per capita inco-
mes, large numbers continuing to live in unacceptable
poverty and India’s relatively low shares in global
 trade and investment flows. It is important, therefore,
for the global community to reinforce India’s own
 efforts in overcoming these critical weaknesses as
quickly as possible. We will then have a credible India
contributing its considerable talents to addressing the
present-day global challenges.
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 The rise of China will have significant and far-reaching impacts on the global economy. As a
new driver for globalisation, China may change and challenge the current world economic trends
and global governance dynamics.
 The country is one of the greatest beneficiaries of globalisation, and it is in China’s own interest
to strengthen a cooperative global multilateralism. Traditionally China is a strong defender of
 sovereignty, now it is ready to surrender some proportion of sovereignty in exchange for world
peace and prosperity as well as its own long-term interests.
 China greatly values its participation in the WTO, World Bank and IMF, for both their substanti-
ve contributions to China’s development and the status the membership brings. China also plays
a vital role in promoting regional cooperation. China respects the authority of the UN, and wishes
to strengthen its authority heart and soul.
 China started to cooperate with the G8 recently, but is not willing to join the G8 at this moment.
China has a long-standing friendship with developing countries and is a strong supporter of
‘South-South’ cooperation.
 China also started to build strategic relations with other emerging large countries, such as India,
Brazil and South Africa. The rise of China, however, will also change the landscape of world eco-
nomy and politics. Many developing countries as well as developed countries have already sensed
the competition from China.
 China has its own history, ideology and culture, and this may change some of the core tenets
of international development thinking. China’s posture in global governance may greatly influence
the reform of both multilateral and regional institutions.
 We believe that China does not have a grand strategy to pursue big power politics by flexing its
military muscles. Rather it tries to promote trade and investment with other countries and increa-
se its presence through social, cultural and educational exchanges.
 China’s spread of its soft power is underpinned by its burgeoning commercial ties. Being willing
to talk about and share the lessons of its own experience will help to promote successful develop-
ment in other countries, and hence increase China’s influence in the international arena.
CHINA
He Fan
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Institute of World Economics and Politics,  Beijing
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GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE
China is one of the greatest beneficiaries of globali -
sation, second only perhaps to the US. The majority
of Chinese elites seem to believe that the trends of
globalisation are inevitable and that there are no alter -
natives to globalisation. They also recognise the cen-
tral role of international organisations in the arena of
global governance.
The country greatly values its participation in the WTO,
the World Bank and the IMF, for both their substan -
tive contributions to China’s development and the sta-
tus the membership brings. However, many Chinese
scholars believe that the influence of these institu -
tions on global governance has been weakened, and
that their influence in China has diminished over the
past decade.
The Global Financial Crisis and  China 
At the second half of 2007, when there were already
clear signals that a severe financial crisis was coming
and would trigger a domino falling in the international
financial markets, China still watched this develop-
ment from a far distance. Many Chinese officials as
well as scholars remained quite optimistic if not
 naïve. They were misled by the popular „decoupling
 thesis” which claimed that developing countries like
China are „decoupled” from the US economy and can
achieve a robust growth independently. 
Now it becomes more and more obvious that the
American financial crisis definitely affects the Chinese
economy both through trade and financial channels.
More than 30 per cent of China’s exports head for the
US. Some analysts argue that China has already diver-
sified its export and this would help China to escape
from the storm. But so far what we can see is that 
EU and Japan have also been dragged to a recession.
China’s export to these markets will consequently slow
down. If more and more small export companies fall
down next year, China might have to face rising un-
employment. Seeing the downturn risk, Chinese banks
become reluctant to extend loans to export companies.
China is also experiencing a credit crunch, although not
as serious as the one at Wall Street. Housing prices
started to fall since summer 2008, and it may continue
to turn down. Stock markets jumped over 60 per cent
since early 2009, and they will keep trembling. 
Especially China’s huge foreign exchange reserves
have to be considered, having reached a volume of
US$ 2 trillion until now. The lion’s share of China’s
 foreign exchange reserves is held in US-Dollar deno-
minated assets. Some American politicians worried
that China might use this massive foreign exchange
reserve as a „nuclear weapon” at its disposal for
countering the US. The truth is, with most of its foreign
exchange reserves invested in US-Dollar-denominated
assets, China is taken hostage by the US. If China
dumps its dollar, it will create a free fall of the US-
 Dollar and China will lose immediately. If China sticks
to the greenback, however, the US-Dollar might depre-
ciate further, and China will lose gradually. 
The world economy is in trying times. The last two
decades witnessed a „golden era” of globalisation. 
But the strong economic growth of both the US and
China is built on an unsustainable relation. China sells
cheap products to the US and piles up the debts from
the US, and at the same time helps to finance the
budget deficit in the US. The result is that trade deficit
in the US will be become larger and larger, and trade
surplus in China will also keeps swelling. The financial
crisis will force both the US and China to change cour-
se. There is no consumer in the world like the Ameri-
can consumer, but now they are forced to spend less.
If the excess consumption in the US has to be correc-
ted, China will also have to change its development
path. The traditional Chinese development strategy
emphasized export growth and FDI inflow, and it has
led to an expanding trade surplus and the massive
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. When
 export and GDP growth are high, there were no in-
centives for China to take the painstaking reform. 
But if the resiliency of the Chinese economy has to be
improved, more efforts have to be put on stimulating
domestic demand, investing more on human capital
and building stronger social safety networks. 
WTO Accession
China’s entry into the WTO in November 2001 marks
one of the most significant steps towards fully inte-
grating the Chinese economy into the world economy.
It sent out a clear signal that China will never turn
back into an isolated and autarchic country. Needless
to say, at that time there were mounted concerns
that China might not be ready for such a bold move
and the fierce competition from outside might crush
many domestic industries. After China’s entry into the
WTO, however, domestic firms did not collapse but
flourished instead. Foreign trade became an engine
for China’s robust economic growth and China gained
new momentum for its market-oriented reforms.
This encouraged China to take a more open and
 active attitude towards international organisations.
China has given top priority to the implementation of
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its WTO accession commitments: the country’s avera-
ge tariff has been reduced to 9.9 per cent from 15.3
per cent in 2001. China has phased out many non-
 tariff restrictions on imports including relevant import
quotas, designated trading and import licenses. China
has also revised some 3,000 items of domestic laws
and regulations in accordance with WTO rules and
promulgated a series of new laws to fulfil its WTO
commitments1.
China has always been very supportive to the Doha
negotiations. It also tries to help to strengthen the
position of developing countries in the WTO negotia -
tions, in order to pursue ‘a balanced outcome’2. Yet 
it is unlikely that China can act as a new leader for
the developing countries in these negotiations. First,
compared with their counterparts in Brazil and India,
Chinese diplomats are less eloquent and aggressive,
and they are quite often not fully authorised to make
critical decisions. China has kept a low profile in the
WTO, lacking the capacity of defining new agendas
and creating coalitions. At Cancun, for example, China
allied itself with the G22 and strongly resisted the
agendas of the United States and Europe. But in the
G22, India is actually the advocate; China’s role is
confined to just expressing its support for India and
other developing countries. Second, developing coun-
tries have quite diversified interests. Some develo-
ping countries are exporting products with the same
destination as China, others benefit a lot from China’s
imports of energy and raw materials. While many de-
veloping countries view the rising of China as a great
opportunity, others already felt the threat of Chinese
products both on international and domestic markets.
Third, many Chinese officials as well as scholars are
more concerned about the impacts of the WTO on
China’s domestic governance. Many high ranking
officials believe that the major challenge is how to
‘get the government to adopt to WTO rules’3.
Chinese Relations with the World Bank
The World Bank has built up its presence in China
since 1980. China has received a large amount of
 loans from the World Bank, especially at the early
stage of its development. Until the end of 2007, the
loans that the World Bank has extended to China
amounted to US$ 44.59 billion. But the World Bank
loans only account for a small share of China’s re-
source flows, about 0.6 per cent of GDP at its maxi-
mum in the early 1990s. The World Bank has not
only extended loans to China, but also helped China
to improve the management capacity for public funds
as well as the macro-economy. For example, the
World Bank played an important role in supporting
the macro management reforms, the reform of 
state-owned enterprises and the financial sector.
Beijing
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China has maintained a very good relationship with
the World Bank, due to its sympathetic attitude to-
wards China’s reform. The World Bank views China as
its best client and has highly praised China’s achieve-
ments on poverty reduction and economic develop-
ment4. With China’s rapid economic growth, it has
formed a new partnership with the World Bank: China
has not only received loans from the World Bank, but
has consistently shared its experiences with the Bank,
helping it to improve the performance of its aid pro-
grammes around the world. Recently, Chinese econo-
mist Justin Lin has been named as senior vice-presi-
dent and chief economist of the World Bank. He is the
first economist from the developing world to hold this
position. Lin’s candidacy is a sign of China’s increa-
sing links with the Bank and the World Bank’s inten -
tion to increase the presence of the developing coun-
tries in its senior management.
China and the IMF
China has also maintained a good relationship with
the IMF, but not as close as that with the World
Bank. First, the IMF mainly deals with financial crisis
and balance of payment issues. China has so far not
suffered from financial crisis and does not need to
borrow from the IMF. Even if China experiences a
 disastrous financial crisis, it is quite doubtful that 
the IMF can bail China out with its limited resources.
Second, the IMF is the proponent of the ‘Washington
Consensus’, but China is not impressed by the policy
package that the IMF is trying to peddle.
Although quite cautious and suspicious about the IMF
recommendations, China’s criticism of the IMF was
much muted. Recently, however, China became more
disappointed when the IMF arbitrarily labelled China’s
Renminbi (RMB) exchange rate as ‘fundamentally mi-
saligned’. The Chinese government is fully aware of
the necessity of appreciating the RMB. What China
needs are convincing analyses on the likely impacts
of an appreciation and tailor-made proposals which
the IMF failed to provide. The collapse of the US sub-
prime mortgage market and its rapid spread to the
international financial market was a warning signal
for the potential risks of globalisation, and it also
 revealed the deficiency of the IMF in promoting global
economic stability and financial surveillance.
China displays a great recognition of its global interests.
It is a very open economy with a trade dependency
 (import and export / GDP) as high as 70 per cent. Its
export markets are global, and it also depends more
and more on the import of energy, raw materials and
agricultural products. Foreign investors play a vital role
in the Chinese economy. It is in China’s interest to
strengthen the multilateral system and promote globa-
lisation. But, similar to other developing countries, China
also feels discontented with the current multilateral
 system. The WTO Doha Round has failed. The World
Bank has done a lot of work to reduce  poverty, but its
success has been localised in China and a few other
countries like India and Vietnam. The gap between 
the rich countries and the poor countries continues to
widen. The Fund’s reputation was greatly tarnished
 during the Asian financial crisis. Also, the existing
structure is still dominated by the West. The interna-
tional decision-making mechanisms are far from demo-
cratic and thus allow a hegemon to ride roughshod
over the weak, imposing its will and values on others.
China believes that the need for reforming the Bretton
Woods Institutions (BWIs) is urgent: the function of
the BWIs needs to be redesigned. The mission of 
the World Bank should not be confined to poverty
 reduction; it should take more responsibility to pro-
mote long-term sustainable growth worldwide. The
World Bank should also play a more important role 
in the provision of global public goods5. Meanwhile,
the IMF has always been criticised for not taking the
reality of individual countries into proper considera -
tion. More tailor-made policy analysis and suggestions
should be encouraged. Also, it is quite ironic that in
2007, when the sub-prime crisis led to an earthquake
in the international financial market which seems to
drag the world economy into recession, the IMF did
nothing and could do nothing but indulging itself in
labelling the currencies of China and Maldives as a
‘fundamental misalignment’6. China holds the opinion
that the BWIs should offer more opportunities for
 developing countries to speak up and talk about 
what they would like to see from these institutions.




Traditionally, regional economic cooperation is weakly
developed in Asia. In the past decades, however, there
has been a proliferation of regional economic coopera-
tion initiatives across the region. Such initiatives are
the result of a combined response to the Asian finan-
cial crisis, slow progress in the WTO, and the fast
economic integration in Europe and other areas in 
the world.
China always prefers a multilateral approach to global
economic governance and considers the regional in-
itiatives sub-optimal in pursuing its international eco-
nomic policy. But its mindset changed dramatically
after the Asian financial crisis. Now it has become an
active participant, an influential facilitator and even
an advocate in some cases of regional economic co-
operation. China is not mainly seeking the benefit 
of trade creation from the regional free trade agree-
ments, nor does it think that regional monetary co-
operation can safeguard it from external speculation.
The underlying reasons behind China’s positive attitu-
des to regional cooperation are: it could ensure finan-
cial stability of the East Asian region; it could create a
good surrounding for China’s economic development;
it could help China to exert greater influence in ASE-
AN 10+3, and it could improve its bargaining power
with other economies.
The first ambitious proposal for regional cooperation
in Asia is the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC), which includes Asian countries as well as 
the United States, Australia and New Zealand. APEC
adopts an approach of ‘open regionalism’, which is
good for consensus building, but it fails to produce
anything significant in the area of trade liberalisation,
not to mention help in stabilising the Asian economy,
for instance when the Asian Financial Crisis struck.
 Despite these failures, China is still very positive about
APEC, because APEC is a forum providing leaders in 
the region with good opportunities to meet and become
 acquainted with each other. This window of opportunity
for leaders ‘to agree to disagree’ is precious7.
A rash of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) is now at
 various stages of negotiation involving different for-
mulations between China, Japan, Korea and ASEAN.
China is playing a leading role in these formulations.
ASEAN and China signed a ‘Framework Agreement 
on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation between
ASEAN and China’ in November 2002 in Phnom Penh,
Cambodia. The Agreement aims at establishing an
ASEAN-China FTA within ten years. These agreements
are beginning to bear fruit. Economic ties between
China and ASEAN have intensified, and this will fur -
ther strengthen China’s central role in the regional
production networks.
The political meaning of this agreement is more im-
portant for China: ASEAN countries used to view the
rise of China as a threat, but now they have changed
their attitudes dramatically. ASEAN countries think it
is beneficial to have China as a neighbour, because
China is providing a ready market for them. China’s
generosity contrasts sharply with Japan’s reluctance
to open its agricultural market. Japan changed its
 trade policy and started its negotiations with ASEAN
countries on an FTA, mainly because of the stimulus
from China. Further agreements between China and
Korea, China and India, Japan and ASEAN, Korea and
ASEAN are under negotiation or being studied.
In May 2000, the Financial Ministers of ASEAN coun-
tries plus China, Japan and Korea (ASEAN+3) met in
Chiang Mai, Thailand, and launched the Chiang Mai
Initiative (CMI) which involves an expanded ASEAN
swap arrangement and a network of bilateral swap
arrangements among the ASEAN+3. It is designed to
counter disruptive capital movements and exchange
rate instability. The development of the CMI has caught
much attention, not only because it is the first signi -
ficant regional financial arrangement in Asia, but also
because it can be a stepping-stone for full-fledged
 regional financial cooperation.
Following the CMI, new proposals emerged for regional
financial cooperation, such as the pooling of foreign
reserves8. But the CMI still has some inherent draw-
backs and without reform, it will not provide a mea-
ningful regional mechanism: the design of the CMI
was to provide liquidity support to member econo-
mies, when they are facing external disequilibrium.
Asian economies are now facing new external risks,
such as the global financial crisis, US dollar deprecia-
tion, US and international economic recession, and
the surge in oil prices. Without coordinated efforts
these risks can easily develop into financial crises. 
In order to solve these problems, the CMI needs to
be reformed and transferred from the ‘fire fighting’
mode of a liquidity provider to a more restrictive form
of regional arrangement. To be honest, China cannot
benefit a lot from the original design of the CMI.
 China is quite likely to become a creditor rather than
debtor in the region. But China still has the interest 
in enhancing the functioning of the CMI and using it
as a platform to explore the feasibility and desirability
of an efficient regional monetary arrangement capable
of addressing more important issues, such as  exchange
rate coordination.9
There is no doubt that China will play a crucial role in
the development of regional economic cooperation,
yet it is premature to predict that it will pursue the
leadership in Asia. Asian countries do not want to see
either China or Japan dominating this region; they
want to see a more stable regional environment grow
out of the balance of power. As for China, it is satis-
fied to see that its trade and investment ties with Asian
countries become closer, with or without the FTAs.
China also respects Japan’s leading role in promoting
regional financial cooperation.
Before the RMB becomes fully convertible, it is un -
likely for China to take the lead in regional financial
affairs. China may want to see more coordination on
exchange rate policy, given the pressure from other
countries urging the RMB to appreciate. But whether
a common move to appreciate the Asian currencies 
is good for China is unclear. China imports a lot from
Asian countries and if the neighbouring countries all
appreciate their currencies, import costs for China will
increase substantially. When Japan proposed the Asian
Monetary Fund (AMF) after the 1997 Asian financial
crisis, China rejected the proposal for fear of weake-
ning the authority of the IMF. Later on, China became
more and more enthusiastic about regional financial
cooperation. Now China welcomes the idea of an AMF,
but it also believes that there is still a long way to go
towards such an institutional arrangement. 
The past two decades witnessed a rapid increase in
de facto regional integration in Asia, although political
and institutional integration is still weak. Many obser-
vers think the slow progress of Asian regional arrange-
ments arises from tensions between China and  Japan,
but what is more important is the resistance from the
United States to any initiatives that would exclude or
erode its influence on regional affairs.  China is now
playing a vital role in promoting regional cooperation,
and it will continue to be a strong supporter of both
regional FTAs as well as financial cooperation. It is also
in China’s interest to establish new platforms for Asian
countries to work closely with each other and tackle
new challenges, such as energy security, environmen-
tal degradation and infectious diseases.
Regional Trade Cooperation
Intra-regional trade is booming in East Asia. An
 emerging regional production network has boosted 
a triangular trade flow among the advanced Asian
 economies, developing Asian countries and the rest 
of the world. China is becoming the hub of this cross-
border production sharing. After China entered the
WTO, it started negotiating RTAs with different other
Asian economies. Under the 2002 Framework Agree-
ment on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between
China and ASEAN, bilateral tariffs will be lowered to 0-5
per cent on most goods and non-tariff barriers will be
gradually dismantled. A key element in the 2002 ASE-
AN-China agreement is an Early Harvest Programme:
under this programme Chinese agricultural markets will
be opened for ASEAN countries ahead of the planned
establishment of the China-ASEAN FTA in 2010.
China has also signed two initial framework agree-
ments with Australia and New Zealand. These two
agreements tend to cover trade, investment, and the
wider economic relationship between China and these
two OECD countries. China and other emerging coun-
tries, including India and South Africa, have started
discussing possible bilateral trade agreements. There
are also bilateral activities with Chile, the Middle East
and Central Asia. Compared to the FTAs of the US
and the EU, which are quite comprehensive and pre-
cise, the bilateral agreements in which China is in -
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volved are rather vague, mainly focusing on trade in
goods and services, and often without a formal dispute
resolution. These features show that China is taking 
a pragmatic approach to promote boarder economic
relations with other countries.
In the future, China should help to bring about region-
wide integration in East Asia, for example, if possible,
China should approach the formation of a pan-East
Asia FTA. China’s influence in this region will be
 further strengthened by its deepening trade and in-
vestment ties with the other East Asian countries. 
As China’s income level grows, there will be a greater
Chinese appetite for services and final consumer
goods from other East Asian countries. The country
will also increase its demands for energy and other
resources and raw materials. It is in China’s interest
to broaden its integration with other East Asian eco-
nomies. Indeed, China would benefit greatly from the
formation of a region-wide free-trade grouping10.
Regional Financial Cooperation
The Asian financial crisis spotlighted the dangers of
external shocks from the international financial markets,
and Asian countries have moved quickly into regional
monetary cooperation. Asian countries resolved to
create institutions to avoid future crises. A network of
bilateral currency swaps was first established, and now
Asian economies are working closer together to find
ways of pooling their huge foreign exchange reserves.
It is quite ironic that Asian economies have to invest
most of their foreign exchange reserves in US dollar
assets. With the depreciation of the US dollar and the
deterioration resulting from the sub-prime crisis, Asian
economies have been placed in a kind of hostage posi-
tion. Developing an Asian bond market, in which Asians
own bonds issued by Asian countries, can break this
cycle of financial dependence. The  Asian Bond Fund 1
(ABF1) and Asian Bond Fund 2 (ABF2) have already
been launched. The sizes of ABF1 and ABF2 are quite
small compared to the US$ 2 trillion of foreign exchange
reserves owned by Asian economies. But hopefully
from the seeds of ABF1 and ABF2, the Asian-owned
Asian bond markets will grow rapidly.
China supports both the CMI and the Asian Bond Fund.
The country is also interested in establishing a regional
investment bank and promoting the building of infra-
structures which can link the more developed areas in
East Asia to less developed areas. International capital
flow is also one of the most important issues of econo-
mic security for China. Consequently, China has great
interest in collaborating with other countries and esta-
blishing a regional surveillance system.
Energy and Environmental Cooperation
Energy and environmental issues are further potential
areas where China is ready to collaborate with other
Asian countries. Asian countries, as a whole, are con-
sumers and importers of energy, and without coordi-
nation they are likely to pay the ‘Asia premium’ when
negotiating with oil exporters, and maybe even wor-
se, there will be new tensions among China and its
neighbouring countries. China is seeking new techno-
logies to improve its energy efficiency from developed
countries, especially from the EU and Japan. China is
also concerned about the safety of its international
shipping lanes11. In sum, China has shown great inte-
rest in cooperating with Asian neighbours on energy
issues. Many environmental problems already have
cross-border impacts, for example, the pollution of
Songhua River in November 2005 and the problem 
of acid rain which has already spread to Korea and
Japan. The extent of the problem and the need for 
a regional approach is widely recognised by Asian
countries. The Chinese government also realises the
grave challenges of environmental degradation and
pollution and is seeking ways to cooperate with other
countries.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was
primarily aimed at addressing security issues, but 
it has now moved to other issues such as energy
 projects. Border security was the initial motivation 
for the Shanghai Five Mechanism (S5), because the
former Soviet Union republics of Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan all share a com-
mon border with China. Border agreements between
China and the former Soviet Union states were
negotiated and signed after 1992. Agreements were
 signed for those sections where consensus could be
reached, while the solutions were left for further
 negotiation in the case of problematic sections. This
piecemeal approach to solving border problems was
very successful. The SCO then focused on regional
security issues: Terrorism, separatism and religious
extremism are the ‘three forces’ that the SCO coun-
tries are trying to fight together. Drugs, arms smugg-
ling and other transnational criminal activities are
also on the SCO agenda. Recently, the SCO has also
moved to economic issues with efforts to boost regio-
nal economic cooperation. Areas which have been
identified as the major fields of cooperation include:
energy, information, telecommunication, environmen-
tal protection and comprehensive utilisation of natural
resources.
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Trade between China and the Central Asian countries
developed rapidly. But infrastructures, such as roads
and railways are still a major bottleneck. Western
 observers, especially form the US, always interpret
the SCO as an organisation with an anti-American
stance. But this is not the case, at least from China’s
perspective. China has long given up fighting ‘impe-
rialism,’ and its interests are more focused on dome-
stic security concerns as well as regional economic
 integration.
The Reform Agenda from a Chinese Perspective
From China’s point of view, the existing Bretton
Woods Institutions, i.e. the IMF, the World Bank and
the WTO, should continue to play their roles in global
economic governance. There are no better alternati-
ves that are more representative and legitimate. It is
too costly and risky to try to invent new organisations
to replace them.
But like many developing countries, China also belie-
ves that the reform of the BWIs is necessary: the
WTO has failed to live up to the expectations of the
developing world. China never wants to weaken the
WTO, but it does insist that any new agreements in
the WTO must be negotiated more inclusively and
must deliver a more equitable outcome. China is
 willing to play a more active role in reviving the WTO
talks. China’s influence can be described as a bridge
between the developed and developing countries.
 Other large emerging economies may share the same
interests with China and should cooperate with each
other more closely. India and Brazil have many vete-
ran trade diplomats, and they are much more elo-
quent in trade negotiation. China’s participation and
its strong support for the interests of the developing
world can bolster this alliance.
China is disappointed to see that the IMF is in eclipse
as the pre-eminent institution of international eco -
nomic and financial stability. Reforms are needed to
 restore its central position. China believes that the US
should take more responsibility to ensure the stability
of exchange rates of major currencies. The United
States need to take into consideration the spill-over
effects of its macro-economic policy to other coun-
tries, especially the developing countries. The IMF
should give due attention to the potential risks in the
international financial markets and strengthen its role
in monitoring and even regulating the massive private
international capital flows. It should consider refor-
ming the distribution of voting power and the repre-
sentation on the Executive Board. The IMF should
also upgrade its research capacity and discard the
one-size-fit-all illusion to provide more relevant and
useful analysis and policy advice.
China hopes that the World Bank can play a more
 important role in world development. From China’s
own experience it knows that development cannot 
be transplanted from outside, therefore the country
ownership should be encouraged. China also believes
that the World Bank can do much better in facilitating
the provision of public goods at the global level.
From a Chinese perspective regional economic coope-
ration is welcome, but the country does not have the
ambition of challenging the multilateral institutions.
Neither does China want to take the leadership in
regional economic cooperation. If China becomes too
aggressive in taking the leadership in regional econo-
mic cooperation, neighbouring countries will become
quite suspicious and may turn to Japan or the US to
keep a power balance in this region. Its influence in
the region has largely relied on increasing economic
integration, in which China is becoming the hub of
 regional production networks.
China is already a full member of various formal multi-
lateral institutions. Its presence and influence in these
organisations will grow over time. China is also lear-
ning how to use a wider variety of platforms to pro-
mote globalisation. In the more informal groupings,
such as G8/G20, China can have a stronger impact in
the coming future. But there is also the problem of
‘duplication’: many institutions and initiatives overlap
with each other, and many international conferences
result in nothing more than cheap talks. Through the
learning-by-doing process, China will gradually beco-
me familiar with the different dynamics in these vario-
us groupings and adopt a somewhat  different strate-
gy in dealing with each of them.
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GLOBAL POLITICAL GOVERNANCE
The UN is unquestionably the single most important
international organisation for China. China recognises
the central role of the United Nations in safeguarding
global stability and peace, and builds its multilateral
diplomacy based on the United Nations as an anchor.
China’s embrace of the UN is not surprising. First,
China is a permanent member of the UN Security
Council, and this membership helps to promote its
positions in world politics. With its veto power, China
feels safe and comfortable. Second, China agrees
with the principles of equality and state sovereignty
which are enshrined in the UN Charter, and believes
the UN principles can constrain the ability of big
powers to impose their self interests on weaker
states. Third, within the UN, China can find more
friends who share its wishes and worries. China belie-
ves that multilateral diplomacy can enhance China’s
block support from the Third World in its bargaining
with the West.
However, it also needs to be pointed out that China
seems to maintain a rather passive and defensive
 posture in the UN. It has rarely used its veto power,
unless of course its own sovereignty is on the line.
China is reluctant to offend other countries and hence
does not want to take a position on controversial
 issues. When China finds itself in opposition to other
permanent members of the UNSC, it prefers to abstain
rather than veto.
This passive attitude is changing, however, with China
trying its best to cooperate with other members of
the Security Council. Take China’s participation in UN
peacekeeping operations, for example. China was
 reluctant in the past to support the use of coercive
measures to solve security and humanitarian pro-
blems. But in the 1980s it started to participate in
UN-led peacekeeping operations. By the end of 2006,
China had already become the largest contributor 
in troops among all five permanent members of the
UN Security Council. In 2006, China’s support for the
UNSC resolutions on imposing sanctions against North
Korea and Iran also indicated that China is changing
its perception on sovereignty and becoming more
aware of the need and value of coercive measures 
in global security governance. The world is changing,
and so too is China. When China has more self-
 confidence, both domestically and internationally, it
will become more active and cooperative in the UN.
In sum, China respects the authority of the UN, and
wishes to strengthen its authority heart and soul.
 China supports the UN reform, and wants to see an
authoritative, efficient and representative United
 Nations. As far as we know, however, China does not
have a concrete plan for UN reform. From ‘position
papers’ and statements of the Chinese government
we can see that China supports the reform of the UN,
but  always emphasises the importance of consensus
building. As for the reform of the Security Council, it is
important to enhance its effectiveness and efficiency.
But in general China believes that UN reform should
focus on urgent issues, such as development and
 poverty, rather than solely Security Council reform.
Informal Global Governance
China used to watch the G8 from a distance, but has
started to cooperate with it recently. China is willing
to strengthen its cooperation with the G8, mainly
 because it fully recognises its importance in shaping
global economic policies. China wants to further deve-
lop its dialogue with the G8. China’s leaders would
like to utilise the opportunities to meet with the
 leaders from the G8 and establish friendly, personal
 relationships with them. Chinese officials at different
levels are glad to have the chance of exchanging
views with their counterparts in the developed coun-
tries and forming a network for information sharing
and policy coordination. In this way all the partners
can have a better understanding of what is going on
elsewhere and react more quickly and efficiently to
changes in the world economy.
However, China does not covet membership of the
G8. G8 members are still debating whether to accept
China as a permanent member or not. Even if it were
to be invited, China sees no necessity to join the G8
at this moment. China does not want to be intrusive
to an exclusive club consisting of so-called ‘like-
Chinese UN soldiers on a peacekeeping mission.
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 minded people’. On the other hand, China does not
want to bear a responsibility that is not its to bear12.
Top political leaders nowadays do not lack opportuni-
ties to meet with each other at various international
events; the marginal benefit of different kinds of
summit meetings is diminishing. But we should further
enhance the informal networking among major policy
makers concerning macroeconomic issues. For exam-
ple, in the discussion on exchange-rate policies,
there should be a platform allowing a full participa -
tion of Senior Representatives (‘Deputies’) from the
US Treasury, the European Central Bank and the Euro
group of Finance Ministers, the Japanese Ministry of
Finance, and the People’s Bank of China. Given the
sensitivity and immediate market-relevance of these
consultations, this forum should be limited to the
main currency areas and involve only a sub-group 
of deputies of the G8. With the confidential, informal
consultation process, China and other major countries
can work out a better solution on exchange rate poli-
cy as well as other issues. Potentially this ‘G4’ format
on the single issue of exchange-rate policy coordinati-
on could be the forerunner of an informal G4, stee-
ring the world economy in the distant future in other
areas as well13.
China does not have this problem with the G20 on
 finance issues. Since 1999, China has actively parti -
cipated in all G20 meetings and has made its due
contributions to the development of the G20. For
 example, China successfully conducted its Presidency
of  Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of
the G20 in 2005. China has been and will be actively
 participating in the discussions of the G20, along with
 other major developing countries. The composition 
of the G20 lends itself well to forging consensus on 
a number of pressing and longer-term issues facing
the global economy: energy policy (with the largest
oil producers and consumers around the table); stra-
tegic reform of the IMF and the World Bank; reform
of the international financial system (with the largest
trade deficit country and surplus country around the
table); global warming and climate changes; regional
integration; migration policies, and so on.
However, China is also worried that the G20 may have
difficulties in living up to this expectation. The size of
20 countries seems too big to avoid the difficulty of
mobilising collective actions. The diversity of the G20,
which consists of both developed and developing coun-
tries, makes it easy to divide its opinions into two op-
posite camps. APEC’s failure to reach  significant agree-
ments is a good reference. China thinks it will be too
costly and undesirable to transform the G20 from a
loose forum to a permanent organisation with a secre-
tariat. Thus the function of the G20 would be to serve
as a supplement or complement to the G8 by making
the G8 hear the voice of developing countries. It is not
very realistic to expect the G20 to do more.
China is not a member of the G77, but it has maintai-
ned a very good relationship with it. China often pre-
sented jointly with the G77 common position papers
as well as announcements, airing opinions from the
vast number of developing countries and proposing
their own amendments. China is now becoming the
largest donor to the G77.
However, it is becoming more and more difficult for
China to assume leadership along the traditional
‘North-South’ division. China’s rise has raised both
hopes and fears in developing countries. China has
always supported developing countries’ struggle to
survive in the global economy, but many developing
countries have also felt the competition from Chinese
products. Some developing countries benefit from
their export of oil and raw materials to China, while
others share similar export destinations with China
and may have a more difficult time. The traditional
collective identity of the developing countries is ob -
solete, since developing countries are forced to form
separate coalitions during multilateral trade negotiati-
ons. For example, when negotiations on agriculture
began, Brazil and some other agricultural developing
countries formed the ‘Cairns group’ which also inclu-
ded some developed agricultural countries. This group
takes a pro-liberalisation position on agricultural issu-
es. Some food importing developing countries, such
as Egypt, Mexico, Peru and Jamaica, sided with the
EU to oppose the liberalisation of agriculture.
Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation
China has always been a strong supporter of multila-
teralism. On the one hand, China accepts the current
international order that reflects the political and eco-
nomic reality after the Second World War in the form
of the authority of the UN and the Bretton Wood In-
stitutions. On the other hand, China wishes to reform
the international order to better reflect the changes
on the stage of international politics and economy.
China’s bilateral relationships with major countries
are very crucial. The Sino-US relationship is always a
love-hate relationship. The Chinese economy and the
American economy complement each other, and there
is still great potential for further cooperation. For
 example, with China’s rapid growth and the gradual
opening of its financial sector, American banks and
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investment funds will find best opportunities in the
Chinese market. Chinese people also remain attached
to the liberal, democratic aspects of US characteri-
stics, as well as popular culture in the United States,
and they feel positively about Americans as indivi-
duals. However, Chinese people are very suspicious
of American foreign policy. China feels the US is
 trying to block its emergence as a rising power, pro-
pagating the ‘universal values’ as a way to reshape
China according to America’s own image. The bilateral
relationship changed greatly after September 11,
2001, when US attention shifted to the immediate
threat of terrorism. Different channels for dialogue
and coordination have been established in recent
 years. The semi-annual US-China strategic economic
dialogue is a good example, since it helps to facilitate
candid communication and prevents miscalculations.
The traditional attitude of the EU towards China was
one of ‘benevolent neglect’, but as China rises rapidly,
the China-EU economic relationship could potentially
be filled with more tension. Exports from European
countries, especially the more labour-intensive pro-
ducts from South European and East European econo-
mies, are facing more pressure from Chinese competi-
tion. Moreover, the EU labour markets are much less
flexible than those of the US, further increasing the
 likelihood of political pressure that trade liberalisation
with China may entail. China’s quest for more energy
and raw materials, including the use of strategic foreign
investment in some cases to secure access to such re-
sources, might put pressure on the EU which is equally
import-dependent on these raw materials. Meanwhile,
China’s rising economic strength could imply a dimi-
nished role for the EU in multilateral institutions and
informal groupings. Closer consultation and joint ac-
tions between China and the EU could help ease the
pain. It is in the interest of both China and the EU to
step up the dialogue process as early as possible14.
China and Japan normalised their diplomatic relations
thirty years ago, and these two countries downplayed
their differences in favour of mutually beneficial eco-
nomics and cooperation. However, the Sino-Japanese
relationship has witnessed ebbs and flows. During
Prime Minister Koizumi’s period in office, Sino-Japanese
diplomatic relations were at their worst since the
1970s. Recently this situation has been greatly im-
proved, although in the future friction may continue
to strain the balance between China and Japan. From
the 1990s, the rise in China’s power and influence in
Asian affairs coincided with a ‘lost decade’ of econo-
mic stagnation and weak political leadership in Japan.
Many Japanese view China’s rise as a threat to their
leading economic role in Asia. An increase in Japanese
nationalism and the generational change in Japanese
leadership also contributed to this sentiment. On the
other hand, China also harbours concerns about
 Japan’s impressive military capacities and has been
dissatisfied with Japan’s policy on historical and other
issues. Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine which
honours Japanese war criminals, and Japan’s increa-
sed support for Taiwan have also raised Chinese
 apprehensions. The foundations for an amiable rela -
tionship and closer cooperation between Japan and
China lie in economic exchange. China depends heavily
on Japan for technology and investment, and Japan is
becoming increasingly dependent on China as a huge
market, a source of imports and an offshore manu-
facturing base. The phrase ‘chilly politics and hot
 economics’ has now come to summarise current
 Japan-China relations, indicating that the differences
between these two countries will continue to collide
with the need to cooperate for common prosperity
and regional security.
Cooperation among Emerging Countries
There is an increasing recognition of the economic
and political importance of the emerging countries,
but it is still premature to predict any institutionalised
alliance among these countries.
Emerging countries share the same aspiration of in-
creasing their influence in the international political
and economic arena. They have the common interest
of developing mechanisms to better coordinate their
positions on related issues. As members of the deve-
loping world, they should closely consult with each
other on trade negotiations, reform of the international
financial architecture and other issues in the frame-
work of multilateral institutions. Outside the WTO, IMF
and UN, they should also strengthen their cooperati-
on. It should be noticed that, as a newcomer in the
international organisations, China still has a long way
to go in developing its capacity. China has been much
less strident in its criticism of the current international
order than Brazil, India and many other developing
countries. As other emerging countries have been en-
gaging in international negotiation for decades, there
is much to be learned from their experiences.
A political coalition among these emerging countries
is, however, unlikely at present. These countries are
quite different in their economic structure, cultural
background and political interests. China is an open
economy with increasing competitiveness on manu-
facture exports. It also has a huge appetite for the
import of energy, raw materials and agricultural pro-
ducts. India is a rising star in the IT sector, and its
115
service industry is developing very fast thanks to the
communications revolution and global outsourcing.
Brazil and Russia, on the other hand, gain a lot from
soaring energy and mineral prices. The renewed geo-
political clout of Russia is also bolstered by its military
power. China’s trade relations with all these emerging
countries are developing rapidly, but the terms of
 trade are now in favour of Russia and Brazil. With its
import costs increasing, China’s terms of trade are
continuously deteriorating. The alliance among these
emerging countries also faces a dilemma: their influ-
ence in the international arena relies on support from
the Third World, but if they form their own exclusive
club and a closer relationship with the developed
countries, their reputation among the poor countries
will be harmed.
Among these emerging countries, China and India 
are most likely to come closer. It is true that there
remain strategic tensions between these two coun-
tries. As rising powers in this region, they will conti-
nue to compete for influence on the periphery. They
will also choose other allies as a means of balancing
each other. India will probably move closer to the US
and  Japan, and China may continue its support to
 Pakistan. However, the imperative for concentrating
on development will drive India and China to look for
ways to develop a partnership for common progress
and cooperative security.
From the 1950s onwards, China has established a
very close relationship with African countries. During
the 1960s and 1970s, driven by perceived ideological,
anti-imperialist affinities, China invested significant
energies in support of independent Africa. China pro-
vided economic aid and dispatched Chinese medical
support teams. Throughout the 1990s, China increa-
sed its aid to African governments. China-South Afri-
ca relations have enjoyed rapid and healthy develop-
ment since diplomatic ties were established between
the two countries in 1998. The Taiwan issue was once
a stumbling block in the China-South Africa relations-
hip, because of President Mandela’s hope that South
Africa could maintain diplomatic relations with both
the PRC and Taiwan. This was not negotiable for
China. Now, with the rapid development of bilateral
trade, both countries have realised that Sino-South
African friendly cooperation has broad prospects for
development. Potential friction may come from the
competition between Chinese import goods and
South Africa’s domestic industry.
China’s most important relationship in the region is
with Brazil, with which China has cooperated closely
in international affairs. In 1994, China and Brazil
 termed their relationship as a ‘strategic partnership,’
a designation that reflects the aspiration to develop
the relationship in the future. In recent years, China
and Brazil have cooperated in numerous ventures in-
cluding satellite technology, energy and infrastructure
development, and aircraft manufacturing. China and
Mexico have also concluded strategic partnerships.
However, Sino-Mexican relations have also been sub-
ject to frictions in recent years. China is competing
with Mexico on the US markets, where China has
overtaken Mexico as the second largest source of US
imports. Unlike other Latin American countries, such
as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, which have found
channels for exporting agricultural and mineral pro-
ducts to China, Mexican exports in these categories
have been minimal. China is also penetrating Mexico’s
domestic market. China has been its second most im-
portant trading partner since 2003, and its trade sur-
plus with Mexico is growing steadily.
INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL ORDER
Sovereign Countries versus Civil Society
China believes that the international order is still
 based on the consensus of sovereign states. Multila-
teral institutions and agreements, bilateral treaties
and coordination between sovereign states are the
foundation for the international order. China is also
aware of the importance of civil society and social
movement in forming an international social order. 
As a matter of fact, the impressive influx of NGOs,
especially international NGOs into China, is to a great
extent the result of globalisation. China’s attitude to-
wards NGOs has fundamentally changed: The govern-
ment is now trying to promote civil society to meet
development and social needs. In the last two deca-
des, NGOs brought fresh air into China and made
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 impressive achievements on such issues as environ-
mental protection, legal assistance, poverty reducti-
on, HIV/Aids prevention, culture, education, health
care. But one fundamental weakness is the underde-
velopment of local grass-root NGOs. Many local NGOs
rely heavily on international assistance. This has
 hindered the growth and full blossom of indigenous
NGOs, and has also increased the suspicion of the
government towards international NGOs. In the future,
China’s involvement in international society will rely
more and more on the development of local NGOs.
China does not lack the seeds for social innovation
and social  entrepreneurs.
‘Washington Consensus’ versus ‘Beijing Consensus’
China regards the dominant view on globalisation as
the so called ‘Washington Consensus’. Although the
anti-globalisation campaign has been growing like a
raging fire in the rest of the world in recent years,
China seems quite apathetic to this movement. It is
fair to say that China does not totally disagree with
the ‘Washington Consensus’. China actually follows
quite a lot of suggestions similar to the components
of the ‘Washington Consensus’, for example, sound
macroeconomic policy, trade liberalisation and priva -
tisation. What China feels uncomfortable with is the
‘pride and prejudice’ of the United States behind the
masks of the Washington institutions.
Quite interestingly, an American journalist, Joshua
Roma, coined the eye-catching concept ‘Beijing Con-
sensus’ which emphasises China’s innovation capaci-
ty.15 Chinese officials may feel good and flattered, but
it is quite doubtful that there exists such a clear vision
of the ‘Beijing Consensus’ in the mind of Chinese policy
makers. The success of China’s reform, according to
the most popular view among Chinese officials and
scholars, relies on the gradual approach of ‘crossing
the river by touching the stone’. Anyway, China’s
 explosive growth challenges many widely accepted
tenets of policy analysis. Private ownership, democra-
cy and the rule of law, which are seen by new classi-
cal economists as necessities in economic development,
were notably absent, at least at the earliest stage of
China’s reform. China is just like a student who never
does his homework, but always outperforms his class-
mates in examinations. Based on its own experience,
China always wants to emphasise the ‘developmental
dimension’ of international policies. Economic growth
is the best way to reduce  poverty, and probably even
a short cut to cultivating democracy.
Domestic Challenges and the Role of the
 International Community
Without a blueprint or well-designed plan, China has
been muddling its way through all the unpredictable
and complex situations and has achieved remarkable
success. However, the ‘crossing the river by touching
the stone’-approach cannot guarantee that China will
be able to sustain its vigour. Without a comprehensi-
ve and forward-looking plan, China’s economy may
become stuck in the mud and lose its momentum.
The good news is, that there is a surprising consen-
sus across different levels of government and also
across society on the need for reform. The central
 government must tap these sentiments to work out 
a comprehensive set of changes. The public finance
system, financial sector reform, and social program-
mes like education and public health should be the
priorities of this new agenda for reform. The package
of reforms will be complex, difficult and protracted. 
What should the international community do to foster
the next generation of reforms in China? In the 1980s,
international organisations like the World Bank were
very active and influential in China. Their influence
 faded, unfortunately. This is partly because of the
 learning curve, since Chinese officials and experts now
know much more than before. But it is also because
the international community’s failure to propose policy
suggestions attractive to the Chinese government.
Such kinds of proposals should take China’s compli -
cated political, economic and social situation into con-
sideration. Outsiders’ policy suggestions have often
been viewed as naive or unrealistic, because they 
did not include those domestic factors.  International
communities can do better by targeting manageable
objectives and providing user-friendly analyses. They
can also do better by providing international experi-
ence, including examples of both successes and failu-
res. One good example is worth a thousand theories.
This is especially true for most Chinese politicians,
because they are trained as engineers; they are very
practical and favour examples above abstract theories.
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
In the medium term, the most important goal for the
Chinese government is to maintain robust economic
growth. There is no indication that China is interested
in altering the current international political and eco-
nomic orders.
China has been the fastest growing economy in the
world for almost three decades, and is very likely to
continue to grow in the coming future. But China is
still plagued by a host of domestic problems which, if
not handled properly, may pose huge risks to China’s
long-term development. A well-rehearsed list of these
problems include, among others, issues such as the
imbalance of macro economy (excessively high saving
and low consumption, inefficient investment), a wide-
ned gap between the coastal and inland area, the
uneven distribution of wealth, rampant corruption,
 insufficient public spending on education and health
care, environmental deterioration. How to manage
these challenges is a leading priority on the Chinese
government’s agenda, while China’s international
 presence is of secondary consideration. The Chinese
government fully realises, that as long as it can main-
tain vigorous growth and secure social stability and
national integrity, it will get the political support of
the Chinese people and increase its legitimacy.
In the foreseeable future, China’s international profile
will be still very much a low-key one, not least becau-
se of the current diplomacy strategy which was laid
down by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s: China still
adheres to Deng’s guideline of ‘not taking the lead in
international affairs’. But we believe that China should
play a more active role in the affairs of regional and
international economies. The global economy faces
various risks that require determined and joint actions
from the major economic powers: the resolution of
the global imbalances; greater exchange-rate flexibi -
lity in East Asia; joint responses to rising oil prices;
reviving trade negotiation and preventing trade
 protectionism, etc. In these and other policy areas,
China’s active participation is essential to help bring
about a meaningful and successful outcome.
The emergence of China as an economic power has
important implications for energy use and environ-
mental outcomes, not only in China but also at the
regional and global level. China is currently the world’s
third largest energy producer and the second largest
energy consumer. In the near term, it is unlikely that
China’s energy supply will rise as rapidly as its energy
demand, and therefore China’s energy imports are
 likely to continue to rise. With world energy prices
reaching record levels, China’s import costs will in-
crease substantially and energy security will become
an important factor shaping China’s development as
well as its diplomatic and military strategies.
China will continue to rely on fossil fuels (particularly
coal) as the primary source of energy for many deca-
des into the future, the environmental impact of which
is a concern to China as well as regionally and global-
ly. China accounts for 13 per cent of global emissions
of carbon dioxide. In addition, the emission of black
carbon is estimated to be responsible for local climate
problems in China, such as increased drought in nor -
thern China and summer floods in southern China.
In sum, China is willing to participate constructively
in international affairs, but whether or not it can fulfil
its commitment is directly dependant on its state
 capacity. This state capacity relies on the evolution 
of China’s political and economic institutions and how
successful the Chinese political leaders can carry out
the next generation of reforms. The international
community needs the constructive and active engage-
ment of China. In an era of increasing integration of
the world economy, what is good for China is also
good for the world.
Chinese Assessment of the Globalisation Process
China is rising in the age of globalisation. Globalisa -
tion provides huge opportunities for the Chinese eco-
nomy to take off in a short period of time. This suc-
cessful experience is encouraging the Chinese govern-
ment to embrace interdependence and globalisation
with increasing enthusiasm. But globalisation also
 introduces new sources of economic vulnerability. 
The Asian financial crisis is a clear manifestation of
this, and it reminds China to take a sober attitude
 towards globalisation. Chinese political elites now
 recognise globalisation as a double-edged sword.
The benefits of China’s growing participation in the
global economy are undeniable. The potential risks
include: heavy dependency on international trade;
trade protectionism against Chinese products; unre-
gulated international capital flows (China was pertur-
bed by the capital outflow after the Asian financial
crisis and the hot money inflow in recent years). 
The growth of non-traditional threats, such as terro-
rism and the spread of infectious diseases, also pre-
sent serious threats to China’s security16.
Traditionally China is a strong defender of sovereignty
and very sensitive to foreign interference. Now it rea-
lises that more and more decisions that traditionally
fall within the sovereignty of one state must be sub-
jected to the authority of international organisations.
China is ready to surrender some proportion of sover-
eignty in exchange for world peace and prosperity as
well as its own long term interests.
China is now a full member of the international com-
munity. It does not have a ‘grand strategy’ to pursue
big power politics by flexing its military muscles. Rat-
her it tries to promote trade and investment with other
countries and increase its presence through social, cul-
tural and educational exchanges. China’s spread of its
soft power is underpinned by its burgeoning commer -
cial ties. Being willing to talk about and share the
 lessons of its own experience will help to promote
 successful development in other countries, and hence
increase China’s influence in the international arena.
VALUE SYSTEM
Many believe that globalisation will be associated with
the destruction of cultural identities. This is why Chi-
na is extremely alert to ‘western cultural imperialism’.
This position is quite understandable considering China’s
history in the 19th century which was full of foreign
invasions and national humiliation. The Chinese govern -
ment responds to the emergence of global culture
with different strategies. The authorities and the offi-
cial media welcome the western-style management
system and corporate culture, tolerate popular culture
and westernised consumer culture, but remain quite
suspicious about ‘Western values’, such as democra-
cy, human rights and religion. This is reflected in the
government’s imposition of censorship, not only on
newspapers but also on the Internet.
China does not want to become victim to the accele-
rating encroachment of a homogenised and westerni-
sed culture, and hopes there will be dialogues among
cultures and civilisations. China feels extremely un -
Beijing living an enormous boom in construction industries.
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easy with the idea of a ‘clash of civilisations’ and wis-
hes the world to become increasingly pluralistic and
polytheistic. If there is a basic canon of global values
or ethics, it should be nothing but ‘respect others’.
A warring phenomenon is that China’s image of itself
and other nations’ views of it are out of alignment17.
This imbalance makes it difficult for China to build
the store of international trust that is essential for
 reducing the costs of the next, complicated phases 
of reform. Chinese authorities became accustomed to
the old-style ‘broadcast’ propaganda campaigns that
do not work anymore. The high expectations on the
2008 Olympics to remake the nation’s image were a
similar miscalculation. Now the Chinese government
is trying to promote a new idea of foreign policy,
 based on Confucian wisdom to forge a ‘harmonious
world’18. Actually, this harmonious world vision is quite
similar to Europe’s civil power tradition. But more
innovation and efforts should be made to properly
convey the traditional Chinese values to the outside
world.
Confucius states that the ultimate pursuit of a states-
man or intellectual is to bring stable peace and lasting
prosperity to the world. Chinese are taught to live in
harmony with people and nature. There is nothing in
the deep roots of society that will lead China to be -
come a nation of violence and invasiveness. An inter-
esting phenomenon is that religions like Islam and
Christianity with their deep belief in one god led to
many conflicts and slaughters in Europe and the
Middle East, but they were brought to China quite
peacefully. The Chinese view of the international order
emphasises ‘win-win’ solutions through cooperation,
as opposed to a ‘zero-sum’ game resulting from com-
petition; the coexistence of the strong and weak, as
opposed to a brutal social Darwinistic struggle for the
survival of the fittest.
Here is our favourite story: two thousand and five
hundred years ago, the great Chinese sage Mencius
was once asked by a prince how neighbouring king-
doms should deal with each other. Mencius said, ‘It
requires a benevolent prince to be able, with a large
kingdom, to accommodate a small one; and it requi-
res a wise prince to be able, with a small kingdom, 
to accommodate a large one. He, who with a large
kingdom accommodates a small one, is grateful of
the mandate of Heaven. He, who with a small king-
dom accommodates a large one, is vigilant about the
mandate of Heaven. He who is grateful of the mandate
of Heaven will protect the whole world. He who is
 vigilant about the mandate of Heaven will keep his
own kingdom.19
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